

THE
AMERICAN THEOLOGICAL REVIEW.

No. V.

FEBRUARY, 1860.

ART. I.—THE LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS THOUGHT.

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The Limits of Religious Thought examined in Eight Lectures delivered before the University of Oxford, in 1858, on the Bampton Foundation. By HENRY LONGUEVILLE MANSEL, B.D., Reader in Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy at Magdalen College, Tutor and late Fellow of St. John's College. First American from the third London edition. With the notes translated. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1859. Pp. 364.

SINCE the Bampton Lectures of 1832, by Dr. Hampden, appointed Bishop of Hereford in 1848, no course has aroused so much discussion as this of Mr. Mansel. The controversy in the two cases sprung from very different causes. Dr. Hampden read on the Scholastic Philosophy considered in Relation to Christian Theology, opposing what Mr. Mansel would call theological dogmatism; and called out in opposition the staunchest defenders of orthodoxy. Mr. Mansel's aim is to set forth the limits not only of religious, but of all thought in respect to the ultimate problems of theological and philosophical speculation; and he has been opposed chiefly by the rationalists. The

Bishop of Hereford was censured by the same class that find an ally in the Reader at Magdalen College.

For the particular task which he undertook—that of repelling the arrogance of the advocates of the absolute philosophy, Mr. Mansel has some excellent qualifications. His *Prolegomena Logica* showed him to be an exact student of the formal logic; his lectures on Kant and his article on Metaphysics indicated familiarity with the higher themes of speculation; and these Bampton Lectures are illustrated throughout by the fruits of much reading among the French and German as well as the English philosophers. The value of the American edition to the general reader is increased by the careful translation of the notes by Prof. T. L. Lincoln, of Brown University.

Another circumstance added to the almost eager curiosity with which these Lectures were welcomed. They were heralded as containing the application of the system of the late Sir William Hamilton, of Edinburgh, to the highest subjects of human thought. That philosophy, it was said, having beat back the proud waves of the Teutonic speculation, having exposed the delusion of a Philosophy of the Absolute, by showing that of that Absolute we cannot form any positive conception whatever, was now to be brought into the form of a Philosophy of Religion, and, as such, to deprive the rationalist of all power by taking his weapons out of his hands. His own arguments against revelation were to be turned against himself. "No difficulty," says Sir William, in a motto prefixed to these Lectures, "emerges in theology which has not previously emerged in philosophy." For philosophy, it is claimed, philosophy itself teaches us that the rational knowledge of what is infinite and absolute is but a nescience, an impotence, a negation; and, consequently—this is the inference, enforces the lesson of that humility which is the beginning of all true wisdom. And thus the mind is duly prepared to receive the positive evidence for the Christian revelation. What Bishop Butler accomplished in respect to the deism of the eighteenth century is here achieved in respect to the pantheism or rationalism of the nineteenth century; if not refuted, it is brought

to silence. The Bishop of Durham showed that there were no greater difficulties in the sphere of religious truth than are found in the constitution and course of nature; that in this respect there is an analogy between the two. His Analogy is an expansion of the sagacious observation of Origen, "that he who believes the Scriptures to have proceeded from Him who is the Author of Nature may well expect to find the same sort of difficulties in it as are found in the constitution of Nature." In the same way, it is argued, may it be shown that there are no more and no greater difficulties about the substantive truths of revelation than there are attending the ultimate verities of reason itself; and hence, on account of such difficulties, no rationalist can rationally quarrel with the Christian faith.

Establishing these points, the Scottish philosophy, in contrast with the presumptuous systems of the Continent, will have earned, better than any monarch, the title of *Defensor Fidei*. In its earliest expounders, and even in some of its later advocates, having taken an attitude of comparative indifference to the peculiar and positive doctrines of Christianity; now in its latest development and sharpest statement it is to become their shield and bulwark; or, if not that, it is to keep the enemy fully employed in defending himself, leaving Christianity the mean while to go on and do its work unhindered.

And there is much in the plan, the method, and the spirit of Mr. Mansel's book which we thoroughly like and approve. His spirit is reverent. He is himself an example of the union of the humility of faith with the keenness and subtlety of the philosophic intellect. The praise of fairness and candor deservedly belongs to him. There is nothing in his Lectures of the bitterness of the polemic or of the bigotry of the dogmatist. The state of the question, on which so much depends, is usually put sharply and cautiously. From beginning to end he marches with a sure step in a definite and conscious order; nor does he falter in his argument or shrink from any conclusion it seems to impose upon him; and as far as his main object is concerned, viz., the proof of the position, that there are no greater difficulties in the sphere of theology than in that of philosophy, and that the difficulties of the two on the most

important points are really identical, his work is successful. This thesis is well maintained. On another point, too, he is no less to be commended, though it comes up somewhat more incidentally. His position involves the inference that the pretension of the absolute philosophy, or rationalism, or pantheism—call it as you please, to be able to develop all truth out of its own principles or assumptions, so as to supersede the necessity of a revelation, is nugatory and impossible. The knowledge of the Infinite or Absolute in such a way, or in such a sense, as to imply the possibility of an *à priori* deduction of all truth, even of all necessary or needed truth, from its sole postulates is, in fact, one of the grandest hallucinations that ever possessed the mind of man. The feat is accomplished, in any alleged instances of such construction, only by slipping in the phenomena of experience, the *à posteriori* data, in a most undemonstrative method into the crises or joints of the alleged developing process. This is fully exemplified in almost all the German systems; in Schelling's Philosophy of Nature and in Hegel's Logic in the most conspicuous manner.

But Mr. Mansel's book, if we understand its import and purport, claims to do something more than all this, though this would seem to be enough for any ordinary course of eight Bampton Lectures. And it is in this work of supererogation,—for such it seems to us to be in view of the real exigencies of the argument, that the chief defect of this able volume is to be found. This additional point too has called forth some of the strongest encomiums of these discussions both in England and our own country. For it is this which forms one of the specialities of the philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, and which is considered by many as his best and lasting contribution to metaphysical science. It consists in the position that our ideas of the Infinite and Absolute are merely negative; that all there is about them is an effort of the mind to conceive something which it cannot possibly conceive; that the attempt to conceive these ideas as positive brings us out into an endless series of antinomies and contradictions. And, closely connected with this, is the further dogma, supposed to be consistent with it, that the human mind, placed thus between two opposite and

contradictory positions as to the highest and most vital subjects of philosophical and theological investigation, is still compelled by a belief, which is blind but sure, to assent to one of these contradictories and there rest. Belief comes in and takes the place of knowledge; we believe what we can neither know nor conceive. And so the haven of philosophy and religion is the same, and on this basis reason and faith can be adjusted; all is resolved into blind belief.

These positions make the pith of Mr. Mansel's argument; they constitute its underlying postulates. They do not constitute its force; they lead, we think, to conclusions which rob it of its vitality and validity. But before considering them more particularly, it will be needful to give a fuller outline of the general course of the argument.

The First Lecture discusses and rejects both Dogmatism and Rationalism as methods of religious philosophy. They are viewed respectively as adding to or diminishing what is contained in revelation; "dogmatism forcing reason into an agreement with revelation, and rationalism forcing revelation into an agreement with reason." The German Wolf and his followers may stand as representatives of the former, and Kant and his school of the latter. The dogmatist, for example, not content with receiving the truths of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Atonement, on the basis of revelation, strives to find some *à priori* and necessary ground or demonstration for them. The rationalist assumes the dicta of reason or conscience as the test of revelation, accepting only so much of it as agrees with these dicta, and of course must, if consistent, end in the denial of any need whatever of a revelation. Both of these methods are false, and yet in both there is an element of truth: "the province of Reason and Faith, the limits of our knowledge and of our ignorance must both be clearly determined; otherwise, we may find ourselves dogmatically protesting against dogmatism and reasoning to prove the worthlessness of reason," (p. 61.) We need then to find some common ground from which we may start. That is announced by Mansel in the position that "*the proper object of criticism is not Religion, natural or revealed, but the human mind in its rela-*

tion to Religion." For thus we may find "the limits of our faculties and the conditions of their legitimate exercise." That is, the real inquiry is as to the Limits of Religious Thought, and this is to be answered by investigating the faculties of thought. And such an investigation, says the author, will show "that the limits of religious and philosophical thought are the same," and if so, "the chief foundation of religious rationalism is cut from under it."

Those curious in such matters will at once notice, that Mr. Mansel proposes to pursue the same method of inquiry which Locke propounded in the beginning of his Essay on the Human Understanding, and which Kant set forth at the outset of his Criticism of Pure Reason. It is an examination of the powers of knowledge, in distinction from the objects of knowledge. Knowing the faculties and their scope, it is alleged that we have the means of determining what the faculties can accomplish, what objects come within their compass. But, beginning in this way, Locke and Kant came to entirely different conclusions. The former proved that we could know only sense and its modifications; while the later, pursuing the same method of investigation, came to the result that we have universal and necessary truths not directly given by sense or its modifications. This shows that a preconceived theory determined the investigation in both cases. And so it is with Mr. Mansel. His statements about our powers of knowing are all made in view of his hypothesis, that we cannot have a conception of what is Infinite and Absolute. Besides, it may well be doubted whether there is not an essential fallacy involved in the method itself. How can we determine what a given faculty can or cannot do, in any other way than by an inspection of its doings? And how can we know its doings in any other way, than by viewing it in connection with the objects about which it is employed? Can any *à priori* examination of perception tell us what we can perceive? If I want to know whether I can know any truth, how can I find that out in any other way than by looking at the truth itself, and asking myself, do I know it or not? If I want to know whether I have any idea of an infinite being, how can I know that,

excepting in and through the idea itself? A knowledge of the faculty apart and separate from its objects, is the knowledge of a mere abstract activity, and no activity can be truly known except in its ends or objects. But waiving this point for the present, we will follow the course of the argument a step further.

The Second Lecture is intended to prove the position that a Rational Theology is a chimera. The author here examines some of the attempts to get at a philosophy of religion on the objective or metaphysical side, as preparatory to the exposition, in the Third Lecture, of the psychological method. Any such objective knowledge of God, he says, is impossible, because the ideas by which alone we can define or describe what God is, lead to absolute contradictions. Because they lead to such, they are no objects of knowledge at all; in respect to knowledge they are negations; all that we mean when we allege that we have a knowledge of them, is that we try to think them and cannot. The thought we have of them is simply a baffling of thought. The chief of these ideas are the Infinite, the Absolute, and the First Cause. It is of these that we can form no conception whatever. While saying this, Mr. Mansel also holds, that these are the very ideas by which God in his essential being is and must be defined or described. All the main ideas, in short, by which we are wont to describe the Divine being or nature, as distinguished from what is finite, are utterly inconceivable, and involve us in point-blank contradictions as soon as we attempt to bring them into the range of conscious thought. And not only is this the case when we take these ideas singly, but also when we view them in their mutual relations; "the conception of an eternal causation is incompatible with the Absolute;" "the Absolute cannot be conceived as a necessary and unconscious cause, nor as a voluntary and conscious cause, nor as possessing consciousness at all, nor as containing in itself any kind of relation, nor as one and simple out of all relation." In short, "the fundamental conceptions of Rational Theology are self-destructive." The sum of his argument here is given as follows: "The conception of the Absolute and Infinite, from whatever side we view it,

appears encompassed with contradictions. There is a contradiction in supposing such an object to exist, whether alone or in conjunction with others, and there is a contradiction in supposing it not to exist. There is a contradiction in conceiving it as one, and there is a contradiction in conceiving it as many. There is a contradiction in conceiving it as personal, and there is a contradiction in conceiving it as impersonal. It cannot, without contradiction, be represented as active, nor, without equal contradiction, be represented as inactive. It cannot be conceived as the sum of all existence, nor yet can it be conceived as part only of that sum."

If all this be so and be true, what follows? It follows, (1) That we cannot have any rational theology; in forming theology we must renounce reason. We have no rational ideas out of which theology can be formed. We have only negative quantities to work with. That is, as far as reason is concerned, we do and must say that we abandon the field to the pantheist or atheist. What, then, about natural theology? What, then, about theism, on philosophical grounds, as opposed to pantheism and atheism? Mr. Mansel capitulates to the pantheist, as far as *reason* is concerned. He says expressly, that if we have any idea of the absolute and infinite, it is, and it must be, that of the pantheist. He says definitely, that the only idea of the infinite and absolute which we can have, is one that authorizes all the pantheistic inferences. He concedes to the pantheist, that personality, and the real existence of the finite and the relative cannot, on grounds of reason, be reconciled with the ideas of an Infinite and Absolute Being. This is what all the pantheists have been saying; and Mr. Mansel says that they are right in saying so, on rational grounds.

In short, as far as the philosophical question between the theist and pantheist is concerned, this work, coming from a theist and a believer, capitulates to the pantheist and the unbeliever. It says that, starting from reason alone, and inquiring for that system which will solve the problem of the universe, in that relation, on this ground, the pantheist has all the advantage. We are aware that it also brings objections to pantheism; but these objections are of no weight after he has

granted all that Hegel himself would or could ask as to the idea of the Absolute and Infinite—"if we have any."

But (2) this Lecture says, that the conclusion to be drawn is not that the pantheist is right, but that neither he nor the theist has any idea of the Infinite and Absolute at all. But of what avail is this, as against the pantheist: he accepts the concessions and denies the inference; and, with the concessions, we do not see how the inference can be forced upon him. Besides—wherein consists the logic of the inference? In attempting to carry out an idea, to apply it in the sphere of relations, I find that it involves me in contradictions: What then? Does that prove that I have not the idea? No; it only, at the utmost, proves that I cannot develope it in consistency and harmony with other ideas. It may prove, we think it does prove, that by *à priori* reasoning upon or from the Absolute and Infinite, human reason cannot develope the relative and finite; but it does not prove that the ideas of the Infinite and Absolute are null in the eye of reason. Whether these ideas be or be not merely negative, we do not now discuss; we simply say, that the fact that we cannot interpret them in relation to each other and in relation to the finite, does not prove them to be no ideas at all.

Another (3) inference would seem to follow from Mr. Mansell's position, viz., universal skepticism, as far as reason goes, in respect to the validity of our highest rational ideas. If they all lead us into absolute contradiction, what is this but the very essence of skepticism? Our author seems to feel that some persons might make this inference, and says, (p. 85 :) "No conclusion can be drawn from it in favor of universal skepticism; first, because universal skepticism equally destroys itself; and, secondly, because the contradictions thus detected belong not to the use of reason in general, but only to its exercise on one particular object of thought." This is all he has to say about it. As to the "first" reply, it is simply confirmatory; it makes out the most thorough-going skepticism. Having granted the rational validity of skepticism as to the highest ideas, what if skepticism does logically destroy itself; it does no more with itself than you have granted may be done with

the highest objects of belief. And then, as to the "secondly," that the "contradictions belong not to the use of reason in general, but only to its exercise on one particular object of thought;" if that object of thought be the highest and best, if it be that which alone is truly substantial and needful, and if reason utterly fails you there, and lands you in entire skepticism; can it be of much worth elsewhere? For all other subjects run back into these: the finite to the Infinite, the relative to the Absolute, the world to God. If you give up reason altogether as to the essentials, it is poor comfort to know that you may still use it about the accidents, which hang upon these essentials for their very life and being.

Kant's Criticism of the Pure Reason has been most objected to, on the ground that it denied that reason could prove the valid being of its highest ideas. Our author goes beyond Kant, not merely denying the objective reality, but affirming the inherent self-contradiction of these ideas. And this is the philosophy which some say is to save us from rationalism!

But we are not through with these inferences. Mr. Mansel claims, (4) that the proper inference from these inextricable contradictions is not skepticism, but belief. Reason being proved impotent—we must believe! This may be very well for those who do believe already; but how will it work in the case of those who do not? How can we convince such of the necessity and reasonableness of belief, when reason gives a negative response on the same points which faith affirms? Reason may doubtless teach us to believe in what we do not understand; but how can it teach us to believe in what to the understanding is a mere inconceivability; in what is "not an object of thought or consciousness at all, but the mere absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible," as our author, in another place (p. 110) says that the Infinite and the Absolute are.

That we do not misapprehend the writer on this point is evident from his statement, in the introduction to the Third Lecture. After having shown that these metaphysical ideas involve contradictions, and are only the negation of thought, he says: "The result" of this examination is, that "we are com-

pelled by the constitution of our minds to believe in the existence of an Absolute and Infinite Being—a belief which appears forced upon us as the complement of our consciousness of the relative and finite.” The underlying philosophy of this leap from negation to faith, is expressed in a proposition of Sir William Hamilton, cited in the notes to these Lectures: “Thought is possible only in the conditioned interval between two unconditioned contradictory extremes or poles, *each of which is altogether inconceivable, but of which, on the principle of excluded middle, the one or the other is necessarily true.*” What Mansel applies to religious truths, Sir William affirms universally. The amount of the matter, as here applied, is this; the Absolute, the Infinite, the First Cause, when we try to think them, lead into absolute contradictions; but we cannot stay there; between the two equally inconceivable opposites, we must choose. How can we tell which to choose? The answer is, by *belief*. And notice here, we are called upon to believe, not in a mystery, not merely in what may be above reason, not in something revealed on the basis of adequate testimony; but we are called upon to believe in what is utterly inconceivable, in what is contradictory to something else, which, in the eye of reason, is of equal validity; in what to reason is merely a negation. And this, too, not upon some minor and relative points, but upon the fundamental ideas of all philosophy and of all religion. Belief, it is said, here affirms certain truths to be positive and necessary, which reason, at the same time, affirms to be merely negative. If this does not make a dualism—what does?

And still further, what is this faith, or belief, which is thus brought in at the decisive instant? Whereabouts, in the classification of the powers of the mind, does it belong? To the intellect? Manifestly not; for if it did, then it would be an act of knowledge, or of reason, and it would involve a too glaring absurdity to say, that the intellect at the same time affirms these ideas to be both positive and negative. But if it does not belong to the intellect, then it must be an instinct or a feeling, for it certainly is not an act of the will. And so we have an instinct or feeling of the positive existence of the

Absolute and Infinite. And this is mysticism in its most vicious form. It is not half so good as the intellectual intuition of Schelling, with which it has a close alliance.

One point more, however, remains to be pressed about this taking all our ideas of the Infinite and Absolute from the sphere of reason, and assigning them over to the guardianship of a blind belief. The position that we can believe that to be positive which reason declares to be negative cannot be thought out. I believe that the Infinite and Absolute are positive; I know the Infinite and Absolute only as negatives. Who has such a double consciousness? If I believe that the Infinite is, I must know that the Infinite is. The question is not, if I can clearly conceive *how* they are; for that we grant we cannot do. But the question is, can I *believe that* they are, without *knowing that* they are, or while knowing that the terms express merely negative ideas? What a curious position a philosopher has got into, when he says: "I believe that there is an Absolute Being, while at the same time I have no conception, or only a negative one of this Absolute Being." What possible advantage is gained, by taking what is positive in our ideas of God, out of the sphere of reason, and bringing it into the sphere of faith? That grand act of the soul by which we recognize the Infinite—what warrant have we for saying that it is not an act of reason? Is not reason the seat or organ of ideas? And are not the Infinite, and Absolute, and First Cause, true ideas of the intelligence? If not, what are they? If they are, does not reason know the Infinite and Absolute as real? And if it does, does it not also know—that they are *not* negative?

In the Third Lecture, Mr. Mansel approaches these ideas from the subjective or psychological side. His object here is to show, from an examination of *consciousness*, that we cannot form any positive conception of the Infinite and Absolute. And this he supposes to be a more thorough-going method than the metaphysical or objective scrutiny of these ideas. If it can be made to appear, that such is the structure of the human intelligence that it can only know the finite and relative; of course, all our supposed knowledge of the unlimited and un-

conditioned must be a mere delusion. We have already remarked upon the inherent fallacy involved in the very attempt. If any body comes to an examination of the powers of the mind, with a preconceived theory, that there are certain things the mind cannot know, he will be very likely to define the powers in such a way as to support his theoretical postulate. But not to press this point, let us see how the criticism is conducted. Our lecturer lays down four conditions of all consciousness; and, from these necessary conditions of all consciousness, makes his inference, that our ideas of the Infinite, etc., must be only negative. The first of these conditions is, that consciousness necessarily implies a distinction between one object and another; the second, that it involves a relation between subject and object; the third condition is that of succession and duration in time; the fourth condition is personality, which is "a limitation and relation, and hence inadequate to represent the Infinite." How this last condition came to be brought in here, parallel with the others, we are unable to conceive. He surely does not mean to say that, because we are persons, we cannot conceive of any thing which is not personal. The only sense of personality, as a condition of consciousness, is, that we who are conscious are persons. This is doubtless a fact about our consciousness, about all consciousness—that only persons are conscious. But how does it follow from this, that their consciousness is limited objectively to a knowledge of personality? The author here argues thus, "personality is *essentially a limitation and a relation*," and hence, "to speak of an Absolute and Infinite Person is simply to use language, to which, however true it may be in a super-human sense, no mode of human thought can possibly attach itself;" and yet he adds, that we are therefore not justified on philosophical grounds "in denying the Personality of God." Why not? Because, he would say, "we babble about nothing under the name of the Infinite." Very well: suppose we do; if the Infinite be really and merely a negation, why may we not talk about an Infinite Person? But if we cannot, and he says we cannot, then he really grants that the Infinite is something more than he has all along been saying that it is.

Besides, he here again gives up fairly and squarely the ground to the pantheist. If personality be necessarily finite, there cannot be an Infinite Person; there cannot be a self-conscious deity. This, he says, is what an analysis of consciousness gives as its result; and yet, he also says, we must believe that God is both Infinite and personal. He allows above that in a "superhuman sense," we may talk about "an Infinite and Absolute Person." Belief, then, it would seem, takes in a "superhuman sense," language to which, in a human sense we can attach no idea at all.

The other three conditions of consciousness, have a more direct bearing upon his argument. What that argument amounts to is this: because consciousness implies a distinction of one object from another, because it involves a relation of subject and object, and because it is limited by time, in succession and duration—therefore, we cannot have any positive idea of the Infinite and Absolute. The Infinite and Absolute cease to be such, when viewed in the light of distinctions, or of relations, or as existing in succession. And thus the ultimate laws and conditions of consciousness limit thought to the finite and the relative. "That man can be conscious of the Infinite is thus a supposition, which, in the very terms in which it is expressed, annihilates itself." "A consciousness of the Infinite, as such, involves a self-contradiction." "The Infinite, from a human point of view, is merely a name for the absence of those conditions under which thought is possible." "The *Absolute* and the *Infinite* are thus, like the *inconceivable* and the *imperceptible*, names indicating not an object of thought, or of consciousness at all, but the mere absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible." And much more to the same effect.

These are certainly very extraordinary assertions and discoveries to come from a Christian divine, from a defender of revelation, from a believer in God. It is the language of the school of materialism and atheism. In the range of philosophical speculation it is found chiefly among the skeptics, and now it is brought forward as the basis of that philosophy of religion which alone can save us from the power of panthe-

ism. It is therefore worthy of serious examination. The purpose of the author is honest; but he has been so far misled, in his eagerness to refute the pantheists, as to take positions which, logically carried out, reduce theology to the vainest of speculations.

And in this whole argument, as it seems to us, there is a real confusion and confounding of entirely different things. It is undoubtedly true, that our human consciousness involves and implies a distinction of one object from another, and of subject and object; and that it exists only in the successions of time. These are simple and undeniable facts about our consciousness. But does it follow, does it begin to follow, from this, that we can not *know* any thing which is not thus limited and finite and related? The question here is not at all about the nature of consciousness; the whole question has to do with the *objects* of consciousness. Mr. Mansel's argument takes for granted, or rests on the silent assumption, that we can know only what we are. I may be finite, and my consciousness may be finite in its modes of activity; but that is no reason at all against the position that the Infinite may be an object of knowledge. Can I not have an idea of any thing which surpasses my own mode of being? If I can not, then I certainly can not have any idea of God.

This position, that we can know only what we are, is one of the most mischievous positions in philosophy and theology. It led to many of the vagaries about perception which Sir William Hamilton has so well refuted; and he refuted them, in part, by an appeal to consciousness, in favor of the position that we can and do know something which we are not; that we, though spiritual, may yet be conscious of an external, material world. This position that we can know only what we are, is also one of the main positions of the pantheistic school. They say that if we know the Infinite, we are of like nature, and if we know the Absolute, that we are kindred thereto. And so our Bampton lecturer tells us that we can know only the finite, because we are finite; and only the relative, because we are relative. But both have a false theory of knowledge. The measure of our finite being is not the measure of the objects

of own knowledge. We can have ideas of that which is altogether above us; the First Good, First Perfect, and First Fair. If we could not, there is no possibility of either moral or religious culture. There is a plain distinction, neglected by our author, between the conditions and the objects of knowledge.

In short, to predicate of the objects of our knowledge, conditions which apply only to our acts of knowledge is a gross paralogism. Our idea of the absolute is no more an absolute idea, and our idea of the infinite is no more an infinite idea, than our idea of matter is a material idea, or our conception of a stone is a stony conception. The absurdity and confusion in the former instances are no greater and other than in the latter.

Nor is the position helped by the statement, (see Sir William Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics, Appendix, Letter to Mr. Henry Calderwood, pp. 684-5,) that "the Infinite," here contemplated, "is considered only as in *thought*; the Infinite beyond thought being, it may be, an object of belief, but not of knowledge." For, as we shall see further on, the argument which makes it negative in thought must also make it negative to belief; the belief cannot be saved if the idea is lost. And if we believe it as positive, we may also know it as such. And besides, what is that Infinite which is at one and the same time beyond all thought, and yet an object of belief? Is belief possible without thought? Is belief possible in any other way than through thought? And if the belief be through thought, and be a belief in the Infinite as positive, must not this Infinite be positive in the thought in order to be positive to the belief? But, even if this be not so, what is the meaning of the position, that the conditions of thought do not apply to the object of thought, but only to the object as in thought? The very statement implies that we can perceive a distinction between the Infinite as it is in thought, and the Infinite as it is beyond thought; and that we are conscious that there is something more about it, than is to be found in what is here called 'thought'; that though in this kind of 'thought' we view it as negative, yet somehow or other we know it to be something more. Thus, even in the most cautious statements of the

matter, there is implied the existence of a higher power of knowing, than that which is cognizant only of the limited and finite.

But this is not the only distinction which is neglected in this style of ratiocination. Mr. Mansel implies throughout, and his argument is valid only on the supposition, that because we can not conceive the Infinite under finite forms without annulling it, and of the Absolute under relations, without destroying its true nature; that therefore we have, and can have, no idea, or only a negative conception, of either the Infinite or the Absolute. It is doubtless true, probably nobody will dispute the assertion, that to conceive of the Infinite as finite, and of the Absolute as relative, is to destroy the soul and sense of both. And if this is all that is meant by the vaunted position, that we can not *conceive* of either—who ever doubted it? It is just what the advocates of the positive nature of these ideas always affirm. The most successful part of Sir William Hamilton's famous article on the philosophy of Cousin was that in which he refuted Cousin's position, that the Infinite and Absolute could be known through plurality and difference. Of course this involves a contradiction. And if all our conceptions are necessarily and solely of the finite and relative, then of course we cannot have any conception of the Infinite and Absolute; but to say that all our conceptions are of this character, is just to beg the question. The word "conception" perhaps here misleads. If taken in the sense of something we can definitely know and bound, of a distinct image, of a limited notion—if that be the only sense of the word conception, then of course we cannot have a *conception* of the Infinite. But it cannot be supposed that such philosophers are merely playing with a word, which has properly only a limited sense. They of course use the term conception for the highest object of thought; but the mischief is, that they carry along constantly its limited usage. It is better perhaps, and may avoid ambiguity, to say that we have the *ideas* of the Infinite and Absolute, rather than the conceptions. And it is involved in the very nature of these ideas, that they exclude the limitations of space and time; as soon as we limit, so soon

we annul them. That our idea of them is of them as limited, is the very thing which we deny. And the position that we can not have them without limiting them, is refuted by the fact, *that our very idea of them is, that they are unlimited and unconditioned*. We grant then to Mr. Mansel all the benefit he can derive from the position, that we can not conceive of the Infinite as finite, or of the Absolute as relative; but it is only by an illogical step that he can thence make the inference, that we know only the finite and relative. At the same time, we are perfectly willing to concede, that there are difficulties which baffle thought in its attempt to construct or conceive the relation between the Infinite and finite; but these difficulties give no warrant for denying the Infinite, any more than for denying the finite. And we may hold to both as essential, without claiming that we can understand and define their mutual relations.

But there is a yet more serious objection to this process by which Mr. Mansel, from an analysis of the conditions of consciousness, comes to the conclusion, that "the Infinite from a human point of view is merely a name for the absence of those conditions under which thought is possible." It will be recollected, that he also asserts that "we are compelled to *believe* in the Infinite and Absolute" as positive, while reason tells us that they are only negative. But now, the very arguments or rather positions, by which he proves that we cannot *think* the Infinite, also prove that we cannot *believe* in the Infinite. We do not say, that we may not believe what we do not comprehend; but, that the reasons here assigned for the impossibility of thought also prove the impossibility of belief. What are these reasons? Chiefly, that because all human consciousness is under the limitations of distinctions and relations, that the objects of consciousness must be viewed as under the like restrictions; and that, as the restriction of the Infinite is an annulling of its idea, we can therefore form no rational idea of it. Very well; is not belief also, as much as thought, included in consciousness? Must not the limitation of consciousness be as much limitation of belief, as of thought, since belief, equally with thought, exists only in consciousness? Of

course, then, it follows irresistibly, that if these limitations of consciousness prevent one having a conception, they also preclude us from having a belief, in the Infinite and Absolute. If thought, being in consciousness, must therefore be restricted by limitations, so must belief, for the same reason. If these limitations of consciousness are to be transferred to, and imposed upon the object of thought, they must equally be transferred to, and imposed upon the object of belief. If in the former case they annul the idea of the Infinite as positive to thought, they in like manner, in the other case, annul the Infinite as positive to belief. The reasons assigned for the impotence of thought, are just as valid in proof of the impotence of faith. This must be so, unless belief transcends consciousness; and that it does, we do not suppose any sane mind would say. If, to escape this conclusion, it be said that the limitations of consciousness do not limit the objects of faith, then in the same way, we say, that no more do the limitations of consciousness limit the objects of thought; and the whole argument of the author falls to the ground. For it either proves that we cannot believe in the Infinite as positive, or else it does not prove that we cannot think the Infinite as positive.

Neither on the objective or metaphysical, nor on the subjective side (that of consciousness) has the author of these Lectures succeeded in establishing his thesis, that our ideas of the Infinite and Absolute are merely negative. And here we might leave the question, did not its theological and philosophical importance seem to demand some additional statements and explanations. Yet our limits will allow only a presentation of some hints, and not a full discussion.

When, then, it is asserted that our ideas of the Infinite and Absolute are merely negative, what is meant by negative? Is it meant that they are equivalent to zero? This would be the strictest interpretation of the language. We suppose that this would not be seriously maintained; yet we do not see how it can be avoided on the principles of the "philosophy of nescience." If all that we know is the finite, and if the Infinite is the negation of this, then the Infinite must be the same as 0. And when we say that God is infinite, we say nothing at all;

we predicate of him a negation. And, as infinitude is the characteristic of Deity in contrast with the finite, we have nothing by which to contrast Him; we have no ideas by which we can define or describe God in distinction from what exists in time and space.

If this be not the sense of the position, that our idea of the Infinite is negative, is it, perhaps, meant, that we cannot conceive of the Infinite, in the same way that we conceive of what is finite and limited? That, of course we grant; for so to conceive of it is to limit it; and to limit is to annul it. But what warrant have we for the implication that only our ideas of the finite are positive? What does positive mean? Does it mean limited? Not at all. It means, rather, that to which we are compelled to attribute real being—that which in thought we affirm to be. Under this aspect the idea of the Infinite is even more positive than that of the finite. So far is it from being true, that that which is limited is alone positive; that, on the contrary, (as the profoundest thinkers have confessed,) limitation involves negation; and the unlimited alone is positive in the highest sense. As Descartes well said, in his *Réponse aux Objections* (to his *Meditations*:) “It is not true that we conceive of the Infinite by the negation of the finite, seeing that, on the contrary, all limitation contains in itself the negation of the Infinite.”

Is it said, that the idea of the Infinite is negative, because we define it by negations, in contrast with that which is finite? as when we say it is not-finite, not-limited? But we can define a positive conception by negations and contrasts, without viewing it as negative. The negation here implies and solely means, that the limits of the finite can not be predicated of the Infinite, and the denial of these limitations involves the positive affirmation that it is above and superior to them.

Or, is it meant, that the ideas of the Infinite and Absolute merely express the impotence of thought; are but “names for the absence of those conditions under which thought is possible”? And what does this mean? Who can attach any “conception” to such affirmations? The Infinite a name for the impotence of thought! What is the impotence of

thought? It is at the utmost a consciousness of inability to think something. What is that something which we cannot think? Is it the impotence itself? Certainly not; for the impotence is in relation to that; and the impotence and the object of the impotence cannot be one and the same thing. And yet Mr. Mansel says, that the Infinite expresses merely the impotence of thought! The assertion is an example of one case of such impotence, even if it does not prove that the idea of the Infinite is that impotence. Just so it is, too, about the further statement, that it "is but a name for the absence of those conditions under which thought is possible." What does this mean? Thought is possible under certain conditions; those conditions are absent; and that absence is—our idea of the Infinite. What possible logic is there here? This position leaves us, we are free to acknowledge, in the precise state described—the total "absence of those conditions under which thought is possible;" but we should never think of adding, that that was an equivalent to the idea of the Infinite and Absolute. The Infinite is not a negative idea; but this statement about it corresponds precisely with Mr. Mansel's definition of a negative idea, "an attempt to think, and a failure in accomplishing that attempt."

But, perhaps, after all, the sense of the "philosophy of nescience" is to be taken less strictly on a subject on which its advocates profess absolute ignorance. What they really mean may after all be, not, that we have no ideas of the Infinite and Absolute; nor that these ideas express mere impotencies; but that we cannot construct out of and by them alone, a final and complete system of philosophy and theology. They may mean only, that we cannot handle these ideas as we do the conceptions of finite objects. They may mean, that we can not exhibit the relations between the Infinite and Finite, the Absolute and the Relative: We rather think this must be what they mean; for their object is to rebut and refute the pretensions of the absolute philosophy. But if this be what is meant, they have taken a very infelicitous and hazardous way of expressing their doctrines. To say that we are impotent to develop the finite out of the Infinite is a very different thing

from the assertion that the Infinite itself is a name for that impotence. The former position is the true one as against the arrogant pretensions of absolutism in philosophy; the latter position only exposes the advocates of a revelation to a defeat in this high argument.

One other singular point deserves a passing notice in relation to this position of the negativity of these ideas. Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel both define the Infinite and the Absolute; they define them in clear, distinct language; they discriminate them, the one from the other; and then they say and add, that both of these defined and distinguishable ideas are incognizable and inconceivable, that they both equally express solely the absence of all thought. If any body can find in the history of speculation a greater logical and philosophical anomaly, we should be curious to see it. Mansel says, the "Absolute is that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other being;" and the "Infinite is that which is free from all possible limitations," etc. Sir William subsumes both under the general idea of the Unconditioned, and in one place says that the Infinite is "the unconditional negation of limitation," and that the Absolute is "the unconditional affirmation of limitation;" that is, he uses the terms as contradictory of each other, diametrical opposites; so that if we apply one to a being, we could not apply the other; God, for example, could not be said to be Infinite and Absolute both. This use of the word Absolute is peculiar to Sir William Hamilton. The Absolute is properly that which is complete in itself; the Infinite is that which is not restricted by the finite, that which cannot in thought be supposed to be completed or made up by finite increments or additions. But our object here is not so much to discuss the question of the proper definitions, as to exhibit the inconsistency between giving such definitions and distinctions, and the affirmation that no positive idea can be attached to them. The definitions imply, what the philosophers deny.

And the fact is, so fundamental and necessary is the conviction that there is a Being, Absolute and Unlimited, that it is well nigh impossible for human language to express the posi-

tion, that this Absolute and this Infinite are merely negations. You may make the word negation the predicate of your sentence, but still the subject remains to testify against it. Nobody can "conceive" the position that the Infinite is negative. Thought is baffled in the attempt; so indefeasible is our native and necessary conviction of the real being of that which correspond with these ideas; and these ideas, like all the ideas of reason, express that which is real and necessary, that which has objective and universal validity: and this is positive, if any thing is.

In affirming the positive nature of the ideas, we do not imply that human reason is itself Infinite or Absolute; nor that man is of the same substance with God; nor that man can fully know, what he knows to be; nor that the human intelligence can comprehend, fully, what it holds to be positive and real. No pantheistic views, nor pretensions to absolute wisdom are involved in the position. But we mean to affirm, that an Infinite and Absolute Being really is; a Being, to whom no limits can be ascribed; a Being, positively contrasted with the finite by these characteristics. And herein is the wonder and the glory of the human intelligence. It has the idea of such a Being, and bows in reverence and awe before Him, as the most real of all that is. What it knows to be it cannot fathom; but this very knowledge gives the profoundest sense of the dignity and pricelessness of that finite nature, which is ever uplifted and upheld by the Infinite One.

We cannot follow Mr. Mansel through the other Lectures of this volume; though in them there is very much in which we heartily concur. When he comes to particular doctrines and truths, as of the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the Atonement, and shows that there are no other or greater difficulties attending them than are found in philosophy itself on kindred points, he is able and successful in his exposition. With all this we have no dispute. Though, at the same time, there are several incidental positions, resulting from his main theory of knowledge, from which we are compelled to dissent. Thus, in the fourth and seventh Lecture, he denies an absolute morality; he will not save his general system, by the method which saved Kant's; he will

be a Kantian even where Kant is superior to his own theory. He also talks of "the fiction of a moral law, binding in a particular form on all possible intelligencies." In the fifth Lecture, he repeats his position about Personality and the Infinite, as in apparently irreconcilable antagonism, and says, that the "recognition of the one in a religious system, almost inevitably involves the sacrifice of the other." To this we need only oppose the consent of almost all the great Christian theologians. We hardly know what to make of such unqualified assertions. These and similar positions, which we might cite, show that our author's underlying theory of knowledge is consistently carried out. Not only the Infinite and Absolute, but also Causality, Substance, Absolute Morality, are held to be ideas, which we cannot conceive as positive; all ultimate, intuitional knowledge, must consistently be denied. All we know is of the relative and finite; in the last analysis, all we know is—relations. How we can know relations, without some positive idea about that which is related, he does not undertake to tell us. And, after all this, of what avail is it to be told that "Reason does not deceive us, if we will only read her witness aright; and Reason herself gives us warning, when we are in danger of reading it wrong." If Reason leaves us in utter contradictions about our highest ideas, how can it help us elsewhere; how can we find out what her witness really is?

This work, with all its ability and with much of sound sense and reason on particular points and questions, when considered as an argument upon the high question between Christianity and rationalism, has fatal defects in its exposition of the relation of reason to revelation or of revelation to rationalism.

As to the relation of reason to revelation, it is a suicidal policy on the part of the advocates of revelation to concede, that the unbelieving rationalist has on his side the authentic utterances of human reason. If we concede to the pantheist that his ideas of the Absolute and the Infinite are the only positive ideas we can have about them, we do not make him a convert to the position that we have only negative conceptions of these ideas, while we do give him the vantage-ground in the con-

troversy. The only true way of meeting him is by showing, that the true Absolute is not, and cannot be, that which includes and thus annuls the relative, and that the true Infinite is not, and cannot be, that which swallows up the finite. We may also try to show him, that in respect to the relation of the Infinite to the Finite and of the Absolute to the Relative, pantheism has no advantage whatever over theism. Both pantheism and theism find here their great difficulty. The problem may be insoluble to human thought. But still, pantheism can no more tell how the finite can be developed out of the Infinite, than theism can show how the finite can be created by the Infinite. And, in fact, theism, in view of the profoundest philosophy, has here the advantage. No *à priori* demonstration can show how or that the Absolute being can take on relative modes of being ; or how the Infinite can come, by logical development, into finite modes. It is more philosophical, it has fewer difficulties about it, to believe that the finite comes from the Infinite by the fiat of a creative will, than by the emanation of an abstract substance. The true Absolute is, and can only be, a Spirit, a Person, a Will. That Absolute which is a mere blank, an It, without distinctions, is not the real Absolute ; it is an abstraction and not a reality.

Now Mr. Mansel, instead of trying to show that the pantheistic Absolute and Infinite are not the real Absolute and Infinite, has adopted the course of granting that, if they mean any thing, they are ; and then, because they lead to pantheism, tells that we must deny the utterance of reason. The false goddess of Reason he has conceded to be the only goddess of Reason.

So as regards the relation of revelation to rationalism, Mr. Mansel seems to fear and think, that if he allows to reason any foothold at all, he has got to allow it to domineer over the whole sphere of revealed truth ; that if the dicta of reason be positive that then there need be no positive revelation. This is again to concede all the claims of an infidel rationalism. But it involves a mistake and misstatement about the real state of the controversy. Revelation, as such, has not directly to do with the ideas of the Absolute and Infinite. It does not pre-

tend to reveal these ideas. The necessary ideas of human reason are neither the substance nor the object of the specific revelation given us in the Sacred Scriptures. The Bible presupposes these ideas as the native possession of the rational soul ; it logically presupposes a belief in the being and perfections of God. What as a specific revelation it professes to reveal, is what could never be known by the light of nature alone, is what could not be directly deduced from these primitive ideas. The Trinity, the Incarnation, the Atonement, Justification, Regeneration, the Kingdom of God, here and hereafter, these are some of the specific and vital truths of the revelation which God has been graciously pleased to make to our apostate race. That we may know God in Christ as our Redeemer from sin, is the purport of its wonderful message. To solve the problem of human destiny, to save from sin, is the object for which the Son of God came into this our earth. Now, suppose we grant that human reason may teach us that God is an Absolute, and Infinite, and Personal Being ; that he is just, and holy, and wise ; that he made the world and all that therein is ; that he is its moral governor ; will it follow from this, that the same reason can speak decisively, of itself alone, about the Trinity and the Incarnation, and the Atonement, and the Kingdom of God in the renewed ? By no manner of means. And here is the point for pressing the argument against the unbelieving rationalist. We must, and can, say to him that we accept all the valid utterances of reason. Our revelation contains nothing which contradicts any of these utterances ; but it does contain some truths which reason could not divine, and these are just the truths most needed by man in his sinful and estranged estate. As no *à priori* reason could deduce them, so no *à priori* reasoning can refute them. We may challenge him to show us any one of these truths which contradicts any universal and necessary truth of reason. The specific Christian verities are truths of another class ; they are revelations of a mystery, they are solutions of a problem, they are facts announced on divine testimony. And with all their mystery, there is not one of them that contradicts any necessary idea of the human intelligence. And this is all which in

reason you can ask. Nay, reason itself bids you trust in a revelation, when that revelation meets your deepest needs, and solves the profoundest problems of your immortal destiny.

On these high mysteries, on these specific peculiarities of the Christian revelation Mr. Mansel's work contains many just and forcible observations. But all of these would have been just as true, and much more convincing, if he had made them on the basis of a different theory. They gain nothing in force by his assertion and claim, that reason is untrustworthy, and that faith is all in all. For the faith by which we receive the Christian verities on the ground of divine testimony is not the same thing as the faith on which he plants himself in order to repel a metaphysical rationalism. The same term may include both acts, but it has different senses. In the one case it is the blind belief of nature; in the other case it is the open eye, receiving a divine and supernatural light, and in the light seeing the objects of faith.

On the principles of this volume we do not see how Mr. Mansel can meet and confute either the pantheist or the atheist. How could he rationally prove to them the existence of an Absolute, Infinite Person when he has told them that, in the eye of reason, Absolute and Person are contradictory to each other? How could he rationally prove the Being of God, after saying that all the terms by which God is defined, Infinite, Absolute, Substance, First Cause, involve us in irreconcilable contradiction? He may tell them again and again that he is "compelled to believe" in that which he knows only as negative and contradictory; but what will that avail with these stubborn reasoners? We cannot gain our cause against such subtle disputants by sacrificing the very basis on which alone a rational knowledge of God is possible.

This volume, then, proves the necessity of adopting a higher and better style of philosophy if we would successfully refute the foes of theism and of Christianity. Sir William Hamilton's system is essentially a logical, and not a metaphysical, scheme. It allows no valid distinction between the functions of the Reason and those of the Understanding. When it grants any thing more, it is an act of blind belief and not of clear vision.

But the high function of Reason is to reveal to us eternal and immutable truths; those ideas which are the suns of the spiritual firmament, the light of all our vision. If we deny these, we quench the inner light; the light in us has become darkness, and how great is that darkness! If we admit this spiritual vision of eternal truth, we have the basis, and the only basis, for settling the controversy between theism and pantheism, between rationalism and Christianity.

ART. II.—HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIANITY.

BY PROF. ROSWELL D. HITCHCOCK, D.D.

It is a dictate of theological conservatism, to be suspicious of new words. And wisely so; only we must not let our suspicions go without bit and bridle. If new words only incarnate, emphasize and recommend old truths, so that our science is the exacter and the richer for them, then surely they render us good service. Bad service we know this word development has rendered in the pantheistic speculations of Hegel, and some of his disciples, sinking the finite in the Infinite; but good service, also, and in larger abundance, as employed first by Herder, and afterwards by Schleiermacher, Neander, and others of that noble band of pious German scholars, who have been leading back their bewildered countrymen to the cross of Christ.

That our Lord, in the parable of the mustard-seed, propounds development of some sort, and to some extent, as the law of his spiritual kingdom, is undeniable. Hence the idea of development is utterly disallowed by no Christian sect, by no Christian believer. In the sphere of outward expansion, development is the universally acknowledged law. Twelve men, we are fond of saying, were the beginning of a kingdom, which has gone victoriously down the ages, over the continents, and amongst the races of men, slowly, but surely, subduing all things to itself; till now, infidelity itself can hardly deny that the standard of the cross bids fair to be planted, sooner or later, over all the earth. So far there is no debate.

But here the question arises, whether this law of development is confined to the sphere of outward expansion, or whether it does not go also into other spheres, determining, in fact, the whole course of our Christian history. John Henry Newman, in his passage from Oxford to Rome, spun for himself an ingenious theory of development, which he hoped would be acceptable to his new friends. He admitted the changes which the Church of Rome had undergone in her polity, in her life, her worship and her doctrine; but labored to prove them legitimate. He laid his treatise humbly at the feet of Rome, and asked her what she thought of it. She was shrewdly silent. That most accomplished scholar, since deceased, Professor Butler, of Dublin, prophesied the breaking of that cunning silence. The present convenience of the Papal Church, counselling the toleration of Newman's theory, he was sure, must be overruled in the end by the inexorable logic of her system;* and so it has come to pass. In every part of the Papal Church, on both sides of the Atlantic, the idea of development is now stigmatized as a Protestant heresy. Alzog, and others, still employ the word, but in a sense wholly different from that of our scientific Protestant historians. Brownson assailed Newman's book in an elaborate review of it some years ago, and has lately said, that there "never was a theory invented less necessary to explain the phenomena of Church history than the theory of development." And so the Roman Church comes back again at last to her old and her only safe position. The Council of Trent made solemn proclamation of its faith in an unchanged and changeless Church. And Perrone, the ablest of living Catholic theologians, asserts with emphasis, "that no date can be named when the Church began to be different from what she was as instituted by Christ in the beginning."† The seven sacraments, the celibacy of the clergy, indulgences, purgatory, and whatever else is Papal now, were all in the first century, and were all Apostolic. The only development to be recognized, is that of schisms and

* See Schaff's *Hist. Devel.*, p. 47.

† *Brownson's Rev.*, Jan. 1857, p. 55.

‡ "Nulla enim assignari epocha potest in qua aliter Ecclesia esse coeperit quam a Christo instituta est."—*Prælectiones Theologicae*, i. 87. Vienna, 1846.

heresies, shooting-off from the Church, to be dissevered, lose her grace, and wither, at last, accursed.

The old Protestantism, in its early days, before as yet it had learned to understand either history, or itself as a child of history, was as far from any just notions of development as the Papal Church now is. The Church, it was conceived, was as complete and perfect as possible at the very start. She came forth full-armed and athletic, like Minerva from the brain of Jove. She had a polity, which ought never to have been modified in the least; and rules of life, and rites of worship, and statements of doctrine, which could not by any possibility be changed for the better, but only for the worse. And such is still the opinion of many Protestants. They agree with Rome in repudiating the idea of development. They agree with Rome in applauding and accepting the Church of the primitive age as the model for all ages. They differ only in regard to what the Church of that age actually was. Rome says there has been no change. These men say there ought not to have been any. Give us only the Church of the first centuries, its polity, its discipline, its worship, and its theology; give us only this, is the unhistoric cry. Here you have it, answers Rome, holding up her Tridentine Canons and Decrees. Here we reproduce it, shout a score or two of sects.

These are the two extremes. We take our stand between them and above them. Confronting Rome, we deny the asserted sameness. Confronting such sects, we deny the asserted perfection of the primitive age. Changes we affirm there have been, ought to have been, and must continue to be, down to the Millennium, and, through the Millennium, down to the end of time, till the Church militant appears in glory as the Church triumphant. The Christianity of Christ and his inspired Apostles, we contend, did not pass fully into the Church of the Apostles, and never has passed fully into any other Church, and never will in this world. In a word, the Christianity of the New Testament, which is a divine and perfect thing, has never yet been the Christianity of Christendom, is not now, and never will be entirely so, till, on the morning of the resurrection, every spot and wrinkle shall be utterly effaced. But all the way along, from Pentecost till now, our

Lord has walked with his earthly bride upon his arm; and all the way along, from now till the Marriage Supper, will he continue thus to walk, shedding the radiance of his love. Christ has overstepped no single century, leaving it to bewail his broken promise; but has traversed all the centuries. Nor has he flooded any single century with the immeasurable fullness of his grace and truth. Something to each; but the whole to none. Even the miracle of Pentecost was not the begetting of a model Church. If heathen fables may be pressed into Christian service, the Church at that time, we would say, was no Minerva, leaping mature from the brain of Jove, but only an infant Hercules, with serpents invading his cradle, and gigantic labors awaiting his manly prime.

I. In order to a proper handling of our subject, we must first inquire what is meant by the term development, taking the genus before the species.

Development is a term belonging to the sphere of organic life. It can neither be affirmed, nor imagined, of God, though He is life itself in its sublimest essence, since that life is not organic. In our Christian Trinity, we have, it is true, the Generation of the Son, and the Procession of the Spirit; but they are both eternal. Nor can development be affirmed of that which is destitute of life. Dead matter, though never so cunningly fashioned and arrayed, knows nothing of it. Astronomy reveals to us only a beautiful order. The heavenly bodies have their circuits, running with infallible precision their appointed rounds; but they have no life, and make no progress. There are circuits also in human history, as, for example, when despotism goads men to revolution, and revolution dissolves in anarchy, and anarchy gives place again to despotism. Or, as when faith decays and stiffens into formalism, and formalism provokes infidelity, and infidelity, by a vital reaction, produces mysticism, and mysticism leads round once more to a robust and sober faith. But these human circuits are spiral. Society revolves, but is also launched onward in its course. The last despotism is wiser and more beneficent, the last faith riper and better, than the first.

Next in order, in the ascending scale of nature, is the mysterious process of crystallization. The exactness of this divine geometry, marshaling inert, blind atoms into such exquisite arrangements of beauty, fills us with wonder. Human history has also its crystallizations, as when a single imperial will, like that of Charlemagne, dropped into Mediæval Europe, holds it back for a century from the chaos of feudalism; or a single word, like that of Staupitz to Luther, brings peace to a troubled soul, and reformation to a corrupted Church. But, in nature, the product is hard and angular; while in human history it is warm, flowing and diversified.

Next in order are the growths of vegetable and animal life; more distinctly prophetic and typical of history, though not themselves historic, since the final product is inflexibly predetermined and present in the germ. And yet the closest possible approach to history. The little acorn in its shining, enamelled shell, giving no token of the life within it, rolls, like a rounded pebble, at our feet. But let your foot tread it down into the ground, and presently it swells and bursts and rises in your path a rugged oak. Here, at length, we encounter, not creation, but development. The creation was ages ago, when the present order of things had its beginning. Now is God's Sabbath, during which his works have only to grow. The process is a vital one, presupposing a vital germ, and the energy of vital forces. Potentially, the acorn is as really an oak, as it is actually an acorn; an oak, because an acorn. A germ is hidden there; and germs are divine thoughts; and divine thoughts are real things. Permit the process of development to go on, and only one result is possible. The germ may be destroyed, ground to a dead powder underneath your heel; or may be dwarfed and crippled in its growth, bruised and battered by violence, or starved by drought and a meagre, sandy soil; but still the planted and sprouting acorn is always the growing oak. It needs no care of ours. Only let it alone, and it takes care of itself.

And so we rise to man, the crown and consummate flower of this his Maker's lower work; the microcosm rather, into which all that is beneath him is gathered up for its final em-

phasis. Planets, gems and trees and birds and beasts, in life or in mimicry of life, are all of them for man, pointing and struggling towards him, prophetic of his grand career. But the distinguishing characteristic of human history, wherein it goes beyond all these types and prophecies of it in nature, is the moral freedom of its finite factor. Human history is indeed motion, expansion, growth; but the motion, expansion and growth of a divine germ, conditioned by finite freedom. In nature, given the germ, and you foreknow infallibly the product. But not so in the sphere of spirit. Free moral agency may issue in revolt and ruin. And if the poison enters the root, it must pervade also the branches. So has it actually happened in the case of man. The creation of the first human pair, was the creation of a race. In God's eternal thought, which Augustine calls the divine idea, or the primal type, the genus precedes the individual.* Or, as Edwards puts it, taking the figure from Stapfer, Adam was the root and humanity the tree; so that the sin of Adam was the fall of man. Or, as Paul has it, "by one man's disobedience, the many (*οἱ πολλοὶ*) were made sinners." (Rom. 5 : 19.)

And this is the proper beginning of human history. It begins in sin. Sin in the root carries sin into all the branches; not, indeed, as a necessity of fate, else it could be no longer sin, but yet as a perfect certainty of history. As is the root, so are the branches; as in the oak, so in the man. In the man a mystery; but so also in the oak. A mystery, because a life. Only in man the mystery is deeper, because the life is deeper. Choice there must be, to have it sin; but the choice is beyond and beneath our scrutiny. Adam *fell* into sin; we are *born* to it. We choose it, indeed; but it is our first choice, and we choose nothing else. Not of contingency, but by nature, are we "children of wrath." (Eph. 2 : 3.)

Left to itself, therefore, human history could have been only a process of decay, ending in dissolution. Had empires been founded, violence would have torn them all to pieces. The womb of society would have become its sepulchre. Gross,

* "Liber de diversis questionibus octoginta tribus."—Quæstio 46.

brutal passions would have sent discord into every family, and rottenness into the loins of every child of Adam, till the whole human race had perished and passed away.

The infidel theory of a primæval barbarism, out of which our race have slowly struggled up, without special Divine help, is intolerably false, impertinent and shallow. The human family is not a sand-heap, but an organism; not a mere succession, but a race; not a stream or a crystal, but a tree. And sin is not an incidental, fortuitous, sporadic, isolated thing in history, but a universal vicious development from a vicious germ. The Roman poet was wiser than he knew, when he sang: "To err is human."

II. We proceed now to inquire into what is meant by development in the Church; in the sphere, that is, of the supernatural.

Had man not fallen, his historical development would have been in a right line, the divine and the human being entirely at one, with no angle between them, and, consequently, no diagonal resultant; as of the angels who are keeping their first estate; as of the human nature of our Lord himself, who "increased in wisdom and stature, and in favor with God and man." (Luke 2 : 52.) The original innocence of man, tried by temptation, without being shattered by it, might have been transformed and toughened into virtue.

Or if, after the fall, there had been no divine interposition, human development, as we have tried to show, with only the one force of evil impelling it, would still have been in a right line, but wholly away from God more and more, waxing only worse and worse, till the whole race had become extinct, and human history had ended in a groan.

But now, besides sin, we have grace also in the problem. Both are inexplicable. Sin is a mystery, which human speculation has never fathomed. Grace is a mystery, into which the angels desire to look. (1 Pet. 1 : 12.) What relief we need, in our perplexed and painful meditations upon human life, may be had by putting the two together, face to face. This we know, that when the angels fell, it was the fall, not of

racess, but only of a host. They do not propagate their kind. There is no fearful entail of sin and suffering down the lines of an historic descent. But when man sinned, and carried a race down with him, immediately the heavens were moved. Father, Son and Spirit took counsel together, and the sublime economy of Redemption was at once inaugurated. Hence there are no right lines in human history. Men go straight neither to heaven nor to hell. Rising towards heaven, sin tugs at our spirits to drag them down. Sinking towards hell, grace interposes to arrest us in our course. And so we move in zig-zag lines either up or down.

The Church, then, had its beginning with Adam. Its creed was the promise of redemption; its ritual, sacrifice; its life, grace in the heart. While its polity was patriarchal; the heads of families, or elders, being the Priests. A modest, feeble germ, for so large a growth as then awaited the coming centuries.

The call of Abraham, and the institution of circumcision, was the beginning of a new stadium of development; the national, which was consummated by the Mosaic legislation. At Sinai, a change was made in the Priesthood, the tribe of Levi being selected in place of the first-born of all the tribes. (Num. 3 : 12.)

Later still, by some hundreds of years, came the bright succession and goodly fellowship of the Prophets. And, close upon their heels, the Kings. Thus completing the circle of historic types, which syllabled the three-fold office of our Redeemer, as Priest, Prophet and King. And after this again, perhaps, the Synagogues, slowly exalting instruction, the land over, into fellowship with the central Temple Sacrifice. Church and nation were coincident; and yet, though mixed, they were never confounded. There was always a spiritual Israel within the political, as there is now an invisible Church within the visible. "He is not a Jew," says Paul, "which is one outwardly." (Rom. 2 : 28.) "For they are not all Israel, which are of Israel." (Rom. 9 : 6.)

The Church was thus grafted, first upon the Family, and then upon the State; both of them institutions of God. These two economies lasted some four or five thousand years; the

Jewish economy having been rendered necessary by the failure of the Patriarchal. Together, they constitute the pupilage of the world, preparatory to the Incarnation of God in Christ. The whole was one grand experiment upon the freedom of man, to demonstrate historically his impotency to redeem himself. This, indeed, was presumed in advance, and loudly proclaimed in the redemptive interposition of God. But human pride resented the assumption, spurned the proffered help, and set up for itself. Hence the gigantic array of heathenism, born, as Kurtz* has finely said, in the rebellious cry at Babel, "Go to, let us build us a city and a tower, whose top may reach unto heaven;" a heathenism of stupendous proportions, and innumerable grades, ranging widely from the gorgeous pantheism of India to the meagre ethics of China, but all equally astray from God, and equally unable to return. And yet a part of the world's history, which the constraining Providence of God would not let slip from the grasp of His own decrees; working against God in its own intent, but negatively working for Him in spite of all. Philosophy achieved its utmost in Greece, standing between the Orient and the Occident. Civil government achieved its utmost in Rome. A religion of types and shadows, its utmost in Palestine. And so the discordant world was still one, under that wise and invincible Providence, which overrules equally the folly and the wrath of man, to the furtherance of its own designs. The final contributions were, from Judaism, a monotheistic faith, and synagogues in all parts of the world; from Greece, an incomparable language, without which the nice distinctions of theology would have been impossible; from Rome, roads, jurisprudence and universal empire. And so, Judea became the mediator of life, Greece of doctrine, and Rome of organization, to the newly-established Church.

Thus the law is that of development throughout. From the first Adam to the second Adam, there is one steady process of growth. The counter-forces are sin and grace, sin struggling to empty the world of its God, grace struggling to

* *Geschichte des Alten Bundes.* Erster Band, p. 56.

fill it with truth and love. The vital product of this conflict is the Church. God is in it, and over it, from first to last; revealed at first in dim but refreshing promise; enshrining His truth in symbols; finding voice for it in Prophets; and, in the fullness of time, becoming incarnate in the Virgin's Son. The Divine agency, throughout the process, is two-fold; imparting knowledge and imparting grace; and, in both these lines of movement, there is a manifest enhancement of efficiency from step to step. There are those who would fain believe, that a large volume of divine truth, including even the mysterious doctrine of the Trinity, that crowning doctrine of our Christian faith, was communicated to man in the earliest morning of history. In support of this assumption, appeal is made to the Trinities of India, of Persia, and of Plato, as dying reverberations of the primal creed. But the Trinities of the Orient are pantheistic, and the Trinity of Plato only subjective. They witness decisively to no Paradisiacal revelation, but rather to a trinal structure of our nature, which, perhaps, dimly shadows the Triune nature of God. The Old Testament Scriptures warrant no such conception of the early history; on the contrary, the volume of revealed truth appears to have been comparatively small at first, swelling larger and larger from age to age. Larger, even at the start, than appears in the Mosaic records, as we may readily concede; but larger on the practical side, rather than on the speculative; unfolding the way of life to ruined men, rather than explaining the mysterious nature of God; and, in a word, putting religion before theology. There is no warrant whatever for the notion that Adam and Abel were as well informed in regard to divine things as John and Paul. As of knowledge, so of grace. Enoch walking with God before the deluge, exhibits a childlike sanctity, as compared with good old Simeon, ready to die as soon as he had seen his Saviour.

Such was the history of the Church from the Promise of Redemption in Eden, to the fulfillment of that promise in the manger at Bethlehem. Now, the presumption is, and must be, that from Bethlehem onward to the Final Judgment, the method of procedure will not be changed. Through two

economies of redemption, the Patriarchal and the Jewish, the law of the Church has been that of growth. In this final economy, which we call the Christian, the law will remain the same.

And so we find it. No other conception of Christianity will abide the test of history. The changes undergone in every department of the Church, are too palpable to be winked or argued out of sight. The Church, as we find it in the writings of Clement, Ignatius and Hermas, is not the Church of Cyril, Athanasius, and Augustine; is not the Church of Hildebrand, and the Council of Trent, and of Bellarmin; is not the Church of Luther, Zwingli and Calvin; is not the Church of the Puritans of England and America. Polity, life, ritual and doctrine have all been changing, and, as can easily be shown, have all been shaping themselves towards better and better forms. Not that each new epoch is in advance of the one immediately preceding it; but each, on the whole, and in the end, will be found to have been essential to all the rest. Winter, stripping the trees of their foliage, looks like defeat and death. But Spring returns, and the leaves that fell and rustled on the frozen ground, now rot and nourish the living roots.

To make good such statements as these, would be to review the whole history of the Church itself; and this would be to write a book instead of an article. A brief and rapid glance at the course of our Christian history is all that is possible.

In regard to the outward extension of Christianity, great apparent losses have indeed been incurred. Central and Eastern Asia, which took the Gospel so quickly, as quickly let go its hold of it. Africa, once so grandly irradiated, from the Nile to the Pillars of Hercules, soon went back into night again. The Roman Empire dissolved, in spite of its Christian baptism; its western half going down under the Gothic avalanche; its eastern half succumbing to the Saracen. And so the theatre has shifted; from Asia to Europe, from one race to another; but always with a real advantage, in spite of all apparent reverses. The Teutonic civilization, supplanting the Græco-Roman, is a great gain. Even Mohammedanism will

be found to have been a gain, falling, as it did, upon an idolatrous Christendom, and pressing on to the subjugation of Pagan races, which are thereby held to a monotheistic faith, as in a sort of "quarantine," till a purer Gospel can be furnished them. Thus, though Christianity has not always held its territorial conquests, it has held on to its conquering march; gaining more and better territories, and, above all, gaining to itself better and better races of men from age to age.

Take the polity of the Church. The lines are faint in the record; but distinct enough to be traced by a mind free from sectarian bias. Paul sent Titus to ordain elders in every city, that is, in every church, since, as we learn in other connections, there was but one church organization in each city, how populous soever the city might be. So that a plural eldership was the Apostolic arrangement. Nor was there any office above the eldership, since elder and bishop are synonymous in Paul's Epistles. Ordination to ministerial office was not, exclusively, an Apostolic prerogative, for Timothy had hands laid on him by the presbytery; so that if Apostles took part in the service, it was not as Apostles, but as presbyters. The only other office-bearer, was the deacon, and in some churches, the deaconess. As to local churches, they were in many respects independent of each other; and yet the Apostolate, so long as the Apostles lived, was a common bond, clasping them all together; while the Synod at Jerusalem, in the year 50, unique as it was in its constitution, is yet a plea for concert and harmony of action through all time.

Such appears to have been the Apostolic polity. But we do not find it prescribed as an indispensable, and the only legitimate form of government. Hence, the Church is at liberty, if she please, or if pressed to it by some exigency from without, to change the form.

She did change it, and that very shortly. Early in the second century, in the Epistles of Ignatius, we see the head of a bishop looming above the eldership. The impelling causes were various: First, the sense of bereavement, consequent upon the removal by death of the College of the Apostles; secondly, heresies and disorders within the Church, which

seemed to call for a more aristocratic and stringent discipline; and, thirdly, the rising tempest of persecution.* These causes operated with power and rapidity, for by the middle of the third century, when Cyprian ruled the Church at Carthage, Episcopacy was well established. How much censure should be visited upon the ambition of individual bishops, it is not easy to say. Cyprian was certainly one of the best men of his age. His Epistle to Donatus, describing his own conversion, with his many epistles written in exile, as he sat watching, with paternal solicitude and heroic faith, the fortunes of an oppressed and bleeding Church, will plead for him to the end of time.

Who will say that Episcopacy, in the time of Cyprian, was a blunder and a sin? More intelligence and more piety in the Church, with less ferocity of hatred against her from without, might have precluded Episcopacy. But, taking the Church as she was, and the world as it was, the Providence of God is justified

So again of the Primacy. It was of very slow growth. The beginning of it was the voluntary honor paid to Rome, on account of her liberality in contributing to the necessities of the saints; as also her stability in doctrine, while so many other churches were sliding into heresies. For centuries, Rome was the pillar of Western Christianity. And when the old Empire of the Cæsars perished, the Primacy of Rome was a blessing, a glory and a defense. Ambition, we know, played a conspicuous part in that high game of spiritual empire. Bad men got lifted into the Papal Chair. The stretch of jurisdiction was enormous. The abuses of ecclesiastical power were many and monstrous. Long before Luther was born, men wondered how Peter could sleep so quietly in his grave, with such scandals going on over his ashes. But Hildebrand, who gave his name as an adjective to what is marked in history as the

* "Denn herrenlos ist auch der Freiste nicht.
Ein Oberhaupt muss sein, ein höchster Richter,
Wo man das Recht mag schöpfen in dem Streit."

Schiller's *William Tell*, vol. vi. p. 64.

period of the lordliest supremacy of Rome, was a reformer of the Papal discipline ; and history has to thank him for throttling abuses and evils not a few. If ever men needed a spiritual master, to lay the rod of bitter discipline over their backs, it was during the feudalism of the Middle Ages. We would neither blindly, nor perversely, apologize for what was bad. But neither may we, on the other hand, be ignorant of the actual conditions of the historic problem to be solved ; but remember the barbarism of the age, the brutality of kings and barons, and the corrupt morals of the bishops and inferior clergy, calling so loudly for the iron rule of Rome.

Consider also the spiritual life of the Church. The virtues of the Apostolic period, we are liable greatly to exaggerate. The lofty ideals of Christian attainment held up for emulation in the Apostolic writings, are often mistaken for reports of what had been actually achieved. But the Church in Corinth, apparently, was not much purer than our Sandwich Island churches have been. It was a most debauched and slimy age, reeking with pollution. The ancient and mediæval Church is blamed for its asceticism, its scorn of the domestic charities, its false estimate of the superior dignity of celibacy, its madness for monasticism. But let a man read the *Tristium* of Ovid, the *Odes* of Horace, the *Lives* of the *Cæsars* by Suetonius, or any honest history like that of Tacitus, and he will cease to wonder at the morbid and extravagant morality of Christians. He may still lament their pusillanimous despair, and their desertion of a world, which they ought rather to have staid and mended ; but he will learn to moderate his indignation, and temper his reproofs with charity. While down through all the centuries he will fall in with multitudes of self-denying and fruitful Christians, whom he need not be ashamed to call his brethren. Nay, the chances are, that he will be put to shame by many an example of mediæval sanctity. Such men as *À Kempis* and *Tauler* shall lead him to depths and to heights of religious experience, of which, perhaps, he has hardly dreamed.

So of the worship of the Church. At first as simple as a weekly meeting of modern Christians for conference and

prayer, presently it began to gather pomp, and finally became a childish and tawdry show. But it came of wishing to convert barbarians.

And so of all the worst abuses and corruptions of the mediæval period, whether in polity, life, or ritual; without excusing, we may yet be permitted to explain them. They were not launched like a deluge upon the Church, nor hurled like an avalanche; but they came by slow degrees. They grew. While underneath the shadow of them, there was also growing the spirit and the purpose to rebuke them.

This stands to the credit of our religion, that the Reformation of the Church in the sixteenth century, was of no extraneous origin, but the product of her own vitality. Out of her own loins, through God's grace, issued her own regenerators.

But no where is the law of development more conspicuous than in the department of doctrine. The growth here has been majestic. We admit the importance of distinguishing between theology and religion. Religion is our life; while theology is only the science of it. And yet in Christianity we claim for theology a dignity acknowledged in regard to no other religion. Heathen religions, as Gieseler has well remarked, have properly no doctrines, only certain outward rites. Even Judaism, though it had doctrines, as for example the Divine unity, consisted mainly of moral and ceremonial precepts, not standing, all of them, in any intimate connection with the doctrines. In regard to Christianity, the case is wholly different. Here doctrines are the expositions of vital realities; the groundwork of our religion, in a sense true of no other religion. When, therefore, a man decries doctrine in comparison with life, and undertakes to praise religion at the expense of theology, we shall do well to suspect him at once either of indolence or of heresy. He either does not like to put his mind into the gymnasium, or else he wishes to slip in some false doctrine.

The word doctrine has two meanings: a divine and a human. Divine doctrine, called no where in the New Testament *δόγμα*, but *λόγος*, is absolute divine truth; as when Christ says, that God is a Spirit; and that the Father and he are one; that no man can come to him except the Father draw

him ; and that all whom the Father giveth him he will keep. Human doctrine is the Divine doctrine, humanly apprehended. As when Origen affirmed, that, if Christ be the Son of God, then he must have been eternally begotten ; and the Church answered, Yea. Or as when Nestorius was understood to affirm a double personality in Christ ; and the Church answered, Nay. Or as when Eutyches was understood to confound the two natures ; and the Church again answered, Nay. As when Augustine, in conflict with Pelagius, wrought out his doctrine of original sin, the eternal, unconditioned decrees of God, irresistible grace, and final perseverance ; and the Church indorsed them. These all are merely human statements, seeking to compass and express the fullness of the Divine. But the two doctrines—the Divine and the human—may not be identical ; perhaps we ought rather to say, that they never *can* be perfectly identical. Yet the degrees of approach to this identity, are innumerable. The human mind may be very near to apprehending the purport of what God has said ; or may be very far from it. That this apprehension has, on the whole, been more and more perfect from generation to generation, we think is clear.

For us, the sum of all Divine doctrine is in the Scriptures, but especially the Scriptures of the New Testament. We accept nothing less than the whole Bible ; and we receive nothing more—neither traditions nor documents ; neither any legend of what an Apostle said, nor any pretended Apostolic constitutions and canons. To assume, as Rome does, that something not in the Scriptures was Apostolic, because some body in the second or third century said it was Apostolic, is to make wild work with history. Tradition is the most uncertain and treacherous of teachers. It is as much as a *book* can do to make its way uninterpolated and unchanged from generation to generation, and from language to language. Tradition, without a perpetual miracle of inspiration, must fail entirely to do it.

And yet we must take the Bible for what it is, and not for what it is not, and does not claim to be. Its teachings are not scientific, but spiritual and practical. Our Lord, for ex-

ample, no where discourses about original sin, nor imputed righteousness, nor the doctrine of the Trinity. He spoke mostly in parables, some thirty of which have come down to us, five of them taking their imagery from the vineyards of southern Palestine; the bulk of them taking their imagery from the lakes, valleys and corn-fields of Galilee in the North.* He announced himself as the Messiah of prophecy, standing in peculiarly intimate relations with the Father; said that he had come to establish a spiritual kingdom in the hearts of men; and that he would come again in the clouds to raise the dead and judge the world, gather to himself his friends, and complete the triumph of the Kingdom of God over all evil. But it is not made clear whether this Kingdom of God, which follows the resurrection, is to be upon the earth or elsewhere.

Of the Apostles, Peter, James and Jude, went but little beyond these points. The theologians of the company were Paul and John. Paul unfolded and emphasized: the perfect brotherhood and equality of Jews and Gentiles; the repeal of the Mosaic ritual; and the spiritual character of Christianity as a fellowship with God through faith in his Son. He also taught the divinity of Christ as the revealer of the unrevealed God, though he forbore to speak about the metaphysical relation of the Son to the Father. The aim of John in his Gospel was to give a practical turn to the Logos speculations then abundantly rife. Docetism is denounced in his Epistles. While Eschatology is laid hold of in his Apocalypse; as also by Paul in his Epistles to the Thessalonians, and the fifteenth chapter of the first Epistle to the Corinthians; the Apocalypse appearing to teach, that the Kingdom of God, in its last stadium, after the resurrection, is to be upon this earth renewed; of which some critics think there is a hint also in the eighth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans.

Such, in brief, was the Divine doctrine given as the basis of our human doctrine. It was received at first with a singular passivity of judgment. The Apostolic Fathers, so called, seem like grown-up children. Till the middle of the second century

* Stanley's *Sinai and Palestine*, pp. 408-27.

there was no theology to speak of, because there was no speculation. But after that time, there was an activity of mind in collision with the grand doctrines of revelation, which, perhaps, has had nothing to match, certainly nothing to overmatch, it in all the history of human opinions and debates. It was then the Church began the construction of her theology; putting divine truths into human forms—the divine λόγος into human δόγμα. First came the doctrine of God, Christ and the Holy Trinity. Then, after a century, the doctrine of man apostate. Not till the Middle Age, when Anselm uttered it, came the true doctrine of satisfaction to the Divine Justice in the sufferings of Christ. In the time of the Reformation there came out into bold historic relief the true idea of Justification. To say that all these doctrines were just as well understood, and just as precious, before as after these debates, is to say what has no right to be said. Involved, it is true, they were in all the confessions, as in all the experience, of the Church from the beginning, but not evolved and made puissant as they now are till after centuries of study and of strife. Thus the higher doctrines touching God, man and their relations, were measurably complete. Athanasius represents the first achievement; Augustine the second; Calvin the third; and the man in our day who goes over the ground these giants trod and says any thing of much moment which shall be at once both new and true, must be a very great man indeed; such a man as we hear no where any footfall of on any continent.

Let us so respect the Christian centuries which are behind us as not to be ashamed to confess, that the theology of the Church, in all the more important features of it, is, in our judgment, quite beyond the possibility of any material improvement. The field for theological achievement is greatly narrowed from what it was. On the great points discussed and settled by Athanasius, Augustine and Calvin, let us not desire the new wine of any modern speculation, for the old is better.

Such is Christianity: its fountain and measure of doctrine, the word of God in the Scriptures; its essential life, the trans-

forming grace of God in the heart ; but itself, in its fullness, a growth of the centuries, an historic organism, the acorn's oak.

This grand life-process, however, is not yet complete. We stand in the midst of it. Christianity is not dead and finished, but alive and growing. There is growth behind us in all the past ; there is growth around us in the present ; there is growth before us in the future. Not a lawless growth which no man can prognosticate, the end of which may possibly contradict its beginning, but a growth which throughout shall answer to its germ. Ours is the same Christianity which struck its roots in Jerusalem, and which Paul saw waving throughout the Roman Empire ; the very same, and yet to be expanded, purified and invigorated till its first fruits shall seem crude and meagre when compared with the final harvest. Let us see, then, where we now stand, and what awaits us in the coming years.

It was one of the positions of Celsus, which Origen, in the Fifth Book of his "Contra Celsum," is at great pains to reply to, that different nations and races of men have necessarily and rightly different religions ; so that no single religion can, with any propriety or any prospect of success, aspire to universal prevalence. Different nationalities, as by some irreversible decree of fate, are pre-configured to their different religions, and are not to be turned away from them. Christianity is accordingly a bold imposture, since it stands committed to this insane ambition of universal conquest. A skepticism similar to this of Celsus in regard to the universal prevalence of Christianity, exists in our day. There are men of letters amongst us, of the Epicurean sort, who have no faith in our evangelism. They admit, indeed, what no candor can deny, that the religion of the cross, which Carlyle has so finely described as "the worship of sorrow," is the religion of the best and ruling races of mankind ; but they do not believe that it can traverse the whole scale of humanity. Precisely because it is the religion of the highest, it must fail to reach the lowest. There are races of men, it is alleged, who can no more take it than they could take the philosophy of Plato. These races

may be pushed out of history and their territories pass into stronger hands; but evangelized they can never be. Or if some of these races may be evangelized, it can only be when they shall have first been civilized. India, for example, can not be Christianized till she has first been Anglicized. Such philosophers of course will waste no money upon missions.

But crude notions of this sort are easily refuted. Refuted, first, by an analysis of Christianity itself, which shows it to be as well suited and as indispensable to the savage as to the sage. Refuted also by experience, since the torrid home of the Zulu, the icy hut of the Greenlander, and the rude wigwam of the North-American Indian have all actually resounded with the accents of our Christian worship. The very Scriptures which fed the genius of Chrysostom, have quickened the stolidity of barbarians whom the pagan scholars of Antioch would have scorned as but little better than brutes. The scale has thus been traversed. The possibility of a universal religion, and that religion confessedly the finest and noblest, is therefore no longer a curious problem, but already a partially accomplished fact. And so there is hope for all. Christianity may go before civilization, as indeed it must, instead of waiting to follow in its train.

But these dainty and scornful Epicureans are not our only doubters. Inside of the Church are men, in number not a few, many of them respectable also for piety, genius and learning, who have come to the conclusion that the kingdom of Christ is not to triumph in its present form. The Millennarians tell us that the process now going on is one of alternate revival and decay; that the career of the Gospel is a westward march, with losses in the rear to balance the conquests in advance; that the Teutonic civilization, now holding the wardenship of Christianity, is rotting and dissolving as utterly as the Græco-Roman civilization rotted and dissolved in its day, and that there is no hope for us but in the personal coming of our Lord to vanquish his enemies and avenge his saints. Such is the modern Gospel of despair. We hear it preached and we have heard it sung. Quaint George Herbert, in his "Church Militant," a poem of stately strains, chants us our requiem. The

Church, like the sun, moves westward, rising and setting, from land to land ; from Canaan to Egypt, from Egypt to Greece, from Greece to Rome, from Rome to western Europe, from western Europe to America, bringing the day, but leaving the night behind her. Decay succeeds to growth, apostasy to faith. The Seine swallows the pollutions of the Tiber, the Thames the Seine, till the new continent takes its turn in history, and so the judgments of God go round the globe.

Against such views it does not suffice to array merely the visions of prophecy, for these very visions are so expounded as to freeze our missionary zeal. Fortunately, the question does not hinge solely upon our Greek and Hebrew lexicons and grammars. It is a question of historical statistics, open to the most unlettered apprehension. Figures prove that the kingdom of Christ, in spite of its shifting theatres and heavy losses in the rear, has been steadily expanding and strengthening from the beginning until now. At the end of the first century, when John laid down his life at Ephesus, half a million of souls, it has been computed, had assumed the Christian name. A little more than two hundred years later, when Constantine gave in his adhesion to the new religion, the number had increased to ten millions, or about one tenth the population of the Roman empire. In the fifteenth century, as the Church was emerging from the troublous passage of the Middle Ages, a hundred millions would have answered to her roll-call. And now of the estimated population of the globe,* three hundred and thirty-five millions, or more than one fourth, are reckoned Christians. One hundred and seventy of these millions, it is true, are in the Papal communion, and seventy-six millions in the Greek communion, leaving but eighty-nine millions of Protestants ; but who will say that the proportion of genuine disciples is not as large to-day as it ever has been in any of the Christian centuries. In spite of the proverb, figures doubtless do sometimes lie ; but still more frequently it happens that they tell only half the truth. So in the case before us. The millions on either side should be weighed as

* According to the directors of the statistical bureau of Berlin for 1859.

well as counted. Tholuck once playfully inquired: "Can you tell me why God made so many Chinese and so few Prussians?" Set aside those four hundred millions of China, and then nearly half the rest of mankind are already Christian. Or compare the opposing nationalities, evangelized and unevangelized; almost any one of the Christian nations is a match and more than a match for the whole of heathendom. And then again of the nations evangelized; compare the Protestant and the Papal. England could almost stand alone against the whole array of nations in allegiance to Rome. With such facts in view, who can doubt the final issue? The tide of Christian conquest is rolling over the globe as visibly as ever the legions of Cæsar or the battalions of Bonaparte swept on to victory. Hindostan and China have long stood as the severest trials of our faith. But recent events, with an electric suddenness, have laid these vast empires open to us, so that, if we do not send them the Gospel quickly, we are irretrievably disgraced. That these empires, if rightly dealt with, will take the Gospel, who that knows the Gospel or knows its history, can doubt? Certainly there are signs of the times which seem to indicate that when the new stadium of missionary activity, now so loudly called for, is once fairly inaugurated, the word of God will run with a swiftness of which as yet we have hardly dreamed. A geometrical progression will be its law.

Not that we anticipate a prevalence of Christianity which shall be absolutely universal; for the Apocalypse grants us the vision of a remnant which shall withstand the millennial evangelism and await in rebellion the lightnings of the second coming of the Son of God. But the consummation shall be abundantly glorious, "for the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea." (Is. 11 : 9.)

The question of polity is far enough from being vital, and yet has something of that importance which attaches to the discipline of armies. The historical developments in this sphere have been already, perhaps, as various as possible. As related to the State, the Church has taken every attitude she can. For three hundred years she stood in a hot antagonism,

and endured the tortures of persecution. Then she entered into an alliance with the State, and endured its friendly but hurtful supremacy. In the eleventh century, the fertile and athletic genius of Hildebrand enabled her to reverse that supremacy, the State succumbing to the Church, as moon to sun. The Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century invoked again the help and accepted the dominion of the State. It has been reserved for us, children of the old world on a new continent, to work out the problem, which still seems so strange in Europe, of a Church independent entirely of the State. This latest birth of time, independence without antagonism, is doubtless the truest and the best. Denied to the Ante-Nicene Church, it has been brought to pass for us.

Internally, the organization of the Church has been equally diversified. The extremes have both been touched, and all the possibilities apparently exhausted. From sheer democratic independency, defiant of all councils, whether mutual or *ex parte*, up to the spiritual Czarship of the Roman Pontiff, every gradation has been tried. What shall now be done? The present diversities and janglings ought surely to cease. But towards what goal shall we direct our steps? We cannot go to Rome. We must not go to pieces, and to chaos. Who has heard, or who can think, of any thing better, than to reproduce essentially the Apostolic polity? Precisely what that was, in every feature of it, it may not be easy to say; but the leading features of it are plain. Vitringa's work, *De Synagoga Vetere*, remains, as yet, an unanswered book. The pope must doff his triple hat; the bishop must subside to the level of the eldership. The deacon must resume his proper sphere as steward of the temporalities; and then the elder and deacon shall alone remain. As to the eldership, whether it should be single or plural the question which now divides the Congregationalists and the Presbyterians, we need not here undertake to say. Either will answer. Both are likely to last for some time longer, side by side. The final choice of history, whatever it may be, must at all events be essentially Republican, since

Republics in the sphere of the State, as Gervinus has tried to show, do most probably stand at the end of the historic course.

As to the life of the Church, so far as this life is free and normal, it must continue to be forever essentially the same. In every disciple there is the same divine grace, encountering essentially the same resistance and working to accomplish essentially the same result. But the human factor in this problem is in many respects a variable and not a constant factor; constant in its depravity, variable in the forms of that depravity. The religious life is always toned and colored by the age to which it belongs: either tainted and weakened by the infection of the world's depravity, or, by a violent reaction, soured, distorted and stiffened by it. Hence, on the one side, the discipline that was called for in Corinth. Hence, on the other side, the asceticisms of the desert and the cloister.

The age now passing has perils in it peculiar to itself; but especially for Protestant Christendom. The Reformation was heralded, and helped, by a wonderful succession of inventions and discoveries, which have changed the whole face of the world, and the whole order of society. Printing, gunpowder, the mariner's compass, the doubling of the Cape of Good Hope, and the discovery of America would, in any case, have made revolutions, electrifying the Church into a new career; but impressed as they were at once into the service of Protestantism, they became doubly rousing and revolutionary. Commerce and the mechanic arts, though not begotten of Protestantism, were soon adopted by it, baptized at its altars, and made to fight its battles for the dominion of the world. The pressure now is outward and downward. The forces of nature, deified by heathenism, distrusted and fought against by the ancient and mediæval Church as unfriendly to sanctity, have, in these latter days, been subdued and harnessed to human uses. Materialism has thus become the characteristic of modern times. Sterile, dividing oceans have become the highways of nations, idleness has given place to industry, and poverty to wealth. The spiritual life of the Church is thus assailed and endangered by a new foe. It is the world, as well as the flesh and the devil; the world, in multiplied forms of

fascination, and with a vigor of onset never before experienced, which now imperils our piety. There is no discharge in this war; we must fight it through. History sounds no retreats. The world will not go backward. Cloisters cannot save us. We have only to take the world as we find it, busy, rich, rampant as it is, and subdue it, as we subdue ourselves, to Christ.

Let us hope that the baptism of a better consecration is in store for us; when, on every sea, the keels of a Christian commerce shall go and come, and every land shall ring with Christian toil, and every fortune that is piled by Christian hands, shall rise as a Christian temple, and every form of fraud, injustice and oppression shall melt like icebergs drifting in a summer sea.

Revivals are preëminently characteristic of the modern life of the Church. Not that they are wholly new. Every age has had them. But never have they played so conspicuous and decisive a part in history, as within the last hundred years. From the time of Whitefield and the Wesleys until now, but especially upon our own continent, they have come like shocks from a galvanic battery, though with shortened intervals and diminished violence, renewing the graces of the Church, multiplying its agencies of beneficence, and hastening the Millennium. Like many other good things, they are peculiarly American; and from America they are making, or will make, the circuit of the globe.

In the sphere of doctrine, as already intimated, there remains not very much to be accomplished. The kingdoms have nearly all been conquered; the boundaries have nearly all been run. Innovations there may be, in mischievous abundance, but not many discoveries. Apparent novelties there may be, but, ten to one, they will turn out to be only patristic and mediæval fossils. Or, if something wholly new under the sun, still, ten to one, not true. Not that we mock at theological science, any more than we mock at philosophy in saying that modern thought has not outgone the range, or outdone the achievements of Plato and Aristotle. Standing upon the shoulders of the ancients, as we boast of doing, we

may see farther on over the landscape, but no deeper into the heavens ; we may enlarge our horizon, but we do not thereby lift our zenith.

There remains, as we have said, not very much to be accomplished, and yet enough to task the intelligence of Christendom, so long as Christendom shall stand. Exegesis, doubtless, has something yet to do in determining the sense of Scripture. The Bible has not yet been rifled of its treasures, any more than the Rocky Mountains have been rifled of their gold. Logic has something yet to do, as Emmons expressed it, "in making joints." Divers adjustments of doctrine to doctrine, leading to more comprehensive and better systems of divinity, may yet be made. And history, certainly, has something to do in reducing the apparent chaos of the centuries to a real Cosmos of providence and grace. But for absolutely new discoveries and settlements of doctrine, the chance is small, save in regard to the Church, the Millennium, the Intermediate State, the Resurrection, and the final abodes of the saved and lost. It is not in Theology proper, nor in Christology, nor in Anthropology, but mostly in Eschatology, that future explorers must win their laurels.

But what Christian scholar will, on this account, let his enthusiasm flag? Shall there be no more Ritters, because there can be no more Kanes and Livingstones? no more Humboldts, because there can be no more Keplers and Newtons? The great doctrines of Christianity are ever new, as well as ever old. The great thinkers of the future may think these doctrines all out again and again, each thinker for himself. Originality is always possible, for it is in the thinker, and not alone in the thought. New forms of infidelity will necessitate new forms of faith; new champions of error will require new champions of truth to hew them down; and the blades that do it must get their temper from the Promethean fire.

With this conception of Christianity, as an organism and a growth, it becomes a matter of vast practical moment to determine our own place and errand in regard to it. We are here on this virgin continent, sometimes called unhistoric, not that we may be severed from the past, but only from its entanglements. We are not one race, but an amalgam of several

racés. Not some little fraction of the past, Gallic, German, or English, but the whole of the past is our inheritance. Our roots are in every soil, and our fruit ought to be for the feeding of the nations. If there be any philosophy of history at all worthy of the name, any method of Providence discerned, or discernible, it points us to the conclusion, that here, between the Atlantic and the Pacific—the ocean of storms and the ocean of calms, lies the favored continent of the future. Here, where the Gospel was so late in planting its banner, where sects have multiplied and wrangled as no where else, and never before in history; where materialism has leaped to its millenium of thrift and comfort; here must the gravest issues of history be brought to trial. The grace of God, working, as hitherto, by means of periodic revivals, must still be invoked to save us from worldliness; the strife of sects must teach us all to be catholic, awaiting in hope the unity that is yet to be; material abundance must purchase for us the means and opportunities of a finer culture, and a wider and wiser beneficence; then shall we be the best, as well as the youngest, of the Christian nationalities, and from our shores, eastward and westward, shall go the ships that carry the world's redemption upon their decks.

ART. III.—ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

By D. R. GODWIN, D.D., HARTFORD, CONN.

Aristotle's Ethics; illustrated with Essays and Notes. By Sir A. GRANT. London: J. W. Parker. 2 vols. 8vo. 1858.

THE overshadowing influence of Aristotle's philosophy—even through gross corruptions of a fragmentary text, and grosser perversions of a circuitous translation; even though rarely half-understood, and often quite misunderstood—upon the scholastic thought of the Middle Ages, is very generally known and acknowledged. But its propagated and renewed influence upon modern thought and even modern phraseology, and especially upon modern English thought and phraseology,

is not so fully appreciated or so generally recognized. There seems to be an especial sympathy between the constitution of the Anglo-Saxon mind, and the spirit of the Aristotelian philosophy. The characteristic defects and merits of English philosophy may alike be traced to this peculiarity of mental constitution, and consequent tendency of mental culture and training. The English mind has gone to school to Aristotle, and has proved an apt scholar. Its many-sidedness, its strength of grasp and breadth of view, its slow apprehension of separate principles, its predominantly practical character, and its spirit of observation; and, on the other hand, its frequent inconsistencies and incongruities, its unsystematized and discordant variety, its natural antipathy to pure speculation, to absolute philosophic unity of conception, and to any thing like a super-sensuous idealism, are all strikingly Aristotelian.

But, perhaps, in no department has the influence of Aristotle been more distinctly impressed upon the generality of English minds, particularly among the educated classes, than in the department of Ethics—a result which is due in some degree to the fact that the *Nicomachæan Ethics* are so constantly and thoroughly studied in his Academic or University course, by almost every educated Englishman. Horace and the *Nicomachæan Ethics* are the leading and indispensable text-books of English classical training.

This influence, in its worst as well as in its best features, is strikingly exhibited, even in such and so late a work as Whewell's *Elements of Morality*. We find it there in three salient points: first, in the manner in which the writer mixes up ethics with politics or jurisprudence, floundering about, over and over again, in impotent efforts to give a consistent account of the relation between the principles of morality and positive law, now making the former dependent upon the latter, and now the latter upon the former, without ever being able to bring both views into intelligible harmony; secondly, in the manner in which he appeals to current language, not for the illustration merely but for the ascertainment of moral principles; and, thirdly, in his rejection or ignoring of any speculative idea in morals or law of evolution, substituting for phi-

losophic development, an empiric accumulation of particulars, and for a real basis of absolute ethical unity, what he calls an *ideal centre*—a centre which is, after all, a mere unreal mathematical point, whose position is ascertained, empirically, by tracing the assumed converging lines of certain virtues and duties generally recognized, to their common point of intersection, without condescending to explain to us how the direction of these lines was determined before the centre was known, nor how it was ascertained that they converge at all; or that, if they converge, they all meet in one common point of intersection. And, after all, how is an “ideal centre” to have the force and majesty of a fundamental moral principle, giving their moral character and sanction to all other moral principles? Whewell has travestied Aristotle. In the looseness of his empirical process he has out-Heroded Herod.

After all the developments of later ethical investigations, both on the Continent and in England, and particularly after the clear and unanswerable enunciations of Bishop Butler, the proceeding of Whewell can hardly seem less than unpardonable. It is true, the work we refer to claims to be only a statement of the *Elements* of Morality—a book for popular instruction. And we freely admit that it may be very useful for popular instruction, containing, as it does, “line upon line, line upon line, precept upon precept, precept upon precept, here a little and there a little;” but, in our apprehension, it would have been more correctly entitled, *the practical results and precepts*, than the *Elements* of Morality; for if morality is really based upon fundamental principles, then these principles must be its very *elements*.

It is true, the English mind has not worked altogether upon an Aristotelian model. There have always been some echoes of the true Platonic spirit. On this side have been found some of the greatest names and profoundest thinkers of whom England can boast. But they have not usually been popular. They have never taken a deep hold upon the common mind, or shaped the tone of national thought. They have, at best, exerted only a corrective and modifying influence.

We are happy to hail this book of Sir Alexander Grant as

belonging rather to this latter style of philosophizing than to the other. Although he has chosen the Ethics of Aristotle as his theme, and though he shows at once a thorough acquaintance with his author, and a full and even a zealous appreciation of his work, yet, we observe with sincere satisfaction, not unmingled with some surprise, that in his style and tendency of thought, he exhibits much more of the genuine Platonic spirit than has been common among English philosophical writers. Whenever Aristotle attacks the doctrines of Plato, Sir Alexander is always ready to take up the defence of the master against what he shows to be the mistaken and one-sided strictures of the pupil. We have rarely seen a more genial, appreciative, deep-sighted, and clear-sighted statement and defence, in a succinct form, of the Platonic doctrine of *ideas*, than is contained in one of these essays of Mr. Grant. And when we follow him up to Plato's magnificent view of the unity of all science and being in the idea of *the good*, we cannot but sorely regret the unspeakable loss to modern science and philosophy, which has arisen from the wider and wider *separation* of the different departments of knowledge and thought. Every thing thus tends to become fragmentary, one-sided and distorted; and a general view of the whole, instead of developing the unity of a grand, substantive, creative idea, becomes a mere inventory or synopsis of a heterogeneous confusion and chaos. The true centre of observation is lost, or is looked out from with optics that can discern only the nearest and pettiest things, magnifying them so that they hide and efface all the circling universe that lies beyond. The man of physical science sees every thing not only from his subordinate centre, but with the spectacles of his special department—the astronomer with astronomic spectacles, the geologist with geologic spectacles, the chemist with chemical spectacles, the mathematician with mathematical spectacles, the politician with political spectacles, the artist with artistic spectacles, the economist with economic spectacles, the metaphysician with metaphysic spectacles, the scholar with classical spectacles, the moralist with ethical spectacles, and even the theologian with theologic spectacles.

Yes, even Theology, which should be the science of sciences, the centre and mother of all the others, has, in her narrow-mindedness and short-sightedness, submitted to be a mere restricted department by the side of the others; from the mistress she has condescended to become the drudge, and this partly by her own fault and partly as a necessary result of the prevailing tendency of the times. This division and segregation of different departments may have tended, like the division of labor in general, to a far greater development and perfection of each department than would probably have been attained without them; still it cannot fail to be perceived that they have sadly interfered with the general elevation, the full and proper development of humanity itself in its truest, noblest, and broadest character, and with human philosophy in its highest and manliest sense. What our modern philosophy wants most, is a greater infusion of the spirit and method of Plato. Not by any means that Aristotle should be depreciated or neglected, but studied—as it seems to us Mr. Grant would present him—not as the substitute, but the complement of Plato.

These Essays of Mr. Grant not only set forth, as we have said, with a high and genial appreciation, the relation of Plato to the Aristotelian Ethics, but they present a very happy development or epitome of the whole progress of Ethical Philosophy in Greece before the times of Aristotle, particularly as connected with the teachings of the Sophists and the powerful impulse of Socrates. Indeed, we regard these Essays as containing one of the most readable and valuable synoptical accounts of the character and development of the early Grecian philosophy which the English language possesses. The tact of the writer in grouping and development may be seen to advantage in the following passage:

“Renouncing any attempt to trace a succession of systems, (which indeed did not exist,) until we come to the limited period of development between Socrates and Aristotle, let us take a broader view of the subject and divide morality into three eras: first, the era of popular or unconscious morals; second, the transitional, skeptical, or sophistic era; thirdly, the philosophic or conscious era. These different stages appear to succeed each other in the

national and equally in the individual mind. The simplicity and trust of childhood, the unsettled and undirected force of youth, and the wisdom of matured life. First, we believe because others do so; then, in order to obtain personal convictions, we pass through a stage of doubt; then we believe the more deeply and in a somewhat different way from what we did at the outset. On these three distinct periods or aspects of thought about moral subjects much might be said. The first thing to remark is, that they are not only successive to each other, if you regard the mind of the most cultivated and advanced thinkers of successive epochs, but also they are contemporaneous and in juxtaposition to each other, if you regard the different degrees of cultivation and advancement among persons of the same epoch."

In regard to the character and genuineness of the several Ethical Treatises ascribed to Aristotle, the author's views, as given in his First Essay, are defended with a little too much, it seems to us, of the pertinacity of special pleading; yet, on the whole, we entirely agree with him in his preference of the Nicomachæan Ethics over the Eudæmian and the Magna Moralia, and in his general hypothesis in regard to the origin and state of the text. And we cannot help observing, in passing, how vastly greater the obscurity and uncertainty which hang over the authorship and genuineness of such classical works as these, than can be alleged against any of the Books of the New Testament. Yet we read these works with a tolerable degree of confidence that we are reading the words of Aristotle.

We have not space to follow our author through his analysis and general *critique* of Aristotle's Ethical System. This work he has done, for the most part, with a masterly hand. It is evident that he has thoroughly studied and comprehended his subject. His criticism of *terms* prepares us to expect unusual philosophical as well as linguistic discrimination and insight in the notes which are to follow. We venture, however, to suggest that, in his commentary upon that most difficult of Aristotælian terms, *ἐνέργεια*, he has pursued his analysis to a termination quite too shadowy when he resolves it substantially into *consciousness*. It is not only consciousness, but also that of which one is conscious. It is the *content* of consciousness. It is not so much an act of consciousness as a *conscious act* or conscious activity, and conscious activity consid-

ered according to Aristotle *objectively*, rather than *subjectively*. We may add, as a trifling point of language, that in speaking of the style of Gorgias, (p. 86,) he, rather strangely, translates τὸ ξενίζειν by "the strangeness" instead of "the metaphorical" or "figurative" character of Gorgias's diction. He seems to us also, in his discussion of the principle of Protagoras, "that man is the measure of all things," to have fallen himself into the net which the sophist had laid for him, in confounding objective existence with subjective knowledge, or at least making the former dependent upon the latter. "One of the main purposes of Philosophy," says he, "is to lift men out of their common unreflecting belief in the *absolute* existence of external objects into so much idealism as this. Objects exist only in relation to a subject, but not necessarily in relation to individual perceptions." But what matters it whether they exist only in relation to individual perceptions or to "the universal reason of man"? If thus only they exist, then to this knowledge, perception, or apprehension of "the universal reason of man," they must owe their whole being. Its cognition creates them. This is the apparent result of Hamilton's metaphysical school. We know only relations, therefore nothing exists but relations. We can conceive of relations, but we cannot conceive of any thing existing independently of and antecedently to the relations; therefore there are relations without any thing related.

Grant endeavors to screen Aristotle from Kant's charge of Eudæmonism, but it seems to us not quite successfully. For while in a large portion of the Ethics Aristotle pursues the discussion without the recognition of any fundamental or ultimate moral principle whatever, even when he comes to such a principle, he finds none higher or deeper than *happiness*—not mere pleasure indeed, but still *happiness*, and that an empirical happiness. In accordance with his philosophic duality of the practical and the intelligible, he endeavors indeed to idealize this happiness, to raise it above the sphere of the practical to that of the intelligible, to make it consist in certain moments of pure philosophic contemplation. But this is a procedure perfectly analogous to that of Paley, who thought

to sanctify his Eudæmonistic theory by placing everlasting happiness as the end of virtue.

It is remarkable that while *τὸ δίκαιον* and *τὸ δέον* are among the familiar words of the Grecian language long before the time of Aristotle, neither he nor the Greek philosophers before him ever apprehended the fundamental character, in morals, of the idea of *right*, of *absolute right*, of immutable and eternal moral distinctions, or even the corresponding idea of duty and moral obligation. Aristotle knows nothing of the authority of conscience—nothing of the subjective relation of the will to the moral action. While he incidentally gives some very pertinent arguments in confirmation of the doctrine of the freedom of the will, he never alleges a sense of responsibility in proof of it. “His *Μεσότης* expresses the objective law of beauty in action, and as correlative with it the critical moral faculty in our minds, but the law of right in action as something binding on the moral subject it leaves unexpressed.” On the whole, Grant has given a very satisfactory development of what Aristotle intended by his “doctrine of the mean,” and he has shown conclusively that it does not reach to the real moral content and moral principle of actions. It is merely an æsthetical view of moral character.

It would seem that Aristotle did not, with Plato, believe in the proper personal immortality of the soul, but adopted rather the oriental doctrine of the elevation and absorption of the individual in the higher and immortal universal reason. And yet he has left the remarkable phrase, that “the soul may be related to the body as the sailor to the boat.”

He evidently did not accept the Polytheism of his times, and, metaphysically, his Theology is strikingly elevated and pure. Yet he denied morality to God, as unworthy of him. He recognized marks of design in nature, as distinctly as ever Paley did, and yet, strangely enough, he seems to have felt no necessity for supposing a designer or Creator. He seems to have thought that a certain blind reaching-forward to an end, a sort of unconscious intelligence, was immanent in nature itself. Aristotle's God would have been as much degraded by

acts of creation and Providence, as by the possession of a moral character.

It is the recognition of man's present state as but the entrance upon our immortal existence, and of Theology and especially of Christianity in their true relation to moral truths and sanctions, that has so completely metamorphosed Ethical science since the days of Aristotle. Butler's doctrine, too, of absolute and immutable moral distinctions has done much in the same direction; and we must beg to say, in passing, that we do not think Mr. Grant speaks of Butler, when he alludes to him, with the respect which he deserves.

Still another very striking distinction between the Aristotelian Ethics and Modern Ethics, yet remains to be mentioned. In Aristotle, and more still in Plato, Ethics is treated as a mere off-shoot, a subordinate branch, of politics. The individual is absorbed in the State. In Book V. of Eudemus, where the Aristotelian doctrine of the *just* or *right* is most fully developed, it is defined according to the principles of Jurisprudence and Political Economy. "To make these a part of morals," says Grant, "would be a confusion we should never now fall into, though we might confess that it would be hard to give the ethical idea of justice its full content without appealing to these extraneous sciences." And yet this is a "*confusion*" into which Whewell seems to have fallen more helplessly even than Aristotle himself. But is it not abundantly clear, that if moral distinctions, if the very idea or the fact of right, is made to depend upon and be determined by the positive enactments of the State, then must the State itself and its enactments be bereft of all moral character? Those enactments would be neither right nor wrong, for they could be referred to no rule, and judged by no criterion. They would be mere arbitrary dicta. The theory which places the ultimate and fundamental basis of right in this positive will, whether of a human legislator or of God, plainly deprives that legislator and God himself of all claims to a moral character. They can neither be righteous, just nor holy, because there would be no rule by which their actions could be judged.

The doctrine of conscience and of absolute right have doubtless been abused—and what true doctrine has not been? But this abuse is not to be remedied by fanatically scouting at conscience and absolute right, and all law or rule higher than positive legislative enactments. All this modern *twaddle* (we beg pardon for the expression, but we cannot speak respectfully) about the absolute supremacy and infallibility of the State can only serve to undermine what little ethical sense we have. It contains, if possible, a greater absurdity and a grosser self-contradiction than the infallibility of the Pope; for it appeals directly to the very conscience whose authority it denies; or if, like the Popish doctrine, it attempt to support itself by Scripture, it, in the same breath, rejects the superior authority of the very Scripture on which it professes to rely.

Let us thank God that, under the guiding light of Christianity, we have reached a knowledge of ethical principles which is not dependent upon human enactments, but upon which the authority of all human enactments, as binding upon the conscience, must ultimately rest.

ART. IV.—CONDITIONS OF VOLUNTARY ACTION.

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THE great question concerning the will has been, whether it is self-determining. The meaning of self-determining, when connected with the will, is, that it is the cause of its own acts, with power to the contrary, involving the inference, that it regulates its choices by its choices. This whole question was carefully examined by President Edwards, and supposed to be settled. It has, however, so close a relation to all theological vagaries, that their victims will keep starting it as something still open. One of our religious publications has lately said, that there is “no phrase which is a more exact and condensed expression of truth upon the subject of the will, than that it determines itself.”

It will be observed, that the question, whether the will determines itself, is quite different from the question, whether the rational man determines himself. Perhaps the analysis of the mind has led many to attribute some things to a single power, which may be applicable to the whole. President Edwards says: "When we speak of the powers or principles of acting or doing such things, we mean that the agents which have these powers of acting, do them in the exercise of those powers. When we say the understanding discerns, we mean the soul in the exercise of that faculty. So when it is said, that the will decides or determines, the meaning must be, that the person in the exercise of a power of willing or choosing, or the soul acting voluntarily, determines." If this language of President Edwards is accepted, if it is the soul acting always, and not one power to the exclusion of others, we may be sure that the struggle upon the matter of self-determination will be brief. A distinction has been made between the voluntary and volitional power. The voluntary power is the entire mind. It is the whole man, whose machinery is large and full enough to embrace a world of causes and effects within itself. If this is the voluntary power referred to; if there is no will but that which comprises not only choices but affections, and what in distinction from ordinary choices is called permanent inclination, or the taste of Dr. Burton, then there can be no hazard in supposing that such a voluntary power is its own regulator.* It is the faculty of will, standing apart from the conviction of the understanding and the affections of the heart; the particular volition that starts independently of its surrounding circle of thought and feeling, that has seemed to many so worthless a director of human actions, so idle a token of human freedom. They feel the necessity of a permanent vol-

* Edwards seems to prefer dichotomy in his mental analysis. In some of his works, he views the affections as different from the will only in the degree and manner of exercise. Thus Part 1, Sec. 1, of the *Religious Affections*, he says: "The will and the affections of the soul are not two faculties; the affections are not essentially distinct from the will, nor do they differ from the mere actings of the will and inclination, but only in the liveliness and sensibility of exercise." The first section of his *Treatise on the Will*, has similar statements.

untary nature, which may have a character, and give a character, to the transient volitions that are its products.

But it is plain that the large body of those who have contended for "self-determination," have no such idea of voluntary being as this. The faculty of will with them is distinct, a faculty of choices or particular volitions. It is upon the independent action of this faculty, that the whole character of God and man is based. This is manifestly the way in which the term is used by the controversialists with Edwards. In the same way it seems to have been used by Dr. Taylor, of New-Haven, in his effort to sustain the notion that there is no free agency, where there is no power of contrary choice. It is manifestly used thus by all those since, who have made it the great weapon of attack upon the Calvinistic idea of original sin, and the truths which necessarily grow out of it, or have been divinely connected with it. It is therefore proper in discussing the questions at issue, to recognize this long-allowed, three-fold division of the faculties. Perhaps it ought always to be recognized. To disprove such a division and distinct action of our faculties, which are working together, it is not enough, to say that we cannot always express the precise difference between them in words, or mark the dividing line so as to tell where each begins and ends its service. Consciousness tells us, that thought, emotion, volition, are not the same.* The operations of one are not to be confounded with those of the other. Nor is it to be supposed that they can be so merged, that they may not act upon each other as causal influences, or stand to each other in the relation of effects. If any one objects that the dividing line is not made clear by verbal statements, we can only say that there are some notions and

* "As perceptions and affections generally differ, philosophers have distinguished them, and formed them into distinct classes; and so they have admitted the existence of two faculties. And for the same reason they admit two, they ought to grant there are three faculties. For when we attend to the affections and to volitions, it is evident there is a generic difference between them. It is evident that pain, pleasure and desire are not volitions, and have no similarity to those voluntary exertions which produce effects on the body and in other things around us."—Burton's *Essays*, p. 93.

feelings which are too striking not to be known, but too simple to admit of explanation.

It seems plain, that if the will be one of the attributes or faculties of the soul, it must be subject to the fundamental conditions of the substance to which it belongs. To set up for it a wholly irresponsible and independent action, is to make it a distinct existence. As long as we consider it only an attribute of the soul, as the understanding and affections are, it will, like them, be subordinate to the conditions of that existence to which it belongs. So that it will not do to cut off the question as to the reasons of the will's action by saying that it wills because it wills, any more than it will do to say that the understanding thinks because it thinks, or the heart loves because it loves. A will absolutely contingent in its action, as it has been represented by some, exempt from all conditions, would be an anomaly among the powers of the mind, and the objects of the universe. To say that the will acts contingently, is to say that it has an empire of its own, into which even the God who gave it may not enter, and whose decisions neither God nor man may venture to calculate. There is no logical consequence more clear, than that divine or human calculation respecting the movements of the will is vain, if it has no law but this, that it may "choose or not choose, act or not act."

The plain fact however is, that the will is as immediately under law, as is any mental power. The laws that govern it, may be the same in language, though not the same in their mode of operation, as those which regulate material things. As far as causation signifies, that certain things are preceded by certain other things, without whose antecedence they will not exist, it is as applicable to the mind as to any outward object.* The reasoning that makes the will independent of causation, would seem to take from us every notion of our exist-

* "The word 'cause' is often used in so restrained a sense as to signify only that which has a positive efficiency or influence to produce a thing, or bring it to pass. But there are many things which have no such positive productive influence, which yet are causes in this respect, that they have truly the nature of a reason why some things are rather than others; or why they are thus rather than otherwise."—*Edwards on Freedom of the Will*, Part 2d, Sec. 3d.

ence, except its present ideas and sensations, and every imagination of the existence of God. Edwards has truly said: "We have no way of proving any thing else but by arguing from effects to causes. We infer the past existence of ourselves, or any thing else, by memory, only as we argue that the ideas which are now in our minds are the consequences of past ideas and sensations. But if things may be without causes, all this necessary connection and dependence is dissolved, and so all means of our knowledge is gone. If there be no difficulty or absurdity in supposing one thing to start out of non-existence into being of itself without a cause, then there is no difficulty in supposing the same of millions of millions." There is certainly a very great absurdity in the idea, which legitimately leads to such results.

The author of the work *Nature and the Supernatural*, says: "Only the will is not under the law of cause and effect." He also says, that: "Thought, memory, association, feeling, are under the law of cause and effect." It is plain that he here uses the terms as they are used in reference to material things; and if he does, he is arguing against a man of straw, when so vehemently assailing Edwards. Edwards never supposed that things external to the will were working upon it with such positive efficiency, as the objects of nature work upon each other. He says, most truly, that the will is under the law of cause and effect, but not in the same way that the stars are; and he has no idea of the will, or what is sometimes called "a power," in distinction from a thing, being the only cause, a cause that is as efficiently and uncontrollably working as God himself.* It appears to us that the great difficulty on this subject has been the material light in which it has been viewed. If the law of causation is acting in precisely the same way in mental as in natural objects, then indeed responsibility may be

* "It is indeed as repugnant to reason to suppose that an act of the will should come into existence without a cause, as to suppose the human soul, or an angel, or the globe of the earth, or the whole universe, should come into existence without a cause. . . . Moral causes may be causes in as proper a sense as any causes whatsoever; may have as real an influence, and as truly be the ground and reason of an event's coming to pass."—*Freedom of the Will*, Part 2d, Sec. 3d.

supposed to cease. But we know the difference. It is a matter of consciousness, that the operation of understanding or feeling upon the will is an unconstrained operation. The difference between the movements of matter and mind is a felt difference, however difficult it may be to express it, so that it shall be immediately detected. Sir William Hamilton says: "To suppose a positive and special principle of causality, is to suppose that there is expressly revealed to us, through intelligence, an affirmation of the fact that there exists no free causation; that is, that there is no cause which is not itself merely an effect, existence being only a series of determined antecedents and determined consequents." Perhaps this statement comes from carrying the idea of material causation into a sphere where it does not belong. The acts of the will are in no sense caused like the changes of material things, unless it be in the reality of the causation. Nor can we suppose a causation more free than when the movements of a man's will are flowing from the pleasure of his heart. If merely being an effect is the ruin of freedom, then it is most certainly ruined. For every thing is an effect, considered in relation to the "First Cause." Therefore we do not wonder that with this idea, Hamilton could say: "How the will can possibly be free, must remain to us, under the present limitation of our faculties, wholly incomprehensible; we are unable to conceive an absolute commencement." Now we deny that it is necessary to conceive an "absolute commencement," in order to conceive of free will. That which hinders free will in any person, is the being obliged to do a thing contrary to his will, or being hindered from doing according to his will. But how it can make the idea of free will inconceivable, to have all its acts subject to the pleasure of its possessor, we can not conceive. What higher token of free will can there be, than that we will according to our wishes? The manifest connection which God has established between the desire of the heart, and choosing the object of that desire, is the guarantee that the liberty of the will never will, and never can be, abridged. Sir William says: "The fact that we are free is given to us in the consciousness of an uncompromising law of duty, in the con-

sciousness of our moral accountability." This is true, and equally true is it that our consciousness applies the law of causation to the mind as well as to matter, though not in the same way. If the second is a delusive teaching of the mind, so may the first be: "*Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.*"

The action of the will must be uniform. This may be called a second condition of our voluntary movements. They follow as settled an order as other operations of mind. Sensation, perception, memory, reasoning, imagination, belief, and association, act always in the same way, when the circumstances are precisely the same. And we see no reason whatever for admitting that the will, whenever the circumstances are the same, will be any thing but uniform in its operations. It has always been regarded as an intuitive principle, that the same substance will always exhibit the same properties; that the same cause, under the same circumstances, will always be followed by the same effect. No distinction can be made between mind and matter in regard to the uniformity of their movements. Any chance starting of the mind upon a new track, when there are no new occasions, is impossible. Such an occurrence would be the signal, that all calculation upon our own or other's arrangements for the morrow would be idle, even though the morrow should be as this day.

The action of the will must be in connection with motives. This may be considered as a third condition, or, perhaps, a varied form of the first. Philosophers have tried to imagine cases in which there could be no ground or motive for the will's choosing one thing in preference to another, that seems nearly identical. But the common-sense of men tells them that volition can not take place without some previous reason to induce it. Only so far as the will acts from motives or intentions, is it rational. Dugald Stewart says, in reply to Dr. Reid: "One thing is clear and indisputable, that it is only in so far as a man acts from motives or intentions that he is entitled to the character of a rational being." These motives may be within us as appetites, passions, and affections, or without us in objects that affect our internal propensities. But whether without or within, they are certainly antecedent to

voluntary exertions, and not the things which the will chooses by its self-moving capacity, and which make what some have called the "passive ground of its action." Sir William Hamilton says, "The doctrine of a motiveless volition would be only casualism," and does not hesitate to add that "the free acts of an indifferent will are morally and rationally worthless." But some have preferred this worthless kind of acting of the will, to the direct and full acknowledgment that it is swayed by motive. The reason must be this, that they suppose the influence of moral motives to arise from that physical necessity which excites and governs the inanimate world. Perhaps those who have thus confounded things that differ, and blended all causes and effects together, can not be treated to better language than that of the distinguished Bishop Horsley: "The source of their mistake is this, that they imagine a similitude between things that admit of no comparison—between the influence of a moral motive upon mind, and that of mechanical force upon matter. A moral motive and a mechanical force are both indeed causes, and equally certain causes each of its proper effects; but they are causes in very different senses of the word, and derive their energy from the most opposite principles. Force is only another name for an efficient cause: it is that which impresses motion upon body, the passive recipient of a foreign impulse. A moral motive is what is more significantly called a final cause, and can have no influence but with a being that proposes to itself an end, chooses means, and thus puts itself in action. It is true that while this is my end, and while I conceive this to be the means, a definite act will as certainly follow that definite choice and judgment of mind, provided it be free from all external restraint and impediment, as a determinate motion will be excited in a body by a force applied in a given direction. There is in both cases an equal certainty of the effect; but the principle of the certainty in the one case and the other is entirely different, which difference necessarily arises from the different nature of final and efficient causes." These sayings of Horsley are sufficient to set aside the objection to moral motive that has been drawn from its supposed likeness to a

material force. It is only necessary to add to his excellent remarks, that it is not merely a moral motive as found abstractly in some threat or invitation of the Gospel, that induces choice. It is only through meeting a corresponding disposition, that such a motive operates.

We have stated certain conditions or laws, which regulate the will. In view of them, some questions would seem to be settled. We say "seem," because we would be far from being arrogant upon a subject beset to finite minds with difficulties. Metaphysicians of the keenest discernment have often passed by the will in considering the mind, with as much care as some shrewd commentators have passed by Solomon's Song, when explaining the Bible. Yet what appears to be settled, it may not be unwise to state.

The first question that may be considered as settled is that which concerns the "power of contrary choice." The meaning of this phrase is, that the will while directed to certain objects by particular affections, may and can direct itself, of its own motion, to opposite objects. It certainly does not mean the natural power of choosing one thing as well as another; that the faculty by which a man chooses is as well calculated to operate upon the opposite of what he chooses, as upon what is actually chosen. For no man in his senses denies such a capacity as this, or supposes that the will is under any kind of involuntary restraint from choosing the opposite of what it does choose. But when it is asserted that the will can in any proper sense of the term whatever, at a given time, and under the influence of given sensibilities, choose opposite from what it does, the assertion seems to involve an absurdity. You might as well say that you can walk north and south at the same moment, or that the body you have set in motion can, while it is going one way, be also moving another. When you have ceased to walk south, you may walk north. The schoolmen used to speak of a thing's being true "*in sensu composito*," which was not true "*in sensu diviso*." It is plain "*in sensu composito*" that when the hand is going down it can not be going up, and plain also "*in sensu diviso*" after the hand has gone down it may go up. Because it is impossible, for the

will to go another way than that which it is going at a given time and under given circumstances, it does not follow that it may not go thus at a different time, and amid changed circumstances. The question is not upon the power of choosing one thing or another. The great question is, whether the power of choice can, of its own motion, go forth in opposition to the judgment at present formed, and the motives that are received by the reason and felt in the heart, and already inclining the will in a certain direction? And this appears to us to be in substance no other than the idle question, whether a man can choose and not choose at the same time, a given object. The ability to choose if a man will choose, if it means any thing, certainly does not mean any real possibility of going contrary to the choice now in exercise. Unless there is some possibility of a contrary choice, it is idle to talk of the power of choosing contraries. A latent unavailable power, a power merely to choose if we do choose, a power to go a different way from what we do, if the laws of the mind and its mode of operation were entirely altered, is not worth contending for. The instance of a man's choosing contrary to what he does choose, is not to be found, and therefore it is reasonable to suppose that no such power exists. A latent unexercised power cannot be asserted by us—"De non apparentibus et de non existentibus eadem est lex." The certainty of choice under peculiar frames of mind is established. We are certain what the character of the infant's first choice will be, and what will be the character of the Divine acts of choice, when we know that the first will choose from the influence of a depraved, and the latter from that of a holy nature. But if thus certain, then it is clear that there can be no real possibility of a contrary choice. The actual possibility that a contrary choice may occur, implies that there can be no certainty as to what the choice will be. If we find in the heart of an infant, and in the nature of God, an infallible cause of a wrong choice in the one, and of a right choice in the other, we find something that will, unless the nature is changed, forever prevent the choice of the one being holy, and the other being sinful. If the motives, or the state of the mind, are otherwise than now, then the choice may be

otherwise than now. But to suppose that the volitions might have been otherwise than they are, the motives and state of the mind being the same, would be to leave men and God no better than the sport of chance. This hypothetical possibility every body is welcome to make the most of in explaining the difficulties in the Divine arrangement. Only let them not suppose that the saying a rational being has power to do right if he should choose to do right, or to do wrong if he should choose to do wrong, is equivalent to a power of contrary choice, or favors the notion that the will while inclined in one direction can be inclined in an opposite direction, or puts it for a moment in doubt whether the child's action while unconverted will be wrong, and the action of God's unchangeable nature right.

Some object that we argue against the power of contrary choice, as though it were the self-same with the Arminian self-determining power. The reason is, that both of them are designed for the same purposes, and both when put to the test assume the same aspect. What the Arminians and contrary choice men both desire is, to show some stronger "bona fide" basis of obligation than the Calvinists have; and what they deem some brighter illumination of the moral government of God, than the Calvinistic idea seems to warrant. They are neither of them satisfied that all which is necessary for accountability is, that God originally gave men an understanding to perceive objects and their differences, a heart with holy desires and affections, a will ready to carry out what the understanding may plan and the feelings may yearn for, and that he does not hinder men from carrying their plans into execution and gratifying the desires of their hearts. The power wholly to suspend choosing, which the Arminians claimed, is precisely that which the "contrary choice" men need, if they would have their power to the contrary in any degree intelligible. The power to stop going north, when motives are leading you there, comes so near suspending voluntary action until you can put yourself under the motives which lead you south, that no man can tell the difference between them. The power of contrary choice, if it mean any thing, must be equivalent to the Armi-

nian power to suspend the operation of motive. The power to choose contrary to motives that now control us, is a power that overrides them, that sets them aside, that frames to itself a new set of motives, and then follows in their train. "Contrary choice" men may not wish to have the Arminian phase put upon their theory. The theory of the Arminians was definite, and had this tangible value in their eyes: that the will was made by it the monarch among motives, played with them as the leviathan does with the waters of the sea, pushed them aside, cast them up and down, preserved the most perfect quiet amid them, and rushed through them no matter with what swiftness and strength they might be rolling along and pressing. The "contrary choice" men must take up this theory, if they would be consistent. Their power, if any thing, is the Arminian power to slip loose from the present governing motive, and so to act without motive until some new motive is selected, from which there is at all times the most easy release. Nor can they claim any certainty that is worth calling certain. An actual power is a power that may be exercised. If you have a substance that has no explosive power, it is certain that it will not explode. But if you have gun-powder, then you have no certainty that it will not explode, save by removing every thing which is so connected with it as to be essential to its possession of the explosive power. You have to remove the power, before you can escape contingency. We do not say that a power does not exist, which has never actually been exercised. But we do say that there is no such power, which may not be exercised. Therefore certainty respecting its operations is no better than the certainty of contingency. The "contrary choice" men think they escape from the absurdity of an infinite series of choices. They may, if their power is only supposed to be latent. But if not latent, it is a power in action. Then how is the will to go contrary to its present act but by an act of the will? And if it be by voluntary action that we are turned from our present tendency, then we are certainly on the old Arminian way to that series of choices which has no beginning. The "contrary choice" men certainly mean something more than what has been sometimes

asserted by them, that the will may apply itself to different objects, and that every time it is exercised it is showing a power to the contrary. If the mere action of the will is all the power to the contrary it has to exhibit, we have no objection to it. If this be all, then these philosophers are certainly in this distinguished from Arminians, but not very favorably as controversialists. For they have been all the time contending for something which no one disputes. The Arminian idea is, that when the will has acted it might quite as easily have acted in an opposite way, though the external and internal influences were the same. The Calvinistic idea is, that the will cannot be conceived to take an opposite direction, until the influence under which it acts have been changed. With which of the two do the "contrary choice" men agree? If really differing from Arminians in the matter of the will, they may claim to be Edwardean. Do they go with Edwards or with Dr. John Taylor in relation of fallen man's will to holiness and sin? In part third, chapter first, of *Original Sin*, we find the following: "He insists upon it that 'when men have not sufficient power to do their duty, they have no duty to do. We may safely and assuredly conclude, that mankind in all parts of the world have sufficient power to do the duty which God requires of them; and that he requires of them no more than they have sufficient powers to do.' And in another place: 'God has given powers equal to the duty which he expects.' And he expresses a great dislike to R. R.'s supposing, that our propensities to evil, and temptations, are too strong to be effectually and constantly resisted; or that we are unavoidably sinful in a degree; that our appetites and passions will be breaking out, notwithstanding our everlasting watchfulness." These things fully imply, that men have in their own natural ability sufficient means to avoid sin, and to be perfectly free from it; and so from all the bad consequences of it. And if the means are sufficient, then there is no need of more; and therefore there is no need of Christ dying in order to it. What Dr. T. says fully implies, that it would be unjust in God to give mankind being in such circumstances, as that they would be more likely to sin, so as to be exposed to final misery, than other-

wise. Hence, then, without Christ and his redemption, and without any grace at all, mere justice makes sufficient provision for our being free from sin and misery, by our own power." We ask again, do the "contrary choice" men go with Edwards or with John Taylor? The "power to the contrary" seems to us a power that is as adequate to choose holiness as sin; and this is the power which Taylor claimed. No man can claim for it the most distant kindred with the ideas which Edwards cherished and expressed.

There is a second question, which our principles seem to settle, and that is the relation of the will to what are called strong and weak motives. Dr. Bushnell makes himself merry with Edwards's idea, that the will always follows the strongest motive,* and says, that in all wrong or blamable action, we take the weakest and most worthless motive, and that the very gist of our sin is, that we follow the motive which is so weak. He seems to have forgotten what "motive" means in the language of those who use the word philosophically. It does not mean an object abstractly considered. No doubt the will often follows the lower object, to the neglect of objects of infinite excellence. And if all that men mean by "motive" is some object abstractly considered, then no one need argue the question, whether men are led by the weaker or the stronger. But philosophically, the motive means the object in the concrete, as it stands in view of the mind. Hence, it is plain, that a motive may have the highest strength, when the object that is pursued is of the most worthless character. In this sense, and no other, does the will follow the strongest motive. The object itself may be no motive to one man, while it is a strong motive to another. The object may be a motive at one time, which has, comparatively speaking, ceased to be a motive at another. But where there is a definite motive,

* "That motive which has a less degree of previous advantage or tendency to move the will, or which appears less inviting, as it stands in the view of the mind, is what I call a *weaker* motive. On the contrary, that which appears most inviting, and has, by what appears concerning it, to the understanding or apprehension, the greatest degree of previous tendency to excite and induce the choice, is what I call the *strongest* motive. And, in this sense, I suppose the will is always determined by the strongest motive."—*Freedom of the Will*. Part 1st, Section 2d.

strong either from the abstract object, or the object and disposition united, then we must either directly oppose one of the great laws under which the human mind operates, or say that the will follows and is determined by the strongest motive. A motive is that which tends to move the will, and without which, as most persons concede, the will does not move. That which tends most strongly to move it, is the strongest motive; that which tends least to move it, is the weakest motive. If the will should follow the weakest motive, it would become independent of one of its great laws, and really act without motive. As far as the motive is weak, just so far it has ceased to be a motive. When the motives are presented, the will is to be led by the one or the other. If it takes that which is in its view the weaker, then most certainly it acts without any real inducement. It does more than simply act without motive; it acts contrary to the very motive by which it is its law to be influenced. This is surely a more proper subject of merriment, than the old idea of Edwards, that the will follows the strongest motive. Dr. Bushnell says: "Could Edwards return to look on the uses now made of his argument, his saintly spirit might be possibly stirred with some doubts of its validity." The point is not, what uses are made of his argument, but what *just uses* are made of it. The "saintly spirit" of Edwards need not be troubled because his own clear statement of a law, under which the human mind moves, is made the basis of schemes which would free that mind from all responsibility in its action, and make its crimes uncriminal. It would be necessary for him still to insist that the will is governed by the strongest motive, or else to say, that it goes and comes without motive, or positively against motive.

The question, also, seems settled, how far sin is necessarily voluntary. The whole matter depends upon the use of the word "voluntary." An old writer says: "In the will we are to conceive suitable and appropriate affections to those we call passions in the sensitive part. Thus in the will, as it is a rational appetite, there are love, joy, desire, fear and hatred, so that the will loveth, the will rejoiceth, the will desireth." Now, with such a view of the will, whose acts embrace

emotions and affections, there can be no sin save in its direct act. Nor will any view of the will which can be sustained for a moment, allow any thing to be sin which is strictly involuntary, which exists in opposition to the will, willing the contrary. But when we allow, according to the usual philosophy, that these emotions and affections are apart from the will, then certainly we may allow of sin without a distinct volition to produce it. The position that sin is necessarily from an act of choice, and cannot exist without it, most certainly carries us back to the hypothesis of a choice before the first choice. If there is any sin any where, it must be in those affections which have colored every object in heaven and earth, and made them minister to our waywardness and departure from God. To make any conscious act of choice the author of these corrupting and corrupted affections, is to make the child the father of him who begets him. The truth in the case is, that each particular volition depends for its existence upon an antecedent temper or disposition. The thoughts and feelings of the soul, to which the voluntary power never acts in opposition, make a sinful or a righteous character, too great a thing to be produced by an *isolated volition*. The sin in the drunkard's individual act, is not, simply, in the volition through which he takes the cup, but in that degraded state of the affections, which leads him to overlook every thing valuable in eternity and time for a momentary and destructive gratification of appetite. The sin which is in the fallen race of Adam, does not originate in a distinct act of choice, but has its seat in that prior state, call it what you may, through which every choice is certain to be sinful, and the soul made liable to eternal death.* If the lust which the apostle speaks of as bringing forth sin, is not sin, then the fountain of all corruption is to be considered as morally pure, though every

* "Back of sins, it (Christianity) recognizes sin; back of the acts a state which they express and represent." (*Nature and the Supernatural*, p. 514.) Our own view of the relation of ordinary volitions to permanent dispositions could not be better expressed. It is a happy comment upon the Saviour's saying: "Out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witness, blasphemies."

stream that flows from it is vile, and made vile by it. Were we inclined to say that "original sin was no sin," because it is not the result of a conscious act of the will, we should be inclined to say, also, that there never was, and never can be, any sin in the universe of God. It is a *ὑστερον πρότερον* most certainly to have your conscious act of will sinful, and no sin in the state of the mind from which that act takes its rise.

It is easy to see how choices have been made the beginning and end of all conceptions of sin. There are many to whom individual choices are the alpha and omega of the soul, springing from nothing, though resulting in the greatest changes which the human mind can conceive. If the water is conceived as gushing up without any earth, it is no wonder that the water should become the whole subject of thought and speculation. It is different, when the water is viewed not as self-starting, self-moving, self-coloring, but, in origin and movement, dependent upon the earth from which it takes its rise. There are many to whom distinct individual choices are but reflections of the deep, underlying disposition. Therefore, they never can be occupied so much as others with special acts of choice, or say that sin waits to be produced by a distinct act of choice; that nothing can be sinful which is not from an act of choice, and so that the first choice cannot be sinful, unless it is, before it is. But they do say, that all sin is voluntary, in the sense that the will rises not against the disposition, but concurs with and follows it. Every sin is a willing sin; the will approves, and there is an absence of all will to resist it.

The question, also, seems settled, concerning a self-regenerating power in the sinner. Those who hold to the will's independence and contingency, and that its single acts make sin or holiness, have often maintained the position, that man needs no help to become a new creature. In this they are right. The faculty of volitions is as certainly applicable to holiness as to sin. If a single isolated volition may turn back the strength of feeling, with which Gabriel now serves God, then a single volition may turn back the tide of obstinacy with which Satan goes against him. Therefore, we are surprised to hear Dr.

Bushnell, with his views of the will, say: "The functions of the soul are all intractable to its sovereignty; it were easier for a man's will to gather all the birds of the sky into martial order, and march them as a squadron through the tempests of the air, than to turn back the current of penal disaster under which he has sunk." But while we do not see how, with such a philosophy, he comes to such a saying, we can easily adopt it as our own, and be glad that Christian experience sometimes leads men to feel the weight of that pollution, which a corrupt philosophy is so ready to deny. We cannot understand how a man is to make himself holy by an independent act of choice. He may have a natural ability to be holy, as well as to be sinful; in other words, may be a rational man, whose powers of thought and feeling are applicable to holy objects, as well as sinful. But this natural ability, which means nothing else than that he has all the capacities of a moral agent, is not a positively efficient ability in originating holiness. The question is upon turning the inclination upward, when it is going downward. The whole soul is bent upon sin, swallowed up in it. The propelling power to what is holy is all departed, and the living energies of the man are pressing him towards deeper and deeper vileness. How is this inward bent to sin to turn against itself? When was this Satan casting out Satan, ever made a part of human history? When has the obstinate energy of hatred turned itself to the tender and vehement force of love? If the carnal mind, which is enmity against God, is the mind of the sinner, if it is his character, his controlling influence, what inability can be more entire than his to take upon himself, by a single choice, the spiritual mind, which is life and peace? The objects presented before him in the invitations and warnings of the Gospel may be good. They are the outward part of the motive, through which he is to be saved; but they succeed or fail of success, according to the state of the mind. The crop depends upon both seed and soil. The motive, which determines the will, arises from both object and disposition united. All hearts are in God's hand, to form them as he pleases. When he has formed them into his own holy image, when he has given us

the new birth, then all the graces of the Spirit will readily follow in the train of those glorious truths presented in the word, and the individual acts of will help us as certainly toward heaven, as they now carry us toward hell. Apart from this prerogative of God to change the mind, the exclamation must be over all our labors, Paul plants and Apollos watereth in vain.

The question, also, seems settled, that there may be such a thing as a morally necessary holiness. God's holiness is necessary. The Scriptures may rightly say, that God "cannot lie," that it is "impossible for God to lie," that he "cannot deny himself." There is an impossibility of his doing it, because he is God. This necessary holiness of God even Arminians acknowledge. Dr. Clark says: "The Supreme Being must do always what is best upon the whole. An infinitely wise being can no more choose to act in contradiction to wisdom and goodness, than a necessary agent can act contrary to the necessity by which it is acted." Thus says Clark, and so say we, that the perfection of the Deity is this, that his unalterable nature makes his will unalterably holy. So the more a man is beyond the effect of these individual and transient choices, the more he is under what is sometimes called the "immanent choice," the more he is necessarily holy; the more like God, and the more perfect he will be. And if there can be such a thing as an uncreated necessary holiness in God, which is to be the moving spring of the will, and not its offspring, then it is easy to pass to the idea, that there may be such a thing as holiness made necessary by divine power in man, which is to be the moving spring of their will, and not the offspring of it.

One of the strange phenomena of theological speculation is the notion, that no character can be created, or exist, without the will's specific action to bring it into being. God is said to have no character till he has chosen it by volition, for to take upon one's self a character voluntarily is to take it by volition. Adam is said to have had no character, till by choice he produced one. Now it seems to us no less absurd to suppose that a person creates himself, than that he creates the faculties and dispositions, which make up himself. The person is created with dispositions, and these dispositions must have a character

determined by the character of the objects to which they prompt us. Jesus Christ, when born of Mary, was the "holy thing," and did not wait to become holy by acts of choice. The benevolence of heart which Adam showed, when fresh from the hand of his Maker, was no more the effect of an act of choice on his part, than his own existence.

The question, also, seems settled, that the fore-knowledge of the Deity is consistent with the action of the will of men. They would not be consistent, were there any independent action of the will, any such thing as individual choice, going forth to make a character, and going forth as easily to alter it again. But when the will has its settled laws, when it acts only from motives, and its action is always the same when the motives are the same, then God, who knows all outward objects, and all secret intentions, may tell just how men will act in the several stages of their being. He does not depend for his knowledge upon what possibly may be, but upon what certainly will be, while the laws of the universe continue as constituted at first.

Bishop Horsley says, in reviewing the controversy upon predestination: "So far as these necessarians maintain the certain influence of moral motives, as the natural and sufficient means whereby human actions, and even human thoughts, are brought into that continued chain of causes and effects, which, taking its beginning in the operations of the Infinite Mind, cannot but be fully understood by him, so far they do service to the cause of truth; placing the great and glorious doctrines of fore-knowledge and providence—absolute fore-knowledge, universal providence, upon a firm and philosophical foundation." We cannot but feel, that the Bishop is right in supposing that all firm and philosophical foundation for the fore-knowledge of God is lost, when human actions are separated from the chain of causes and effects, and nothing is left but an unregulated self-moving will, whose only definite feature is, that its movements are independent, not to be inferred from any thing prior to themselves, or safely calculated until they are seen.

It is easy to see the origin of those views respecting the

human will, which differ from the ones here expressed. They were meant to be a way of escape, with some from any thing like native depravity, redemption, sovereignty of grace, supernatural conversion, and with others, from the difficulties which attend a bias to sin, when it is declared not to be truly and properly sinful. "But the bed is shorter than that a man can stretch himself on it; and the covering narrower than that he can wrap himself in it." Sin and regeneration both become comparatively shallow. God is no more justified than before by such an explanation of the difficulties that attend his government, nor does man feel more deeply the obligations to obedience. The world is not thus made any more ready or sure to learn the lesson, that "the wisdom of men is foolishness with God."

ART. V.—THE PEARL OF GREAT PRICE: THE PLATONIC AND THE EVANGELICAL IDEA.

By TAYLER LEWIS, LL.D., SCHENECTADY, N. Y.

Nothing seems more secular than the language of the exchange or the mart, and yet it is this language and this imagery which the Scripture employs to express one of its most holy and heavenly ideas. "The kingdom of heaven is like unto a *merchantman* seeking goodly pearls, who when he hath found one pearl of *great price*, goeth straightway and *selleth* all that he hath and *buyeth it*." As in the parable of the unjust steward, the most worldly conceptions are made the medium of the highest truth. Buying and selling, barter, profit, yea, something like what we would call the spirit of speculation, or haste to secure the advantage by obtaining the best and earliest bargain, are the prominent thoughts that are thus sanctified, as it were, and converted to a sacred use.

And this is in accordance with what would seem to be a favorite kind of imagery, whenever the same idea is presented in other parts of the Bible. It is as though there was nothing

which men would so readily understand in its outward form, or which would, therefore, take a deeper hold when once its spiritual import had truly penetrated the soul.

"The pearl of great price:" the expression has become proverbial as a name for one of the most precious portions of our Lord's teaching. So perfectly plain is it, however, that the only outward interpretation needed is to put it in parallelism with the same or kindred images in other portions of the Bible, and exhibit its place in the Scriptural analogy, that is, its harmony with the Biblical spirit and the controlling Biblical ideas. It calls to mind the priceless wisdom of Job 28 : 16 : "The pure gold (the *segur* or gold of the treasury) shall not be given for it; the choicest silver shall not be weighed as its price. It cannot be valued with the *stamped* gold of Ophir, with the precious onyx or the sapphire. There shall be no mention of pearls or of agates in comparison with it; it shall not be *priced* by the topaz of Ethiopia; for the possession of wisdom is above that of rubies." Compare also Proverbs 3 : 15 : "Blessed is the man that *findeth* wisdom; for her *merchandise* is better than the merchandise of silver, and her *exchange* than the choice gold; she is of *higher price* than pearls, and all that thou canst desire is not to be compared to her."

In all these rich figures, and especially in the language of our Saviour, there would seem to be something more than the thought merely of comparative value. There is a deeper mercantile idea known to the ancient, and still more familiar to the modern mind. This costly possession not only excells all other things in *exchangeable* worth, but is itself the ground of all other value. It is the *νόμισμα* (*numisma*, *nummus*) in the highest sense, the pure, and genuine, and undepreciable *money*—itself the regulative standard of exchange. The *price* of every thing else is to be determined by it. Without it all other wealth is baseless, all other *credit* but bankruptcy and spiritual ruin. This idea also comes out in the Hebrew of Proverbs 4 : 7. "Wisdom is the *principal* thing," the *summa capitalis*; for such would seem to be the meaning of ראשית here. Wisdom is the *principium*—the beginning, as well as

the תְּבוּאָה (Prov. 3 : 14,) the *fructus* or *income* of spiritual wealth. Therefore, "get wisdom;" make it thy first, thy fixed possession, and all is thine. "Seek first the kingdom of God, and all other things shall be added." All is ours if we have that "precious faith," that priceless faith whose lasting is of so much more importance than gold that perisheth, that τιμιωτέρα πόνου (1 Pet. 1 : 17; 2 Pet. 1 : 1) that turns in fact to gold our earthly currency, transmuting even the dross of sense and earthly knowledge into the pure and spiritual ore of the heavenly mint.

There is a striking passage in the *Phædo*, wherein Socrates uses language which certainly presents a remarkable similarity, in outward diction at least, to the words and figure of our Lord. May we not, without irreverence, suppose him to have had at least the shadow of the great truth? It is, however, but a shadow; for the more closely we examine it, the more do we find wanting that cardinal idea, without which the highest human virtue falls into the inferior rank of exchangeable values, and must be given up, or confessed as an imperfection, if we would win the pearl of *salvation*, the soul's true *salus* or "saving health." As the object, however, is not so much to define the nature of the spiritual idea itself as to bring out the force and beauty of the peculiar language in which it is presented, we cannot, for this purpose, find a passage more illustrative, or more worthy of being called parallel, outside of the sacred Scriptures themselves.

Socrates is speaking of the inestimable φρόνησις, a Greek word employed by him in a sort of unearthly sense, that other Greek writers, as well as the lexicographers, fail to represent. "Be careful," says he, with great earnestness, employing that peculiar Greek idiom, in which the expression of warning has its strongest force, by means simply of the objective negative particle, without the cautionary verb: μὴ γὰρ, "see to it, my blessed young friend Simmias, lest this be not, after all, the right way to true virtue, namely, to *exchange* pleasure for pleasure, and pain for pain, and fear for fear, like *coins of money*." He warns his beloved young disciple against it as the greatest mistake that could possibly be committed in life,

as the error which would involve every other error. "Yes, see to it," he continues, "lest it should turn out that there is but *one true coin*, even that for which all other things must be exchanged, in other words, *φρόνησις* or *wisdom*, that *for* which and *with* which all things else, even every other virtue, must be bought and sold; so that we may say, in a word, righteousness, and temperance, and manliness—in short, all true virtue has its root and value in *φρόνησις*; and that, too, whether pleasure or pain, whether grief or fear, or all things else, be present or not. And see to it again, my young friend, lest all these other things, apart from the true *wisdom*, and exchanged among themselves, be but a shadow of a picture, (or a picture of a shadow,) a false virtue, a servile barter, having nothing sound nor true." (*Phædo*, 69, A.)

There is certainly a noble morality here. It is no commonplace prudential caution against low vice, or health-destroying sensuality, or any vulgar worldly ambition. It is not the commendation of an epicurean self-denial, purchasing one pleasure by a judicious abstinence from another. It is no ordinary declamation respecting the higher and more refined enjoyments as compared with the lower and coarser appetites. So far it is like the Gospel, that it demands a renunciation of all. Nothing of worldly utility, nothing of happiness, nothing of reputation or rank among men, must stand in the way of *φρόνησις*. A man must sell all that he hath to purchase it. Even the other virtues, in that famous and beautiful fourfold division of the ancient moralists, have no value, are really no virtues, aside from it. *Δικαιοσύνη*, *σωφροσύνη*, *ανδρεία*, righteousness, temperance, manliness, are nothing but hollow marks without *φρόνησις*, or the *spiritual mind*.

And yet we would be far from comparing Socrates and Christ in regard to the essential idea. It is Christ-like, and yet not wholly nor truly Christian. The highest thought which Socrates connected with his *φρόνησις*, was that of a self-purification of the soul, or a *κάθαρσις*, (as he calls it in the succeeding sentence,) effected by means of philosophy giving the reason, or more spiritual part of humanity, the supremacy over the sensual or passional nature. This, it is true, is something far

higher than the ordinary, or the utilitarian virtue, as afterwards defined by the followers of Epicurus. It altogether transcended that system of prudential discipline which would cure one evil passion or one form of selfishness by the dominion of another; as when grovelling vice is put down by the love of reputation or the fear of disgrace; or, when gross sensuality, with all its torments, is cast out by the higher demon of worldliness or ambition. All this is what Socrates calls, "*exchanging* pleasure for pleasure, and pain for pain, and fear for fear." It was all barter, having no fixed standard of value, nothing absolute in itself or regulative of other things in their relation to it. The *φρόνησις* of Socrates rose, also, far above that best worldly form of virtue which afterwards took the denomination of the stoical. Like the Gospel grace, it was a self-denial terminating in itself; a good *per se*, in as far as it was the assertion and maintenance of the spiritual supremacy. It is a good thing in itself that the soul be master of the body. This is the highest argument for temperance of every kind, and one which should be more employed than it has been by the modern lecturer. Even asceticism for such a spiritual end, and when the idea of merit or expiation is wholly left out, becomes in the highest degree rational. It is to be revered and admired, even in its stoical form, simply as the assertion of the spirit's power; but when regarded as the method of the soul's purification, its submission to the discipline of love, its being cured of selfishness and made more ethereal, by being delivered from the weight of the earth-gravitating sensuality—all of which are included in the Platonic idea—it presents the noblest form of spiritual excellence that the human mind has ever entertained, or that has ever been imagined without the aid of a heavenly grace and a heaven-sent revelation. Still it is not the evangelical wisdom. It falls below it, even as itself so sublimely transcends what the world, the ancient world, the modern world, the respectable world, the philosophical world, (if we except the remarkable philosophy of Socrates,) has ever called *worth* or virtue.

Such a regulation or temperament of the soul, consisting in the balancing of one evil propensity by another, or one form

of selfishness by another, (the lower and more disreputable by the higher and the more honorable, according to the human scale,) Socrates well defines, in another place, as δημοτικὴ καὶ πολιτικὴ ἀρετὴ, "popular and political virtue," using the latter term, not in the loose sense in which it is now employed, nor even as denoting primarily the duties we owe to government, but rather as expressive of that higher life which man lives as a member of a social organism, lifting him out of that gross individual selfishness which is lowest of all, and barely rises above the most earthly or animal nature. This "popular and political virtue," however, he maintains is not the offspring of the pure reason, or the soul submitting itself unselfishly, unconsciously, without the thought of barter, or the hope of gain, to the idea of the true, the rapt contemplation of the right, the beautiful, and the good. "That temperance and that righteousness which men" (the respectable men of the world he means in his peculiar sense, as distinguished from the true philosophers) "do generally call by these names," he describes as being ἐξ ἔθους τε καὶ μελέτης γεγονυῖαν ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας τε καὶ νοῦ, "from temperament and customary observance without philosophy and without reason." (*Phædo*, 82, B.) It cannot produce the *katharsis*, of which he speaks, the true salvation or spiritual health. It, too, is a barter, an ever-floating exchange, having no immutable standard of price and value. The end of it all, whether in its highest or lowest forms, is the depreciation, the ruin, of the soul's true excellence—in other words, an everlasting spiritual bankruptcy.

In contrast with all these varieties of a floating, ever-drifting morality, he holds forth φρόνησις as the only true and unfailing currency. It is, indeed, very beautiful. Why not scriptural, too, is the first thought. The language and imagery favor the comparison. We think of "the gold tried in the fire," which our Saviour counsels us to buy of him; then comes up to the mind "this pearl of greatest price," for the acquisition of which a man must "go and straightway sell all that he hath." One, whose Platonizing had never been brought to the more rigid test of the Scriptures in all their teaching, might almost be led to regard the φρόνησις of Socrates as synonymous with

the *φρόνημα πνεύματος*, or "*mind of the Spirit*," as the term is used by Paul in Romans. This was, in fact, the error of the Alexandrian school among the Fathers. They regarded Paul as talking Platonically; and that was true, in one sense. It was the Platonic idea, made holy, made living, made Christian, in short, by being united to another thought which lay wholly above the sphere of the Socratic speculation. The *φρόνημα πνεύματος* of the Apostle *may be* sometimes interpreted of the human spirit, of the human reason, as put in contrast with the *φρόνημα σαρκός*, or lowest nature. But this, in the new Bible language, is ever as connected with a divine Spirit, and a divine reason, which alone can raise the human *πνεῦμα*, or rather the *πνεῦμα* in man, from its base bondage to the *ψυχή*, or keep it from that surrender through which, notwithstanding its high claims, and its original connection with the divine Logos, it becomes lost, individualized as it were, in sense and nature; for, to use Platonic language, the *νοῦς*, when it becomes subservient to the *θυμὸς*, and the still lower *ἐπιθυμία*, (the *irascible*, and the *appetitive*,) severs itself from the universal or divine *reason*, and falls into the psychical or animal world. What Plato speculated about, Paul understood, experimentally and by revelation. On this account it is that the Apostolic language includes in the *σὰρξ*, "the flesh," or the *φρόνημα σαρκός*, the "mind of the flesh," much more than the Platonic in its common usage. The whole evil of humanity, the pure *soul-sins* as well as sensuality, even ambition, love of praise, love of power, self-esteem, revenge, envy—the latter the most incorporeal of human emotions—are all classed as "works of the flesh," or of "the carnal mind," though having their birth in the spirit, and fallen from the spiritual sphere. Against such a fall this philosophic wisdom, relying wholly upon itself, has no security. And thus it is that though, indeed, most beautiful as compared with the grosser sensual life, or even the life of more refined enjoyment, or the common forms of worldly honor or worldly ambition, it does, nevertheless, fall essentially below, and, we may therefore say, infinitely below, the Christian idea. It is, after all, but a harmony, to use the favorite Platonic word, a self-tempered harmony, or harmon-

ized selfishness, having no higher concert tone regulative of its own earthly scale. There is recognized a *disorder* in the soul, but not a *fall*. The instrument is out of tune in itself, it is full of internal discords, but there is no knowledge of how far its every tone, its best tones, are below the key of a higher and heavenly modulation. No uninspired man, we venture to say, ever saw more keenly than Socrates, the war in the human spirit, and the utter ruin and desolation that were the consequences of this inner strife; but that higher and more ancient war of the soul with God, "the Father of souls," that more incurable dissonance that existed between it and the source of its *pneumatic* life, and which was the cause of all the lower dissonances, of this, alas! he had but the faintest, if he had any, thought at all. There is no recognition of it, a careful examination enables us to say, in any thing that has been handed down from him by either of his recording disciples. It was given to Socrates to see that "the town of Mansoul" was full of Diabolonians, and that they held the old native inhabitants, the lordly *will*, and, as he deemed, the preëxistent or divine power of the *reason*, in awful servitude. "Human nature is turned upside down," (ἀνατετραμμένος ἂν εἴη,) as he says in one place, "and we do every thing in a manner contrary to what we ought." But how came these Diabolonians there? Of this he had no theory, even as he knew nothing, and seemingly suspected nothing, of that ancient revolt from King Shaddai, which had given them admission to the stronghold of the spirit. Man at war with himself, in thought, could be cured by philosophy. The case was bad, but not desperate. Righteousness, as he teaches in the fourth book of the *Republic*, is a *rectified state* of soul, brought about by the reason, or the νοῦς, asserting its rightful supremacy over the θυμὸς and the ἐπιθυμία; but this was much more easily said than done; it was not perceived that no step could be intelligently taken in this recuperation, until it was known how the *reason* came to occupy such an inverted position. Moreover, the disease being wholly internal, it would yield, he thought, to internal remedies; the disproportioned powers might be reduced to *ratio*, the deranged balance might be restored to equilibrium, the crooked might

be made straight, the rebellious *sensual* might be put down, even although it had become the *ipseity* or man himself, the captive *will* might be released, the *θυμὸς*, or the spiritual military power, might be brought back to its allegiance, and thus the dethroned *reason* might be restored again to its native rule and dignity. What power in the soul, or out of the soul, was to be the mighty captain under whose banners the town was to be retaken? This, to be sure, was not clearly told, nor could be told; but, somehow, the work was to be done by philosophy. It was only a civil war, and, therefore, might be cured by a domestic peace. But there was an enemy in the town—a foreign enemy. So the Bible and Bible-Bunyan tell us; and it is full of thought, the question, whence this uncultivated tinker learned his psychology, so much higher, so much more profound, so much more suggestive of the high and profound, than that of Plato with all its sublimity and beauty. There was an enemy in the town, the citadel was occupied and closely guarded, the townsmen were in chains. My Lord Well-be-Well has surrendered himself to the invader, my Lord Understanding, or the *νοῦς*, as Bunyan would have called him, had he used Platonic language, has had his windows darkened; the old Recorder Conscience has been shut up in a dungeon of his own house and fallen into epileptic fits. These old citizens of Mansoul are utterly helpless, and even should they attempt to *right* themselves in such a condition, their apparent success would only be the means of setting up in the citadel some mere philosophic, or æsthetic, or artistic Diabolus, instead of that glorious image of Shaddai, and that glorious banner of Prince Emanuel, which had been cast down.

Socrates would cure the soul by philosophy. Now this word *philosophia* is certainly used by him in a high sense, a religious, we may even say an unearthly sense, unknown to the other ancient schools; yea, surpassing in purity any employment of the term by modern psychologists or metaphysicians. We are not claiming much for Socrates when we say he was more religious in his style of thought and language than Stewart, or Brown, or even Hamilton. There are passages in the Socratic or Platonic writings, in which this word and this idea

of philosophy seems truly to assume a heavenly aspect ; there accompany it strains of unearthly diction and unearthly ideas that make us think of Christ. Nothing ever looked so much like Christianity. It might have almost seemed, in some respects, identical with it, had it not been for the fatal omission of which we have spoken. Its language bore a close resemblance to some things in the sacred writings. Paul evidently has kindred words suggested by kindred if not identical ideas. This *philosophia* of Socrates, so transcending the dry rationalism of Aristotle, so high above what Peripatetic or Stoic of after-times ever dreamed of, was called by him the "*study of dying*," or as Cicero translates it, *commentatio mortis*. We think of the Christian idea of preparation for death : but that was not strictly the meaning. It was a life-long dying, a life devoted to deliverance from the power of the flesh, and to the cultivation of the spiritual nature ; μελέτημα τοῦτο τῶν φιλοσόφων λύσις καὶ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος. This was grand talk for a heathen. It looks like the Apostle's "*dying to sin*," (Rom. 6 : 10, 11,) and dreaming mystics, even in the Church, have sometimes confounded them. But the immense difference lies in this little word of awful import. The idea of *sin*, in its truest sense, was unknown to Socrates. With him the great evil of the soul was not opposition to God, rebellion against God, but the rebellion of the sense and the passion against the reason, and hence this *commentatio mortis*, this cure of philosophy, noble as it is, (for it has a very high value and dignity when compared with Epicureanism or Stoicism,) was through the ascetic submission of all the lower propensities, especially the bodily propensities, to the higher rule of the purely spiritual. This might make a hero, a monk, a pietistic philosopher, with every wild beast within him laid to sleep except the sleepless serpent ; with grace, too, it might aid in making a Christian ; but it was not Christianity, although the most resembling it of any thing on earth, that ever sprang from human thought. It was the beautiful quietism that he describes in another place, as the release of the spirit from the dominion of the sense, (or the grossly natural,) by whose power, to use his own graphic comparison, "it hath been made

drunk and delirious." When the soul gets above this drunken earthly state, either by contemplation or ascetic discipline, then "in its ethereal lightness does it fly away to the study of the pure, the immortal, the ever being, the ever true, the ever fair; then does it cease from error, *πέπανται τοῦ πλάνου*, comes home from its far wanderings in sense and matter," gives up its endless exchanges of one earthly passion for another, and thus enters into philosophic rest. This is the far sought idea; *τοῦτο ψυχῆς τὸ πάθημα φρόνησις κέκληται*—"this state of soul is called Phronesis;" it is the Platonic "*spiritual mind*."

"It is all indeed very beautiful what you say, O Socrates!" So answers the admiring Simmias. And he is not alone. The most devout, the most religious, the most profound of all succeeding ages have had their hearts moved and their minds elevated by it. Who can read the picture without being charmed? And yet it may be but a philosophic rapture after all. There may be in it, too, an immeasurable self-deception. One may truly admire, yea love the abstract ideal beauty, he may be enraptured with the philosophic *τὸ καλὸν*, and yet his own inner world be full of all deformity. In spite of Shakespeare, is it true that a man may be "moved by concord of sweet sounds," and yet "his soul be dark as Erebus." A man may love to read Plato, and yet be immersed in sensuality; one may be delighted with the psychology of Bunyan, and yet his town of Mansoul full of the most malignant Diabolonians. The blind may study optics, the deaf may be pleased with the science and philosophy of sounds. It is a startling and humbling thought—the writer would take it as an admonition to himself as well as to others—that one may discourse of light, the ideal light so tempting by its proud show of philosophy—he may do all this, not hypocritically, but with the highest glow of what might seem an almost divine enthusiasm, and yet be farther from its celestial ray than the pauper Bartimeus when he came to Christ.

Especially has this talk of "the supremacy of the higher nature" a charm often for those, whose moral condition may be described in the directly opposite terms. As the dishonest man, the hard, unfeeling man would rather hear of works than

faith, so the selfish worldling of another kind may gaze with admiration on the ideal spirituality, especially if it be the literary or sentimental worldling. To such preaching the veriest sensualist may listen with the keenest intellectual, yea æsthetic and emotional interest. Oh! this is divine philosophy, he says; how far above the ordinary pulpit rant of grace, and the dry dogmas of the catechism! This, too, is "practical preaching" in its purest sense, and that is what he loves; it is the life, as he fancies it, instead of those dead doctrines which, with all his contempt of them and all his denunciation of their powerlessness, he has so learned to dread as well as hate.

Thus it is that for a moment in his dream, the poor soul fancies that the real life might be as easy and as pleasant as the contemplation of the idea. And this is the secret of the strange love of all such preaching. Only let there be kept away the painful thought of entire dependence on divine or foreign aid, and he really thinks that he could do it—do it at some time, at least, if not convenient now. Certainly it must be easy, that which so harmonizes with his "better notions." It is no longer that baffling, unintelligible, humbling "work of grace," but only a power of high resolve, and this, though suggestive of difficulty, rather pleases him; it is so associated with the grand and the heroic. He is carried away by the thought that there shall be no Lord within but that "higher nature" which he is so glad to hear of his possessing, and that to this ideal sovereign of his spirit's throne shall bow all that is mean and grovelling in the sense. And yet, alas! how truly empty may be the soul that is filled with all this spiritual inflation. "He dreameth, and behold he drinketh; he awaketh, and lo he is faint and the *spirit still hath appetite*;" the "soul yet cleaveth unto the dust," the reason lies still prostrate, still the servant of the *θυμὸς* and the *ἐπιθυμία*, the blind passion, the earth-wise "subtle serpent" of the sense.

This psychological mystery, as we may call it, is constantly verified in the strange human experience. Both the characters we have described, and all similar characters, may sit for years under such preaching of the spiritual and such condemnation of the sensual; they may listen to it with the keenest

intellectual interest, and still be unaffected by any of those emotions in which the true spiritual hath its dwelling and its life. They have their pleasant ideal reverie; they have seen an ideal likeness, if not "their own natural face," in the preacher's or lecturer's "glass," and they go away forgetting, or rather having never known, what strange "manner of persons they are." Even when there might seem to be produced something that looks like a more inward and abiding effect, it may be but the *inertia* of quietism, not the *rest* of holiness. The difference may be stated in a word—one single word, found only in the Bible language, and unknown alike to the highest as to the lowest philosophy. Platonism, the best Platonism, has no *cross*. With all its apparent asceticism, with all its proud talk of autocracy, or the government of the lower by the higher nature, it has no real *cross* either in the doctrinal or the practical, the disciplinary or the expiatory sense. When it is not wholly speculative, but sincerely carried out in some consistent form of life, there may be ascetic mortification of the flesh, and yet, perhaps, only in obedience to some proud demand of this "higher nature," falsely laying its own soul-sins upon the miserable body.

Thus it is a radical defect of this pseudo-spirituality that there is no descending before ascending, as is the uncompromising Gospel way. There is no humiliation in it, however much it may sometimes seem to assume the form of humility. There is no true repentance for sin as committed against God and Christ. There is no acknowledgment of utter spiritual, as well as passional ruin; of utter alienation from God as the cause of all the lower war that has been let loose in the sense and the flesh. Socrates is eloquent here, most impressive as well as most instructive. He well understood the soul to be divided, broken, "*dispersed*," as Augustine says, "over variety of vanities." Hence he so earnestly speaks of its being "collected, gathered into itself," *αὐτὴν εἰς αὐτὴν συλλέγεσθαι*, and in this way "made *whole*." Such was the only *peace* he knew. The Psalmist had the same, or a higher thought, but he connects it with a still more transcending and saving idea

when he prays, (Ps. 86 : 11,) "*Unite my heart (make one my heart) to fear thy name.*"

Hence, too, it is that in this Platonic *σωτηρία* there is no real losing the earthly life to gain a heavenly. The sins of the mind, the "spiritual wickedness in high places," demanding often a severer struggle than with the powers of flesh and blood—these are not cast away, or *may not* be cast away. On this account there is no reconciliation with God and of God—in other words, no outward and forensic as the ground of any inward peace. In short, there is no *coming to Jesus*, being lost in Jesus, going out of self (the highest as well as the lowest self) into Christ and finding in him that priceless righteousness without which all human virtue, from the lowest form of prudential worldliness to the highest dream of a pietistic philosophy, is but an eternal bankruptcy.

Socrates might have brought his *phronesis*, too, within the list of exchangeable values. The philosophic calmness, as well as the sensual riot, is to be surrendered. Quietism itself must be disturbed, as well as ambition dethroned, and appetite resisted, and worldliness exchanged for grace, if we would win the higher riches,* the *κληρονομίαν ἀμάραντον*, (1 Pet. 1 : 4,) "the inheritance unfading," "the amaranthine crown" (1 Pet. 5 : 4) "preserved in heaven for those who are kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation." The whole soul must be emptied out with all its fancied treasures. A man must sell all that he hath, parting with every "high thought" as well as low desire. Self-loathing, repentance in dust and ashes, must take the place of all philosophic complacency, and "God be merciful to me a sinner!" must be the only plea and

* "*The riches of grace* (Eph. 1 : 8) which he hath made to abound in us in all wisdom and prudence," (*σοφία καὶ φρονήσις*.) Prudence is a poor rendering for this last word. We are not to suppose that Paul here meant to talk Platonically, but the more spiritual sense of the word was on his mind, and the very structure of the sentence shows that *φρόνησις* here is higher than *σοφία*. As the one denotes the knowledge of the intellect, the other more properly suggests the knowledge of the heart, that moral state of the spirit which makes the mind clear. Socrates was aiming at something like this in his *φρόνησις* or harmony of the soul. This passage in Ephesians should be rendered: "In all wisdom and spiritual discernment."

prayer with which the most intellectual as well as the most sensual, the most ideal as well as the most material, the most philosophical as well as the most worldly, must come as beggars to the treasury of heaven. The Senecas and the Antonines, if they come at all, must come as the contemned publican or the sensual epicurean ; Gamaliel must receive salvation on the same terms and with the same repentance as the crucified thief. All men do not owe the same amount, but all are equally bankrupt, the least owing ten thousand talents without a farthing to pay. "Lord, forgive us our debts:" the idea, as well as the prayer, was unknown to any heathen ethics or heathen philosophy. O loose our bonds, *remitte nobis debita nostra*. The pure breathing of this petition, from a soul conscious of its insolvency as well as its poverty, is demanded, if not as the price, at least as the condition, on which any one can become an heir of the true riches, or indulge the hope of any share or interest in the "Pearl of great price."

ART. VI.—EDWARDS ON THE ATONEMENT.

BY PARSONS COOKE, D.D., LYNN, MASS.

The Atonement. — Discourses and Treatises by Edwards, Smalley, Maxcy, Emmons, Griffin, Burge, and Weeks. With an Introductory Essay, by Edwards A. Park, Abbot Professor of Christian Theology, Andover, Mass. Boston: Congregational Board of Publication. 1859. Pp. lxxx. 596.

THE Introduction here named has a separate title, to wit. The Rise of the Edwardean Theory of the Atonement; an Introductory Essay. This is a true description of what the author undertakes in this Introduction, whatever views may be taken of the success of his endeavors. In the course of his remarks, he embraces in his series of "successors of Edwards," besides those whose works appear in the book before us, the names of Bellamy, Hopkins and West. These three, whose works on the atonement are not published in the series before

us, Dr. Park represents, as having a position second to none of the successors of Edwards. The reason why these are omitted, and others of less importance are inserted, does not appear at the first glance. This, however, is to be said, that of Bellamy he testifies, that: "Like the elder Edwards, he sanctioned in the main both the views and the phraseology of the old Calvinists. He repeatedly declares, that God must and does always, throughout all his dominions, not only in word threaten, but in fact punish sin, with infinite severity, without the least mitigation or abatement, in any one instance whatever." As to Hopkins, he says: "We do not deny, that, like his teacher, Edwards, and his companion, Bellamy, he makes an impression favorable in many respects to the more ancient form of Calvinism." But as he makes Dr. West more fruitful in sources of argument for the new theory, than either of the others, it is not to be supposed that the others, or that West himself would have been excluded, because the impression which their whole treatises would have made, would have been too favorable to the old Calvinism. But, certainly, the republication of West's treatise, would have been a public benefit, could we have had it in the place of some, which have recently been republished.

The Introduction is the main attraction of the book.

It is of great importance, as a means of defining the position of the author, and of the large and influential body of ministers and people in sympathy with him. There are two reasons, in our view, why it has been so little noticed. One is, that it consists very much of subtle and abstruse disquisitions and quotations, not to be understood without labor; and the other is, that it is not to be bought without purchasing a volume of nearly seven hundred large octavo pages, consisting of treatises on the atonement, by other authors, most of whom are already well known to the public; to which volume, Professor Park's work is put as the vestibule. But, for present purposes, the vestibule is more important than the house; especially for the light it throws on what has seemed ominous and mysterious in existing accounts of theological speculation. It goes far to enucleate the paradox of Edwardeanism against

Edwards, that lately developed system which is claimed to be most in accordance with Edwards, and yet is made vastly more consistent and improved by positions in conflict with him. During the development of this scheme, Calvinists have looked on with suspicion. It has been a painful mystery to them, that those opposing the distinctive features of the system of Edwards and Calvin, should assume the name of Edwardeans, and virtually deny it to those who, in all points, adhered to that system. The mystery has been still more painful, from our remembrance of a similar phenomenon, attending the early development of Unitarianism among us. Then it was contended, that the Liberals were the only true successors of the Puritans. Now, the work before us, though it may not allay the anxiety in the case, will give us the needed information. It comes from one who ought to be able to tell us all about it; and one who, upon the main point, has not been wanting in frankness.

The author's frankness in the concession, that the elder Edwards is against him, is worthy of all praise. What other writers have attempted to prove, he more than confesses. He not only admits this in general, but he specifically states the points of conflict between Edwards and the Edwardeans. He then goes on to show, how elements of opposition to Edwards were eliminated from him; how the progeny has devoured its parent; how the inference has annihilated its premises.

Our author uses the term Edwardean in the sense, not of those who believe with Edwards, but with "the successors of Edwards." This is a favorite phrase with him, as if the inheritance of his name had somehow gone out of his family, and out of possession of those who adhere to his system. He traces the line of Edwardean succession down through such honored names as Bellamy, Hopkins, Dwight, Smalley, Emmons, Maxcy and Griffin, and makes it terminate in himself and those like him, who hold views on material points, as he himself shows, opposite to those of the elder Edwards.

But we must no longer delay to let our author speak for himself. The joint product, which he gets from the writings of Edwards, developed by the long line of successors, and

which he adopts as his own theory of the atonement, he lays down in the following distinct propositions :

"Our Lord suffered pains, which were substituted for the penalty of the law, and may be called punishment in the more general sense of that word, but were not strictly and literally the penalty which the law had threatened."

"Secondly, the sufferings of our Lord satisfied the general justice of God, but did not satisfy his distributive justice."

"Thirdly, the humiliation, pains and death of our Redeemer were equivalent, in meaning, to the punishment threatened in the moral law, and thus satisfied him, who is determined to maintain the honor of this law ; but they did not satisfy the demands of the law itself for our punishment."

"Fourthly, the active obedience, viewed as the holiness of Christ, was honorable to the law ; but was not a work of supererogation performed by our substitute, and then transferred and imputed to us, so as to satisfy the requisitions of the law, for our own active obedience."

"Fifthly, the law and the distributive justice of God, although honored by the life and death of Christ, will yet eternally demand the punishment of every one who has sinned."

The four following propositions in the series, are deductions framed against a limited atonement. But regarding as we do, and as Dr. Griffin has most clearly proved, the controversy about a limited or a general atonement, as a dispute very much about words and definitions, we attach little importance to those points. The five points above specified contain the gist of those departures from Edwards, which are most worthy of our attention. These are, what our author calls Edwardean principles involved in the doctrine of the atonement. That Edwards himself taught them, he does not pretend. He says of Edwards, that: "He adopted, in general, both the views and the phrases of the older Calvinists, with regard to the atonement. But, like those Calvinists, he made various remarks, which have suggested the more modern theory." Here we are given to understand, that Edwards gave no more countenance to the modern theory, than did his predecessors in Calvinism,

such as Owen and the Puritan writers generally. But some casual expressions, some *obiter dicta* of his, have been seized upon, and, whether legitimately or not, we shall hereafter see, have been pressed into the service of the new theory.

Now, upon these five propositions, our first object will be to show, both that our author has proved, and that he might still further have proved, that they are contrary to the views of Edwards. Take, first, the fourth proposition, which, stripped of its argument, and reduced to a mere statement, is, that *Christ's active obedience was not wrought out for us, and imputed to us, to supply the want of our obedience, and to be a ground of our justification before God.* On page 19, he quotes Edwards, as asserting what he here denies.

"By that righteousness being imputed to us, is meant, no other than this, that the righteousness of Christ is accepted for us, and admitted, instead of that perfect inherent righteousness, which ought to be in ourselves. Christ's perfect obedience shall be reckoned to our account, so that we shall have the benefit of it, as though we had performed it ourselves."

"There is the very same need of Christ's obeying the laws in our stead, in order to the reward, as of his suffering the penalty of the law in our stead, in order to our escaping the penalty."

Our author gives a generous page of quotations to the same point. So it is no matter of dispute between him and us, that Edwards taught exactly the contrary of what he and his Edwardeanism teach, touching this cardinal point of the doctrine of justification by faith. To quote all which Edwards said, in intensely arguing out what our author denies, would be to quote twenty-two pages of his work on justification by faith, to say nothing of what appears in his other works. As to the fourth proposition, then, there can be no question, that the *true* Edwardeans are in direct opposition with the *new* Edwardeans.

We will next demonstrate the same touching the first proposition, which is in substance, that *Christ did not strictly and literally suffer the penalty of the law.* The phrase, "*strictly and literally,*" here binds like an india-rubber clasp, more or less according to convenience and occasion. And how much it binds will be seen in the sequel. The point here reasoned

against is not a literal, but substantial and real suffering of the penalty of the law. As to the play of thought under the terms literal and figurative, we shall speak more under an appropriate head. We are here to show, that Edwards did teach that Christ really and substantially, though not in literal form, endured the penalty of the law for sinners. We shall show it first, and mainly, through our author's showing. He first tells us, that Edwards on this subject, "adopted in general both the views and phrases of the old Calvinists;" and he fully concedes that these made Christ's atonement to be an endurance of the penalty of the law. In the quotations from Edwards already referred to, are found such sentences as these:

"There is the same need of Christ's obeying the law in our stead, in order to the reward, as of his *suffering the penalty of the law in our stead*, in order to our escaping the penalty." "That Christ suffered the full punishment of the sin that was imputed to him, or offered that to God that was fully and completely equivalent to what we owed to Divine justice for our sins, is evident from Psalms 69 : 5." "If he unites himself to guilty creatures, he of necessity brings their guilt on himself." "The general meaning of the phrase, to bear sin, is lying under the guilt of sin, having it imputed and charged upon the person, as obnoxious to the punishment of it, or obliged to answer and make satisfaction for it." "Thus Christ bore our sins; God laid on him the iniquity of us all; and he bore the burden of them. And so his bearing the burden of our sins may be considered as something diverse from his suffering God's wrath. For his suffering wrath consisted more in the sense he had of the other thing, viz., the dreadfulness of the punishment of sin, or the dreadfulness of God's wrath inflicted for it." "Thus Christ suffered, that which the damned in hell do not suffer; for they do not see the hateful nature of sin."

These are a part of the quotations which our author makes from Edwards, showing that Edwards believed that Christ really suffered the penalty of the law. We might make many more equally in point; but since there is no dispute here, we will save the space. It is then clearly seen and fully conceded,

that on this radical point also, the new Edwardeans are directly opposed to Edwards.

The next point to come under notice is, that Christ's sufferings satisfied the general justice, but did not satisfy the distributive justice of God. By general justice, our author means the benevolence of God. In this he follows the younger Edwards and many other standard writers. The younger Edwards says: "General justice comprehends all moral goodness." Indeed the prevalent notion of general justice, is rectitude, or goodness of conduct touching all things. So, when it is said, that in the death of Christ, God satisfied general justice, it means that God did right, or his act was good, or accordant with truth and justice—an assertion which requires no very high orthodoxy to receive.

But what is meant by saying that Christ's sufferings did not satisfy distributive justice? Distributive justice has a well-defined meaning, having been in use from the days of Aristotle. Does not the whole include all the parts, and does not general or universal justice include distributive justice? And can all of God's justice be satisfied, and leave this part unsatisfied? The younger Edwards, who should be good authority with our author, says: "General or public justice comprehends all moral goodness." "Whatever is right is said to be just, and an act of justice." So Aristotle divided justice into universal and particular. Concerning the former he says: "In justice every virtue is summarily comprehended." (*Ethic ad Nicom.* lib. v. cap. 12.) And he affirms, that justice nowise differs from virtue in general, unless in respect to its relation to another being. But he says, particular justice is a part thereof, under the same name—which he again distinguishes into *distributive* and *commutative*. In this definition Aristotle has been followed by the schoolmen and by all later divines. Here it is both implied and asserted that distributive justice is a part included in general justice. Hence it is a plain contradiction to say, that general justice is satisfied when distributive justice is not.

The truth is, there are not two kinds of justice in God. These distinctions obtain in our narrow conceptions, and are

set up as convenient waymarks in our reasoning. God's justice is one and simple. If in any branch his justice fails of execution, the simple truth is, he is unjust; there is no evasion of the fact by hair-splitting. Thus, punishment has been defined as "an expression of God's distributive justice, which exercise is an expression of all God's attributes." That is, all that is right in God comes into exercise in his distributive justice. And if so, when his distributive justice goes unsatisfied, there is a chasm in his universal right doing.

The question whether God's justice was satisfied in the death of Christ for sinners, is simply the question whether that justice that sustains and administers law and deals out retributions, had its demands met in the death of Christ. As to this question, our author quotes Edwards as saying:

"Christ has satisfied justice fully for his sins, so that it is a thing that may be challenged, that God should now release the believer from punishment. It is but a piece of justice, that the creditor should release the debtor when he has fully paid the debt."

Here, it will be seen, Edwards uses the terms justice in no narrow sense. For the justice which Christ satisfied fully in view of man's sin, was not the punishing of the individual sinner. Then in the next quotation which he makes from Edwards, the term vindictive suggests the idea of vindication or enforcing of public justice, as follows:

"Yet in these sufferings was the mark of the vindictive expressions of that very justice of God. Revenging justice spent *all its force* upon him, on account of our guilt. . . . And this is the way and means by which Christ stood up for the honor of God's justice, viz., by suffering its terrible executions. For when he had undertaken for sinners, and had substituted himself in their room, Divine justice could have its due honor in no other way, than by his suffering its revenges."

By quotations so much in point, does our author show, that Edwards was *toto caelo* against him on this radical point. We might add indefinitely to the appropriate quotations which he has made. So in his sermon on the Excellency of Christ, Edwards says: "In Christ has been seen already an actual, complete accomplishment of those threatenings." "He will do

nothing contrary to the threatenings of the law and their complete fulfilment." "He suffered as though guilty from God himself, by reason of our guilt imputed to him; for he was made sin for us, who knew no sin; and he was made subject to wrath, as if he had been sinful himself. He was made a curse for us."

But we will not weary the reader with further proofs of what is not in dispute.

Our author's third point is, that Christ's sufferings did not answer *the demands of the law* itself for our punishment. This differs little, except in form, from the preceding, which is, that they did not answer the demands of justice. And many of the quotations already made are good to show, that Edwards held that they did answer the demands of the law as well as of justice. And that quotation (page 16) which begins with, "The truth of the Lawgiver makes it necessary that the threatening of the law should be fulfilled in every punctilio; the threatening of the law is absolute—thou shalt surely die," etc., is in point. Again, God "would not abate him [that is, Christ] the least mite of that debt, which justice demanded." "God hereby showed, that not only heaven and earth should pass away, but which is more, that the blood of him who is the eternal Jehovah, should be spilt, rather than one jot or tittle of his word should fail, till all be fulfilled." So much for the proof exhibited by our author, that Edwards was against his position as to the atonement meeting the demands of the law.

We have but one more point to bring under consideration: that is, that "both the law and distributive justice of God," notwithstanding the atonement of Christ, "will yet eternally demand the punishment of every one who has sinned." This is a fearful conclusion, and it becomes us to look to it. That it was no doctrine of Edwards, may be seen in quotations already made. So in this: "The justice of God that required man's damnation, and seemed inconsistent with his salvation, now does as much require the salvation of those that believe in Christ, as ever before it required their damnation. Salvation is an absolute debt to the believer from God, so that he may in justice demand and challenge it; not upon the account of what

he himself has done, but on account of what his surety has done." But as we have already quoted much more that is in point we will proceed no further in this line.

Now in our main positions so far we have the happiness perfectly to agree with our author. His quotations are more full than our space will allow ours to be, all showing that on the five points specified, to wit, the main pillars of the doctrine of the atonement, himself and Edwards are in direct contradiction. That is, what he calls the Edwardean System is the opposite of the system which Jonathan Edwards held. Now however skilfully he may describe an alleged process of sliding from the standpoint of Edwards to his own, and however imperceptible he may show the steps to have been which have carried him so far from the platform of Edwards, no skill in deduction and no intermediate facts in the case can justify the application of the name of Edwards to principles which Edwards opposed. One thing which we complain of, and which cannot be reconciled either to general or distributive justice, is, that the favor which attaches to the name of Edwards and his doctrines, in this community, is, by an unwarranted use of his name, made to support the contrary doctrines and rule out the principles which he held; and no skill in dialectics can transmute this wrong into a right. By common consent for generations past, the name of Edwards has stood as an index of the Calvinistic sentiment of New-England, and the sentiment usually indicated by that name was *what Edwards really held*, and not till very recently did any one dream of being excommunicated from the Edwardean family for holding the very doctrines which Edwards taught. And now the great body of our people, who are not in the secret of these new methods, are misled by this use of names. When they hear certain parties called Edwardean, they take it in good faith, and not as meaning just the opposite of what is expressed; and under this name sentiments are propagated around them, and under their unconscious concurrence and aid, from which they would revolt.

It is a universally acknowledged principle in reasoning, that we are not to attribute to an opponent, as his belief, even

the warrantable inferences which we draw from his principles. We are not to call them his principles till he has acknowledged them as such. Now apply this maxim of just controversy to the case in hand. It is set forth that a long line of Edwards' successors have, with a long pull, and a strong pull, and a pull altogether, drawn out of Edwards' principles, inferences diametrically opposite to the main features of his system. Now admit that these inferences are all just, which is so far from fact, yet it is a violation of all right rules to attribute them to him and give them his name, for they are such as he has repudiated. Every application of the term Edwardean to this theory is an abuse of Edwards' good name, as well as a perversion of the truth of history.

It would take us quite too much aside from our purpose were we to follow the author in all his comments on the Edwardean successors. Suffice it here to say that if such a line of expounders have in their writings, taken together, furnished the data from which conclusions can be fairly drawn so opposite to Edwards' system, it is self-evident, that so far as these utterances gave ground for opposing his system, so far they were his opponents, and not his successors. We have no occasion here to say, that in none of the writers whom the author calls Edwards' successors, there may be found here and there expressions dropped or theories maintained, which may serve the purpose of his conclusions. Nor do we care to deny that for each and every conclusion opposing Edwards, which he has wrought into his own scheme, he may find ground in some one of his line of Edwards' successors. We go still farther; we admit that in some of these (a little for a starting-point in the younger Edwards, more in Emmons and others) may be found plain departures from the Calvinistic view as held by Edwards. And this is easily accounted for without supposing that either one of the number intended a serious difference from Edwards. After the days of Edwards, and while most of these writers were on the stage, the controversy between a limited and general atonement was rife and hot. For a part of the time it was carried forward with intense feeling, the traces of which are manifest in some of the productions of the writers under notice.

On each side the writers took partial and one-sided views, and hence were betrayed into statements which were not justified by the round-about common sense which looks at all sides. From this source, as we conceive, came the individual errors of which the author has taken advantage to construct the errors of his theory. And yet he cannot shield himself under the name of all or any one of these writers. For, though by sweeping a drag-net through the whole mass of their writings, gathering the bad into vessels and casting the good away, he may have found material enough to construct his system, yet there is no one of them who, considered in his whole system of theology, was not substantially and nearly as much against our author as was Edwards himself. This shows, in a strong light, the fallacy and the wrong of the idea of being Edwardean, because one stands not with Edwards, but with Edwards' successors; when he really stands with neither him nor any one of them.

It would be interesting to trace minutely the history of these *obiter dicta*, and inconsiderate utterances, referring each error to its true author. But for this work we have neither space nor time. It should be done completely if attempted at all, and it should in each case expose the sophisms by which the criticism has been misled. Yet it is not to be assumed in advance that all the author's conclusions are based on what is found in these works; for he begins his work by attempting to show Edwards at variance with himself. If his deductions from the successors are framed like those from Edwards himself, they must sometimes lead us astray. For instance, on page 12, he misconceives and misapplies what Edwards says about the sovereignty of God in reference to the atonement. But here first let it be observed that Unitarianism sets the atonement wholly aside, by holding that God may safely forgive the sinner on repentance and as a merely sovereign act; and all those theories that depress the doctrine from its high Scriptural ground, in proportion as they approximate more or less to Unitarianism, make more or less use of the sovereignty of God put in the place of law and justice. They represent God as doing this or that in virtue of his sovereignty, which,

in fact he does in adherence to law. Hence it is very important for our author to get the countenance of Edwards in this misuse of God's sovereignty. He says, page xii. : "He (Edwards) exalts the sovereignty of God in connection with the atonement. Perhaps the most distinguishing feature of the new divinity is, that it gives prominence to God as a Sovereign in applying and conducting as well as originating the redemptive work."

He then goes on to specify some ways in which Edwards exalts the sovereignty of God in connection with the atonement, and one is, "that the degree of glory which we are to enjoy in heaven is determined not by the *atonement* of Christ, but by the *sovereignty* of God." Very good. But how is this an instance of sovereignty applied to the doctrine of the atonement? Edwards' paragraph brought to prove it, argues that each one's measure of happiness in heaven is to be full, and that so much results from the atonement and righteousness of Christ, but that the different measures of the capacity of different souls are determined by an act of *sovereignty in the Creator*; so that, in truth, this is only an instance of God's sovereignty exercised in creation, and not in applying the atonement.

And equally aside from Edwards' true intent is our author when he says :

"President Edwards occasionally represents the act of imputing Christ's righteousness to us as an act of sovereignty. He distinguishes sharply between strict *law and justice* on the one hand, and sovereign pleasure on the other. But he says that 'God, of his sovereign grace, is pleased, in his dealings with the sinner so to regard one that has no righteousness that the consequence shall be the same as if he had.'"

Now, if this were a true representation of Edwards' views, it would make him teach bald Unitarianism—that is, that the sinner is forgiven and treated as righteous by mere sovereignty, and without an atonement. And the reader will be slow to believe, that even by an inadvertence he so taught. And he is made to appear to teach it only by separating his words from their connection. The passage (vol. 7, page 11, Worcester ed.) reads as follows :

"It is evident that the subject of justification is looked upon as destitute of any righteousness in himself, by that expression, *it is counted or imputed to him for righteousness*. The phrase, as the Apostle uses it here, and in the context, manifestly imports that God, of his sovereign grace, is pleased, in his dealings with the sinner, to take and regard that which indeed is not righteousness, and in one that has no righteousness, so that the consequence shall be the same as if he had righteousness, which may be from the respect which it bears to something that is indeed righteous."

Here, it will be seen, by comparing the quotation given by us with that given by our author, that the passage from Edwards is so cited that its sense is sadly perverted. It is hardly fair in quotation, to give a mere condensation of an author's words in quotation marks, as his own; and much less, when that condensation makes him speak a very different thing from what he did speak. Our author makes him say, that God is sovereign *in the act of imputing Christ's righteousness*. What his words imply is, that God, of his sovereign grace, establishes that constitution of things, which imputes righteousness in, one that has none of his own, out of respect to something that is indeed righteous. And this method of wresting the sense of Edwards, is a part of the process by which we have our purified and consistent Edwardeanism.

The fact is, that Edwards carried the idea of law and justice to the exclusion of sovereignty into the atonement, even farther than many sound men of the present day now do. Take an example (from vol. 7, page 61):

"It is absolutely necessary that in order to a sinner's being justified, that the righteousness of some other should be reckoned to his account, for it is declared, that the person justified is looked upon as (in himself) ungodly; but God neither will nor can justify a person without righteousness, for justification is manifestly a forensic term as the word is used in Scripture. And the thing is a judicial thing, or an act of a judge; so that if a person should be justified without righteousness, the judgment would not be according to truth. The sentence would be a false sentence, unless there be a righteousness performed, that is properly looked upon as his."

In the next place our author tells us, that Edwards condemned the distinction between the active and passive obedience of Christ, and makes a quotation to show it; and leaves it to be inferred, that in so doing he favored our author's

theory which excludes the positive righteousness of Christ from being a ground of our justification; whereas, these remarks against the distinction between active and passive obedience, come in in answer to an objection, which occurred in the way of Edwards' argument *against* the main pillar of our author's theory—his argument to show that the obedience of Christ rendered in our stead, is an indispensable ground of our justification. Yet, though Edwards does not make the distinction between the active and passive obedience, that some have made, he makes the distinction which others indicate by those terms: that is, the distinction between the suffering of the penalty, and thereby making an atonement, on the one hand, and obeying the law, and thereby laying the ground for our being counted righteous, on the other. The proof of this distinction is a cardinal part of his work on justification. (See page 57.)

Under the fifth head, our author says, that "the President maintained that we are delivered from hell on the ground of our Lord's sufferings as a *penalty*, and not on the ground of them as meritorious," leaving the reader to infer that, so far, he favored the new theory, that only the *sufferings* without the positive righteousness, are needful to our justification. True, Edwards did maintain that Christ's sufferings delivered us from hell, and yet that without his obedience or positive righteousness considered as *meritorious*, none can be lifted to heaven; as our author himself admits in the next proposition, where he undoes upon one page the work done on the preceding.

We come now to the main source of bewilderment touching this whole subject; that is, the interpretation of phrases that qualify the figurative language of the Scripture. Our author tells us (page xxi.):

"President Edwards introduces various *explanations*, which have suggested to his successors the propriety of a nomenclature needing fewer explanations. He introduces brief modifying phrases, which happily illustrate the tendency of his thoughts, and relieve his bolder statements from the objections originally suggested by them. Thus he says 'that Christ suffered the wrath of God for men's sins, *in such a way as he was capable of*.' Although he affirms that Christ suffered the punishment of our sins, he speaks with peculiar frequency of our Lord's agonies as '*equivalent*,' '*equal in*

value and weight, to the punishment threatened us. He often employs the phrase '*as it were,*' and similar qualifying words, to denote that his original terms are not to be taken in their strict and precise meaning."

Now, if the reader will note the method of interpretation which the New Edwardeanism here adopts, he will be able to trace the error to its grand source. Much of what is said in the Scripture about the atonement is in figurative language, and is conceded to be so on all sides. Now, it is said, that this is only a figure, and we may make it mean as little as we choose. If it is said, Christ suffered the wrath of God only in such a way as he is "capable of," this means nothing, if it is clear to us that he is not capable of suffering it at all. It is by such a play upon figurative language, more than any other means, that there has sprung up a system of Edwardeanism, in opposition to Edwards and Calvinism.

But the truth is, that the figurative language on this subject has a meaning, as determinate and clear to common-sense, as literal language has on any subject. The language of Scripture applied to invisible things must be tropical, having first been formed upon objects of sense, to match ideas gained by sensation and reflection. But the senses give no ideas of the unseen world; and our language in its original structure provides no names for them; and God's revelation constructs for us no new language for these subjects. It simply takes the existing language, formed upon sensible objects, and bends it to the higher purpose of spiritual discourse. So it describes the saving change of the soul as a birth, and the relation formed upon that as an adoption. And to the abode of the blest it gives the name first applied to the visible expanse above us, and to the properties of God, names borrowed from those of men. Such anthropomorphitic modes of expression are indispensable. They are indeed figurative or symbolical, and yet as literal as any language in such a case can be. They give the truth as far as the resemblance holds, and leave it to common-sense to fix the limit. And this is important to be borne in mind, in all our inquiries on these subjects. It is not safe to say that the language is figurative, and therefore must mean something far less than it seems to mean. For

though all Scripture language is figurative so far as applied to invisible objects, yet it conveys a clear and determinate sense, obvious to the common mind, which instinctively modifies and limits anthropomorphic forms of speech. Indeed it was written not for the learned, but for the common mind. And touching all these subjects it has an *obvious* sense, and that is the true sense, which the Holy Spirit intended to convey. The literal meaning is one thing, and the obvious sense is often quite another. The obvious sense is that by which we are bound.

Now President Edwards, when he spoke of Christ suffering, "*as it were*," the penalty of the law for us, and used the other qualifying phrases referred to, recognized this very principle, which every safe interpreter must recognize; that is, he took the language of the Scriptures as the nearest possible approximation to the idea, and yet allowed for the *anthropomorphism* necessary in the case. He read out of the Scriptures the truth that Christ endured the penalty of the law, in our stead, not in form, circumstances, and duration the same, but in substance, essential ingredients, and moral significance the same. He allowed, that in some respects he did not endure precisely what the sinner in hell endures; and he maintained that in some respects he endured what the sinner never can endure. And yet he saw in it the *substantial* execution of the threatened penalty, a full execution of what God's justice required.

This much is clear, that this mode of understanding the passages of Scripture bearing on this subject meets the obvious meaning of those passages, and diminishes nothing from the force with which they speak to the common mind, and answers exactly to the sense in which we understand Scripture terms on other subjects, as depravity, regeneration, and sanctification, and indeed all branches of Christian theology; while the mode attempted by these Edwardeans lands us in a virtual denial of what is obviously asserted in the Scriptures. Take now the assumptions which these Edwardeans, feeling "the propriety of a nomenclature needing fewer explanations," have chosen, and see whether that, or Edwards' form of speech, best answers the obvious sense of Scripture. These assumptions

are, that Christ has not paid the penalty of the law, has not satisfied the justice of God, has not answered the demands of the law, has not wrought out a righteousness as the ground of our justification, has not delivered us from the curse of the law demanding our eternal punishment. And then take those of Edwards, which are the opposite of these. Now, read a little of Scripture and see which best strikes the obvious sense, and "needs fewer explanations."

"Who his own self bore our sins in his own body on the tree; by whose stripes we are healed." "He hath borne our griefs and carried our sorrows; he was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities; the chastisement of our peace was upon him, and with his stripes we are healed." "Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise him; he hath put him to grief." "When thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin, he shall see his seed:" "he shall bear their iniquities," and "he bore the sins of many." "For even Christ our paschal Lamb is sacrificed for us." "Now once in the end of the world hath he appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself." "Who gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity." "Ye are bought with a price." "The Church of God which he hath purchased with his own blood." "Forasmuch as ye know that ye were not redeemed with corruptible things, but with the precious blood of Christ." "In whom we have redemption through his blood, even the forgiveness of sins." "Having made peace by the blood of his cross." "Behold the Lamb of God, that taketh away the sin of the world." "Being justified freely by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus." "Therefore, as by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men unto condemnation; so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men to justification of life. For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners; so by the obedience of one, shall many be made righteous."

These are but a small part of passages that are equally to the purpose. Now, let the reader judge, whether these passages, in their obvious sense, better accord with the sense of Edwards or of his opponents. In Edwards' reading of them

they require no modification, except now and then the phrase *as it were*, indicating the anthropomorphic sense; but in the other reading of them, we need a metaphysical argument to evade their proper force, at every turn.

And here we have an illustration of the evils of an attempt to force Christian doctrine into the cramping-irons of a rationalizing metaphysics. In the Bible, God has laid out Christian doctrines, in phrases that give the sense, in a way to be most easily apprehended by the common mind, and with no intention to favor metaphysical definitions. Indeed, many of the things revealed, being matters to be learned by spiritual experience, are intrinsically incapable of being defined in a language framed upon sensible objects. Hence, there is a clear absurdity, and an abundance of mischief, in the design of reducing Edwards' teaching of Christian doctrine, by a process of metaphysical definitions and reasonings, into a "CONSISTENT CALVINISM," set forth under "a nomenclature needing fewer explanations." This is a sin of theologians, which, when it is conceived, bringeth forth death. Just as soon as this scheme of reducing Christian doctrine to the narrow limits of man's metaphysics, and inclosing God's thoughts, which are heaven-high above ours, in definition framed by man's conceptions—that is, just as soon as we get the Infinite nicely ensconced in the finite, we find, on comparison of our system with God's book, that one is in conflict with the other. And no where has this tendency been more strikingly and sadly exemplified, than in such philosophizing upon the doctrine of the atonement.

We are well aware, that the new Edwardeans are not the only offenders in this line. The old Calvinists have, in some instances, built metaphysical conclusions upon literal interpretations of the texts, and have not sufficiently allowed for the anthropomorphism. And, instead of reasoning from the plain fact, that there has been a substantial execution of the penalty, they have sometimes pressed their theories to extreme points, and drawn unscriptural conclusions, when they had for their premises only a literality of Scripture expression, and not the obvious sense of Scripture.

But to return from this digression, it is one of the main principles of the scheme, as laid down in our author's categories, that God's justice will yet "eternally demand the punishment of every one who has sinned." How plainly this conflicts with the Scriptures, may be seen at a glance. "There is now no condemnation [no demand of justice against] them that are in Christ Jesus." "It is God that justifieth, who is he that condemneth?" "Christ has redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us." "We are not under the law, but under grace." If by saying, that the law will eternally demand the punishment, even of the believer, he meant no more, than that every believer, considered in his relations to law, and not in his union with Christ, *deserves* punishment, he would have said no more than all have always admitted, and so he would have said that which was not fit to stand as number five, in his series of the principles of what he calls "the *new* divinity." But when he says, and says it as a part of the *new* scheme, that the law "*will eternally demand*" the sinner's punishment, he says it to show, that the demands of the law have not been satisfied in case of the believer, that God saves believers in a sovereign way, leaving law and justice still crying, "Give, give." The theory, that the law has been honored, indeed, but not satisfied; that justice has been expressed, but not executed or satisfied, comes out under this phrase. It is true, that the younger Edwards uses expressions something like this; but he connects with them such a definition of distributive justice, as to show, that he means no more than that, considered in his personal character, Paul will always *deserve* to be damned. It is by the same definition, that he makes the salvation of Judas consistent with God's justice. And it is very plain, that justice, in that sense, is not satisfied; for Judas has gone to his own place. And Paul may be content to have his damnation demanded, by a kind of justice, that would save Judas.

We notice another assumption pervading our author's speculations on this subject, that is, that God's justice has *expression*, but not an *exercise* or *execution* upon Christ in his sufferings and death; or, in other words, he makes himself to

appear to be just, while he does not, as the protector of law, execute justice; he *shows* justice, but he does not *do* justice; he *shows* a firm purpose, that law shall be executed, but he does not execute that purpose. Now, common-sense teaches, that the true way to appear to be just, is actually to be so; and the true way to show a purpose, that the law shall be executed, is to put it in execution, on the offender, or on his surety.

But how has God's justice had expression, where it had no execution? We are told, that, instead of a substantial execution of justice on one standing in the sinner's place, God did another thing on another person, not the sinner's surety, which cost him as much reluctance to do, as it would to send the whole human race to hell, and because it cost him as much reluctance to do this other thing, as it would to execute his law, therefore, what he did was equivalent for all purposes to the execution of law. But how so? If an officer of government were charged with the execution of a certain criminal condemned to death, would he be considered as having done an equivalent to the execution of the criminal, for the purposes of law, if he had gone and set fire to his own property, though it might have cost him double the reluctance that it would to have done the office of a hangman? We cannot see how God honors his law or justice, in letting off the offender, by simply doing a thing that costs reluctance, if there is on no one an actual execution of the law. Allow of a substitution of a surety or victim in the place of the offender, and let the evil threatened in the law spend itself on him, as a surety, then, according to a principle universally acknowledged, we see, that the law has a fit vindication; but not otherwise.

But, after all, this question, whether God only expressed, or whether he actually executed his justice, on his Son, is a question of the plain obvious import of Scripture language. To us it is irresistibly plain, that such Scriptures as the following show, that the Lord executed the penalty on his Son. "It pleased the Lord to bruise him." "Thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin." In bearing our griefs and carrying our sorrows, he "was stricken, smitten of God, and afflicted." "Awake, O sword, against my shepherd, and against the man

that is my fellow, saith the Lord of Hosts ; smite the shepherd, and the sheep shall be scattered." "The *Lord hath laid* on him the iniquity of us all." "The cup which my *Father hath given me*, shall I not drink it?" Do not these plainly import more than a *show* of justice, even an actual *execution* by the lawgiver of the penalty on the Son? Here we see the tendency of such speculations, to lead the mind away from the Scriptures.

The book under examination was prepared, as an introduction, to a series of works on the atonement, collected from different authors, and published by the Congregational Board of Publication. The whole design of the collection, with its introduction, is not to give to the public works that were difficult of access, for a part of them had been recently reprinted before. But both the collection of treatises and the Introduction were designed to sustain the author's special theory, which he calls the "new divinity." But, however many shreds and patches of argument may have been gathered from these selected writings, the system which is here offered us, is, as a system, that of the author of the Introduction, and, in some of its features, very diverse from any thing which has yet appeared under a Calvinistic name.

We have not space to follow our author through all his misconceptions of the views of Edwards. We have rarely met with an instance, in which so distinguished an author as Edwards has met with so much injustice at the hands of a commentator. In witnessing such an amount of hard labor employed, to show him to be inconsistent with himself, on so many points, as to leave him little worthy of confidence or respect, as a consistent thinker, and that labor bestowed by one who claims to be an Edwardean, while, in the main drift of his system opposed to Edwards, we are forced to ask—what all this means? It can only mean, that the homage and deference which have been paid to Edwards, in the departments of mental science and theology, must now be transferred to the greater lights of the present age. But at the risk of being set down as behind the times, we shall venture to express our deliberate opinion, that no author of the present age is better qualified to put forth a profound, comprehensive, and self-consistent system of theology, than was Jonathan Edwards.

And, as to these after-thoughts, said to have been elicited by the successors of Edwards, in the light of which Edwards' own system is stultified, it could be easily shown, that most of them had been carefully examined, and, for good reasons, repudiated by Edwards himself.

But this conceit of setting aside a system of theology, in the act of completing its constructive idea, and putting, in its place and under its name a very different system, constructed of inferences, could hardly be named with a sober face, had it not come forth under such high auspices. The illusions spread abroad by it, after it has found entertainment in respectable quarters, are immense. The mass of people to whom the representation is addressed, that this new system is peculiarly Edwardean, and substantially Calvinistic, have not the means of detecting the error; and, under the sanction of imposing names, are made to receive for Calvinistic and Scriptural truth, that which runs counter to it.

Our author is strongly opposed to a limited atonement scheme. His chief labor upon his theory seems to look mainly to an escape from what he conceives to be the dangers of that system. The writer of this article has no partiality for what is peculiar in that theory, and yet, he is free to say, that no living writer has done so much to give currency to that theory as the author of this Introduction. This Introduction, unless we are much mistaken, will be made use of extensively to convey the impression, that the doctrine of a general atonement cannot be carried to its logical conclusions, without abandoning, so far as our author has abandoned, the essential elements of the old doctrine. The way has here been opened, for an host of superficial thinkers to rise up and say, That is just what we have maintained. This Edwardean system has now been proved to have laid the foundations for a logical exclusion of the strict doctrine of atonement. Nor is this mere prophecy. We have seen results akin to this, on many minds. Many younger men in New-England, having been familiarized to these deductions from Edwards' successors, and not readily detecting their fallacy, as deductions, and yet convinced that the conclusion is unscriptural, and so feeling, that

they must choose between a limited atonement, and an abandonment of the atonement, are preferring the former. So we speak advisedly when we say, that the doctrine of a general atonement has not, in this generation, received so severe a wound, as in this deduction carried through Edwards' successors, giving an apparent *reductio ad absurdum* to Edwards' system, and presenting, to one who admits these conclusions, the alternative of receiving the limited atonement scheme, or rejecting the substance of the doctrine of the atonement, as a proper satisfaction to divine justice.

ART. VII.—FRENCH THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

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1. *The Crisis of Theology in the Countries where the French Language is Spoken.*

To understand the bearings of the theological works now published in these countries, it is necessary to have some acquaintance with the state of thought and discussion. Since the fall of the First Empire, (1815,) the places where the French language is spoken have been the theatre of a remarkable religious awakening. This awakening was a reaction, in the practical sphere, against the languor, indifference, and death, which had invaded the Protestant Churches, in consequence of the philosophical tendencies of the Eighteenth Century. This revival was successful; for all the churches, even those least favored, are now in a much higher spiritual state than at the beginning of the century. Unhappily, this awakening ex-

tended only to the practical workings of the church, and, consequently, was incomplete, and is now in peril. As soon as this spiritual life reappeared, it attached itself to the dogmatic system of the sixteenth century, without independent and earnest investigation. Many men who accepted, almost without reserve, the scientific results of the sixteenth century in all departments of theology, often affected a disdain of science, and seemed to look upon severe studies as injurious to true piety.

Matters went on thus until the time when the influence of Vinet began to be felt. A new power was then seen to be at work, an awakening within the awakening. Although Vinet accepted, especially at the outset of his career, the dogmas of the Reformation on all essential points, yet he desired to have them received with intelligence and freedom. Insisting upon the human, moral, anthropological side of Christianity, which appeared to him to have been sacrificed to the Divine side, and enlisting in this cause with his admirable talents, Vinet soon came to exercise a powerful influence. His mind vivified and renewed the old: he led the men of the world to feel the power of Christianity: and all those religious people who felt the need of thinking and studying grouped themselves around him. Those were noble days for French Protestantism: days of joy, of faith, and of hope; those days in which elect souls, through their organ, *Le Semeur*, spake to the new generation and directed them in the ways of piety. Then was gained the cause of Religious Liberty, and the separation of Church and State. The quickening impulse was visibly advancing, and gaining in depth as well. They did not then despair of the triumph of any good cause: they did not doubt about the possibility of a scientific development, which, without restraint, would allow the formation of a French theology, adapted to the wants of the nineteenth century, and not breaking with the tradition of the sixteenth century.

The premature death of Vinet, May 4, 1847, first led many to tremble as to the realization of that happy future, about which they had been dreaming. Then came the sensation produced by the dismissal of Scherer from Geneva in 1849. This

was the signal of the approaching conflict. That learned professor at first only attacked the ideas of his colleague Gaussen, upon the verbal inspiration of the Scriptures; and his friends hoped, for a time, that he would seriously engage in the attempt to give a new form to theology, in a more liberal but yet profoundly Christian sense. Unhappily, the traditional theology was represented by some advocates, who were far from recommending it. They despised philosophy; wholly unable to defend their views in a scientific manner, they could only anathematize all novelties and frighten the simple. The lovely and conciliating genius of Vinet was no longer there, to speak with authority and ward off the shock. The *mêlée* became general. M. Scherer, too, soon overstepping all bounds, adopted an absolute necessarianism. In the consciousness of sin and in remorse, he saw only an illusion of conscience. He soon found himself in the position of a general without an army; and the little army of liberals was disbanded for want of a leader. The defenders of tradition at first appeared to have better promise of success: but there was not among them any man of high philosophical culture. It is remarkable that the cause of orthodoxy had for its leading champion an extempore theologian, a layman, Count Agénor de Gasparin. No one denied that he had talent, strong convictions, and zeal; but the wise men among the French orthodox felt that he did not defend their cause with the best weapons.

The adversaries of Scherer were represented only by a popular journal, the *Archives du Christianisme*. His friends, under his lead, founded the *Revue de Théologie* at Strasburg, and there published learned treatises. Without a definite programme, it was an organ for those who felt the need of something novel; but the negative tendency predominated. For the last five years another journal, the *Revue Chrétienne*, the organ of M. de Presensé, has taken a different position; not joining the adversaries, but not following in the negations, of M. Scherer. But as this *Revue* is rather literary than theological, it cannot be considered as the proper representative of the intermediate party, called the *tiers-parti*.

Such is the critical condition of this revival of French Pro-

testantism. On the one side are M. de Gasparin, Merle, and Gaussen, defending the theology of the sixteenth century; on the other Scherer and his party, who have taken a decided position against Christianity. Between the two are floating the large mass of men, at a greater or less distance from these two camps. Unhappily, in this general confusion, the young men and ministers are without sure guides; and skepticism and latitudinarianism are making such progress as to alarm even those who believe in the triumph of a healthful and free theology, retaining what is fundamental in the theology of the sixteenth century. But it is much to be feared that this work will go on, not by a gradual process, but through a violent crisis, which threatens to compromise every thing.

2. *Theological Works: Pécaut's Christ and Conscience; Calvin's Institutes, new edition.*

The negative teaching has spoken its last words in the work: *Le Christ et la Conscience. Lettres à un Pasteur, sur l'autorité de la Bible, et celle de Jésus Christ.* Par FELIX PECAUT. Paris. 1859. This author goes as far as is possible, stopping short of atheism. His system is a pure deism, admitting no revelation. The point of view of the author is essentially antique; a Judaism without any revelation. Christians of the present day find themselves face to face with pantheism: and it is a matter of surprise to find a new-comer in the garb of a kind of Pharisee. M. Pécaut accepts, against the Scriptures, all the destructive results of the German criticism: but he is an entire stranger to the philosophy that prevails beyond the Rhine. The book is born in the country of Voltaire, where metaphysical baggage is made light of. But, let us well understand it, the deism of M. Pécaut is serious; he prays, without, it is true, telling us how his God can hear and answer prayer: nor would the author have any objection to take the communion once a year. Although it may seem paradoxical, and the very words rush into conflict with each other, we may say, that *he preaches the most decided incredulity with piety and unction.* There is in him a striking vein of that natural religiosity (if we may coin a

word) which breathes in the writings of Bernardin de St. Pierre, and to which Jean Jacques Rousseau was no stranger in his better moments. This is all which the author seems to have preserved of a decided early Christian education.

But this is not to go very far. The great problems of life are not such to him; he speaks of sin, only to say that Jesus Christ was not exempt from it; as to himself, he has no need of a Saviour or of salvation. The great drama of the inner life, he says, "the moral struggle to which the Gospel calls all men, can be carried through and out, *in virtue of the name of God alone*, without a mediator and without authority." (P. 436.) Here, too, is a characteristic passage, containing all that remains of the positive faith of the writer: "It is true that I have ceased to see in Jesus Christ the only and indispensable being, the Son of God in the absolute sense, the Jewish Messiah or the Christian Word: but still he has for me the *primacy* among the brethren; he is the man who has seen God and who first fully revealed him to us, saluting him with the name of *Father*. . . . If not my God, he is my master, by the double right of teaching and of love; I confess that I am not his *worshipper*, but his *disciple*. Undoubtedly, I can no longer share his Messianic hopes: but the ideal which I keep before me is no other than his. His Father is my Father; the will of God which was his meat and drink, is my supreme good. Like him, I believe that it is necessary to be born anew to enter the Kingdom of Heaven; that our only help is in the pity of God; that our calling is to serve, and not to be served by, our brethren. His peace will be my peace; his strength my strength. I dare believe that if he should to-day return among the living, he would say to me, after hearing my confession, Thou art not far from the kingdom of God." (P. 432.)

M. Pécaut pretends that the moral sphere is altogether separate from that of Christian doctrines: the latter are to him only an undigested tradition, keeping men away from true morality. The moral ideal, which he adopts in estimating the character of the Lord, is not adapted to recommend his positions. Jesus Christ being only a man, cannot, in his view, be holy. Here are some of the circumstances in which, according

to M. Pécaut, Christ was in fault. First, when Jesus allows the legion of demons (Matt. 8 : 28) to drive the herd of swine into the sea, this "is directly opposed to the most elementary principles of right and of property." (P. 256.) Then he treated the poor woman of Canaan harshly, (Matt. 15): "I am not sent, he says, save to the lost sheep of the house of Israel. What words! befitting the Jewish Messiah rather than the Lamb of God! What tenderness for the afflicted ones in Zion; but what harshness towards the pagan!" "It is true that Jesus yields to her request and ends by saying: 'O woman! great is thy faith; be it unto thee even as thou wilt!'" And M. Pécaut goes on: "Let us with Christ say, a great faith; and we will add, a great lesson given by the *woman of Canaan*! In this dialogue she plays the superior part!" (P. 258.) The Lord was also, says this critic, equally at fault when he drove the buyers and sellers from the temple; why did he not apply to the police, asks M. Pécaut, if he was troubled by the sight of them? "The crowd was perhaps complaining of their need; the monopoly bore hard upon the buyers; but there must have been a regular police, which there, as elsewhere, performed its functions well or ill. Was it in keeping with the part of the Messiah, as we conceive of him, to perform such an office?" (P. 252.) To these instances M. Pécaut adds, that Jesus trod under foot the most sacred duties of the family, when he said to the young man, who asked if he might follow him: Let the dead bury their dead. (Luke 9.) These are the most essential points, on the ground of which he brings reproach upon the character of the Saviour. It is plain, that the moral ideal, in view of which the new deism tries to correct Christian morals, is not of the most elevated order.

M. Pécaut, however, has one incontestable merit. He has boldly drawn the consequences from that stand-point, which will neither admit mysteries in Christianity, nor metaphysics of any sort. In his view, Jesus was a sinner like his brethren; he was a man eminent for his endowments of mind and heart; but he was also one who, doubtless in good faith and with a sound mind, although led away by the Messianic hopes of his race, wrongfully ascribed to himself an authority which he did

not possess; took the part of being a mediator between God and man, and thus laid the foundation of a new idolatry. Jesus Christ, in spiritualizing the idea of the Messiah, was necessarily led to attribute to himself Divine prerogatives. "His Apostles, and after them the Church, followed a logical course in *regularizing* (excuse the term) the position of Jesus Christ. They could only *regularize* it by enlarging it." (P. 351.) And this, according to M. Pécaut, is the way in which the Church has been brought to see in Jesus Christ a God; it was, that it might not see in him only a fanatic and an enthusiast.

But here some weighty questions come up. How can this fanaticism, this enthusiasm, be harmonized with that calm, sober, and also honest character, which the author is also willing to ascribe to Christ? How can we account, from the position of M. Pécaut, for the origin, the propagation, and the influence of Christianity? These, and such like questions, he does not even deign to discuss. He wholly ignores philosophy, and all the profounder problems. He rejects in the Gospel all that wounds his conscience! fifty years ago he would have said, all that is repugnant to *reason and common-sense*.

However, he takes care to repeat, in many parts of his book, that he arrived at these negative conclusions, combating them all along; he would have liked very well to have saved the whole Christian tradition. Despite himself he came to deism! If this be so, he has not yet spoken his last word; for M. Scherer, his master, takes care to warn him, "that when the supernatural is lost, the belief in a personal God is engulfed."* M. Pécaut repels this conclusion with indignation. If he succeeds in keeping himself erect in the abyss, it would be right to say to him, that if he had made as strong efforts to remain (perhaps we should say, become) a Christian, as he must to remain a Deist, he would not have come to the position where we now find him.

* *Nouvelle Revue de Théologie*, Tome ii. p. 293.

Institution de la Religion Chrestienne en quatre livres : et distinguée par chapîtres, en ordre et méthode bien propre : augmentée aussi de tel accroissement qu'on la peut presque estimer en livre nouveau, par JEHAN CALVIN. Nous avons aussi adjousté deux indices, l'une des matières principales, l'autre, des passages de l'Ecriture, exposés en icelle, recueillis par A. Marlorat. Deux volumes, grand in 8, sur deux colonnes. Paris : 1859. Librairie de Charles Meyrueis et Compagnie.

This new edition of the great doctrinal work of the sixteenth century, which is also the *chef d'œuvre* of the French reformer, may suggest a just idea of the present theological culture of the countries where the French language is spoken. Thorough theological works are no longer neglected as they formerly were; and yet, incapable of composing original ones, fully occupied with the urgent demands of the times, they limit themselves to reprinting what is best in the past.

The editors indicate the good results they expect from this publication: "In a scientific point of view, neither theologians nor laymen, who pretend to solid religious knowledge, can neglect the work which was at the doctrinal basis of the French reformation, and of which at least nine tenths of Protestantism now bear ineffaceable traces." "Let us not be misunderstood; we emphatically aver, that in respect to religious truth we recognize no man as master. We bow in the obedience of faith only to Him who could say: 'I am the truth; I am the light; I am the life.' We admit, as a fully adequate expression of his revelation only the Testament, which he has given us by the Church. To all else we apply the grand principle of St. Paul: 'Examine all things; hold fast that which is good.' We declare no less strongly that we do not think that even the most excellent and illustrious productions of any one epoch are fitted to meet all the wants of any other epoch. Here, as in all things, we believe in progress. Far be from us the idea of proclaiming the perfectibility of that Gospel, which was perfect from the day on which Jesus Christ finished his work by pouring out his Spirit upon the Church. But that which is perfectible, that in which we ought to make constant

progress, is the understanding and the exposition of Christian truth in ever new applications, in results ever more rich and more fair, for the salvation of our fallen humanity." (Introduction, p. 32.) Not one of the least characteristic traits of our present theology is seen in the fact, that these editors of Calvin also declare that they do not adopt his views on predestination. They say (p. 29) that while most of the other evangelical truths taught by Calvin are still received almost as he held them, somewhat modified indeed by individual peculiarities, yet there are very few French Christians who fully agree with his convictions upon this doctrine.

The editors, however, have not undertaken the work in a merely literary point of view; on the contrary, they suppose it to have a direct and urgent interest for persons of all persuasions. "We offer to men of all parties these Institutes, and say to all: Read! Men of science and of progress, consent to suspend for a moment your dream of the future, to look once again at the past, to plunge again into that sixteenth century, with which, perhaps, you are too slightly acquainted; and, after having read the book, see if you can still stigmatize by the name of *orthodoxy*, and reject as mere *formulas*, what has laid hold of your conscience, humbled and elevated your heart." A like appeal is addressed to the men enlisted in the French awakening, who have too much neglected the grand traditions of the sixteenth century: to the Lutherans, often too fanatical; to the Catholics, who know only the calumnies against this reformer. "We invite, also, to the sumptuous banquet prepared by Calvin, those who, under the influence of a philosophic rationalism, have come to regard all positive revelation as an absurdity, those even whose speculations have dragged them nearer and nearer to the abyss of pantheism. And why not? Calvin presents, without artifice, and with all the energy of an honest conscience, those doctrines and facts of Christianity, which Paul called 'the foolishness of preaching.' A century before Pascal, Calvin showed how the proud man was overwhelmed with the weight of misery, and then pointed him to the only possible rescue; and who knows but that this strange method, inaugurated by

the prophet of Nazareth, and followed by his greatest missionary, not without success, before the Areopagus of Athens, may not yet be effectual with some thinkers, too earnest to find peace in Kant and Hegel? With men it is impossible, but with God all things are possible! We leave the reader in the society of the greatest divine of the sixteenth century. May the Spirit of God preside over their secret intercourse."

This edition, besides the Introduction by the new editors, contains Calvin's Letter to Francis I.; several Indices; and the Address of the Author to the Reader. The new editors recite the circumstances that led Calvin to write the work, and give a short history of previous editions. They have reprinted the French edition of 1559, and corrected a great number of errors, found in all previous editions. Thus, of nearly four thousand citations from Scripture, verified by them, they have corrected about one thousand. The style of Calvin is reproduced, without any change. In this respect, this edition is distinguished from that of Pastor Icard de Brend, Geneva, 1818, who undertook to modernize it.

Another circumstance about this new edition, is characteristic of the times. The French Protestants of the nineteenth century, are indebted to the Christians of the United States of America, for the republication, in French, of the Commentaries and the Institutes of Calvin. The editors say, that, without the aid of the Presbyterian Board of Publication in Philadelphia, they could not have undertaken this work and carried it through. Thanks to this assistance, they have already issued all the Commentaries of Calvin on the New Testament, and intend to give to the public all his other works.

3. *Philosophical Works.* Vacherot's *Metaphysics* ; Renan's *Essays*.

La Métaphysique et la Science ; ou Principes de Métaphysique positive, par Etienne Vacherot, ancien Directeur des études à l'Ecole Normale. 2 vols. 8vo, pp. 450, 693. Paris, 1858.

HERE are nearly 1200 pages of metaphysics, from Paris ! The fact is certainly worthy of notice, especially in the time current. Although France once had a Descartes in philosophy, yet for a long time it seems to have lost the habit of profound metaphysical studies ; in these latter days, when the French have taken to philosophy, it has been chiefly under a literary and historical point of view. It is now manifest to all the world, that M. Cousin is but a great writer, and not strictly a metaphysician ; and, for some time past, the few persons who once took eclecticism in a serious way, have ceased to do so any longer.

Here, too, is M. Vacherot's own description of the world in which his work has come to light. "I know that with us science has little curiosity about metaphysics, and that criticism employs itself about history. The best minds, those born for the discovery and demonstration of truth, willingly trust themselves, like common people, to what they have agreed to call the light of common-sense. Our country, even in its days of greatest liberty, has never been the classic land of free thought. The worship of truth is rare ; I mean its disinterested worship. We love, we seek for truth, not for its own sake, but for the good it will bring, for its practical virtues. We know no more about the theory of science, for the sake of science, than about the theory of art, for the sake of art ; we leave these principles to the learned and poetic Germany. With us, when an author publishes a book on philosophy, no one takes account either of the ardor of his efforts, or of the vigor of his analysis and demonstration. All that is looked upon as a superfluous preamble, which nobody stops to read. Readers go right to the conclusion of the book ; and it is class-

ified, judged and condemned without appeal, according as these conclusions conform to received opinion, or otherwise."

"It is even very rare for justice to be rendered to the sincerity of an author's opinions. It does not occur to the minds of his surprised readers, that he can have written simply for the sake of the truth. Every thing becomes matter for scandal in this land of discipline; not because there is great boldness of individual thinking, but because the sway of the words, *order and example*, is prodigious. Such is the style of the French mind. It thinks before the public; it is never alone, free and face to face with the problem which is the object of its researches. The public is always there, to give advice, to inspire, to modify the development and expression of the thought. The truth is never seen but through the prism of opinion. We, too, the rest of us Frenchmen, are men of discipline, in thought as in battle. Just like our soldiers, so do our thinkers rouse up, become animated and exalted under the gaze and applause of the crowd. Their nerve consists in that French *fury*, which requires noise and success; the shade damps their ardor, silence is like ice. The broad day of public opinion, and of favorable opinion, is the working place of our philosophers, even when they make a show of shutting themselves up for meditation inside four walls. This has always been so; it is the very genius of the French mind. . . . With us the Descartes are rare, and a Spinoza is impossible. This method has its advantages and its inconveniences. To it we owe the large number of our writers, and the small number of our thinkers; the admirable clearness, and the mediocre originality of our works. It has been said, with entire truth, that the French mind, like the French language, is the *verò* of universal thought; it is not best for the discovery of truth, but to express, preserve, and popularize it. In this sense, it is the organ, par excellence, of general truths and ideas." (*Préface*, pp. ix, x.)

We readily concede that a good degree of courage was needed to write two large volumes of metaphysics under such circumstances. M. Vacherot deserves the respect of all scientific men for not having avoided such a task. Here, at

last, is a Frenchman, who seriously undertakes the mission of a philosopher. He wanders far astray ; but he is no mere declaimer ; he is not a rhetorician, but a thinker. He avows, indeed, a profound hatred to Christianity ; his work is a manifesto of unbelief ; but his frankness is more instructive to Christians, than the reserve and hypocritical homage of many so-called eclectic philosophers.

And, besides, M. Vacherot is a representative of his country. His work is admirably clear ; the style is a model in its way ; and yet his volumes do not rise above that "mediocre originality," which he has just told us is the characteristic of the larger part of French books ; and the author, too, avows that this is the character of his work. At the bottom, it is still an eclecticism, that is to say, a mixture of different elements from the most diverse sources, not ranged under the sceptre of any one great and fruitful idea to bind them together, to systematize them. M. Vacherot believes, in good faith, that he is giving to his readers Hegelianism, clad in French ; in fact, he serves up to them, in a monstrous amalgam, conceptions, borrowed by turns from Hegel, Kant and Locke. A superficial acquaintance with these three systems is enough to give an idea of the strange results to which the author comes.

The term, *positive*, sufficiently characterizes this system of metaphysics. The author understands by it, a philosophy rigorously limited to the positive, that is, to the incontestable facts which experience reveals to us. He endeavors to render a complete account of these facts, renouncing all hypothesis. In one word, he endeavors to find the rationale of the existence of phenomena, but *without going out of the world of phenomena*. Thus far he might be considered as only a Kantian ; but he also intrepidly denies all that is supersensual, (the *noumena*,) while Kant doubted not the existence, but the knowledge thereof. Thus the doubt of Kant becomes dogmatism in M. Vacheroti ; his positive metaphysics materialism. His fundamental idea is very simple. It is that of the absolute opposition of the ideal and the real, of the phenomenal and the intelligible, (*noumena*,) of the subjective and objective. Ideal perfection is a mere abstraction,

necessarily produced by the reason, but as soon as the attempt is made to *realize* this ideal in the affirmation that a perfect Being exists, we are precipitated, he says, into diametrical contradictions. The axiom most evident to him, is the complete and eternal separation of the ideal and the real; the utter impossibility of any kind of perfection. God, the moral world, metaphysics properly so called, all this is boldly declared to be impossible.

With Kant, the moral sentiment was still so mighty that he could not come to any such result. Thus, though in the sphere of the *theoretical reason* he became bankrupt, and renounced science, he regained all he there lost as soon as he entered the domain of the *practical reason*. For M. Vacherot this second sphere is a nullity; he is profoundly silent on this part of Kant's system. All the problems, raised by the moral and religious conscience, elude him; phenomena are enough for him; he has no need of asking, Why and How? Thus his philosophy ends just where it ought to begin. He remains this side of the real philosophical problems; they do not exist for him. But they always have existed, and always will exist, for the human mind. The glorious mission of philosophy consists in just not stopping with the bare fact, with phenomena: in seeking for the solution of the problems raised by reason. To suppress the difficulty by denying it, is an abdication of reason.

Such, in a few words, is the fundamental position of this Positive Metaphysics; and it is, perhaps, sufficient to indicate its attitude in respect to Christianity.

All know the ground taken by the eclectic philosophy in relation to the religion of Christ. In public it was prodigal in its professions of obeisance; it seemed to look upon it as vanquished, subjected, still of some use, though its approaching death was proclaimed in the esoteric circles. M. Vacherot, whose sincerity is undoubted, is not entirely free from such a method of procedure. According to him: "Christianity is the most profound, the most perfect, the last of the religious systems; it is the true and manly religion of the spirit, containing the most fruitful, the most sublime, the most concrete

of religious doctrines; the only religion which has penetrated being in all its depths, and recognized it in its universality." (Tome ii. p. 466.) It is "a religion of the second formation, a religion of reflection. Born of a spontaneous religion, it has been formed, developed, constituted by the help of philosophy. Like all religions, it is a commingling of imagination and reason, of poetry and science; but science and reason predominate." (Tome i. p. 134.)

What are we to think of these eulogiums? Are they to be taken seriously, when we see that M. Vacherot also rejects all the constitutive doctrines of Christianity? The real existence of Jesus Christ, the voluntary fall of man, the real being of God, his personality, his perfection, creation by an act of will; all these doctrines, at the tribunal of the positive metaphysics, are so many errors to be rejected. The author does not even deign to discuss the difficult problem, suggested to every philosophic mind, by the origin of Christianity and its influence on humanity. He does not even pause to take account of that superiority, which he concedes it has over all other religions. Suspicious praises, much invective and sarcasm, this is all that he grants to Christianity. He has not, even, always taken the trouble to raise serious objections against it. He reasons in the following way, against the doctrine of creation. The idea of creation from nothing is not given by experience; nor yet is it an *à priori* truth, for it has *its precise date in history*; hence, it cannot be thought, it is an empty word. How long is it since a truth has been considered as deprived of an *à priori* character, by the fact that its precise date in history is known? M. Vacherot grants that geometrical principles are *à priori*; will he go on and say, in the face of history, that all the theorems of geometry have been always held, in the shape of formulas, in all minds; that they have been every where known? Do these truths lose their *à priori* character, because they have been discovered at such a day, and such an hour, by some well-known geometrician? We see that the positive metaphysician passes very lightly over the most important question. Besides, M. Vacherot has never given himself the trouble to learn, even as much about

Christianity as a good Sunday-school scholar might have taught him. Nothing can be more strange or novel than the idea he has about the Christian doctrine of the fall of man. Will it be credited, that he attributes to the theology of the Church, not the doctrine of a fall at the outset of history, but that of a series of successive falls? "The development of being and of life," he says, "is but a series of falls. . . . The Christian faith reverses the true dialectics of things, making thought, nature and history descend from better to worse, instead of ascending from worse to better. And this is not simply the aberration of a great school; it is the error of all antiquity. . . . *Christian theology makes this its principle*, as much as did the Neo-Platonic school. This error constitutes the basis and the distinctive character of ancient thought, just as modern thought is essentially characterized by the law of progress, the formula of which it is the glory of the Hegelian philosophy to have expressed." (Tome ii. p. 468.)

To understand the full character of this *positive* philosophy, we must also indicate its relations to the *positivist* school of Auguste Comte. The resemblance, it is apparent, is not in mere words. M. Vacherot does not restrain his eulogy upon his elder brethren. "They form," he says, "a numerous and weighty school, which responds to the general tendencies of the human mind. It is also making rapid conquests in the learned world. All the elevated and generalizing minds there found attach themselves to the philosophy of Auguste Comte. Yet still, in the eyes of M. Vacherot, the positivists are wrong; they react against *all* metaphysics. "This name of metaphysics," he says, "sounds badly in their ears; it means to them an *à priori* philosophy, a speculative method, which they reject at all hazards; and, I may add, which it is perfectly reasonable for them not to want to have. We are in entire agreement with them on this point. Idealism is a cause decided and condemned; genius, in all the different epochs of philosophy, has been applied to this form of speculation, but its *à priori* principles have never been able to take a scientific form. Even the absolute idealism of Schelling and Hegel, in spite of the positive science by which it is nur-

tured, is, nowadays, adjudged to be arbitrary in the larger part of its constructions and formulas; all that is true and productive in it, it has from experience and positive science. If metaphysics be devoted to this ungrateful and sterile labor, we consider the disdain of the positivists for this false science to be legitimate. But here is just the question. The positivist school passes the limits of criticism, when it mutilates the human mind, and denies all *à priori* knowledge. Kant has incontrovertibly shown, that *à priori* principles are not peculiar to *metaphysical* speculation; that they begin with science itself. They are to be found every where; in the imagination, in the understanding, as well as in the reason." It is plain, that there is here a family quarrel between the *positivists* and the *positives*. The former are frank sensualists, and will not go out of the physical and mathematical sphere; and here they limit themselves to the proof of *laws*, and do not trouble themselves about *causes*, for this would be to fall into metaphysics, into theology. M. Vacherot, less timid, wishes to find order in the movements and forces of nature; he wants to have a system. He needs metaphysics, to set forth the internal harmony and substantial unity of the phenomenal world. This is his metaphysics. Then, when pressed to go further, to mount the ladder higher, he, too, holds back in his turn. No, he says, this would be idealism, theology. Arrived at the confines of the phenomenal world, he will not philosophize any more, not seeing that here is just the right moment to begin. And this is his anomalous position! He sees the need of the ideal; he agrees that humanity cannot keep itself from thinking it; and he denies that it is realized any where, or in any being. Kant was much wiser. Arrived at the confines of the phenomenal world, about to put his foot into the intelligible sphere, he stopped short. Far from denying it, he receded, seized with reverence. He renounced the attempt to prove with certitude the existence of a perfect Being, in consequence of the limitation of our faculties. But he admitted the existence of this perfect Being, and conducted a proof on the basis of practical reason. M. Vacherot seems not to feel this moral need of God; he stops

on this side, he will not go beyond the phenomenal world. He takes but one step in advance of his rival, Auguste Comte., and we may say to him, what he says to the positivists: "It is necessary to mount upwards, and still to mount. There is a natural and irresistible movement, drawing upward all thought, all human reason, toward the Infinite and the Absolute." Only a personal God, living and true, can explain all.

Essais de Morale et de Critique, par Ernest Renan, Membre de l'Institut. 8vo, Paris, 1859.

The French writers of the day are very fond of the old custom of collecting, in one volume, different articles, published in Reviews and Journals. Thanks to this practice, a book can be made without much trouble, and even without meaning to make it. And besides, in such a collection, one can dispense with that unity of conception, which is indispensable in writing a work; and, in these days of skepticism, this is no slight advantage. And these factitious volumes, too, have good success, when written by one who is in popular esteem. M. Renan is one of the most esteemed and lauded of our French writers. He is a man distinguished for his learning, and yet knows how to adapt the results of his scientific studies to the comprehension of persons of culture. He is an essentially aristocratic writer; he takes care to tell us in his Prefaces, that he writes for that select minority of superior minds, that make up the *élite* of humanity. He is a dilettante, a literary Epicurean, writing for those who wish to be able to talk about every thing, without going to the bottom of any thing, which would take too much time and trouble.

M. Renan is a celebrated Orientalist. For some years back, he has kept the public acquainted with the negative criticism on the Old Testament, from the school of Ewald. He has published a History of the Semitic Languages; Studies upon Religious History; and, lately, the Book of Job, translated from the Hebrew, with Studies on the Age and Character of the poem: he has also under the press, a Translation of the Song of Songs, with an exposition of its primitive plan.

The present volume is designed to teach ethics to his adepts, for he already has a school. It does not give us a system or the discussion of principles. It is a collection of articles already published in the *Revue des deux Mondes* and the *Journal des Débats*. He here moralizes, in view of the Revolution of Italy, and the Guelph party in Italy at the present time. Other subjects of the essays are, M. de Sacy (editor of the *Journal des Débats*) and the Liberal School; Cousin; Auguste Thierry; De Lamartine; the French Academy; the Poetry of the Paris Exposition; the Poetry of the Celtic Races, etc.

Thanks to this primitive method of moralizing about every thing, two results of inestimable value are obtained: one's favorite ideas can be emitted under the form of indisputable axioms, and there is no necessity of proving them. This is a double gain; for the readers of the day do not love the interminable discussion of arduous problems. There is, indeed, some risk of falling into contradictions; but who will espy them? The reader, seduced by the charms of style, has lost sight of the first articles when he comes to the last. Those slight defects, invisible to the eye, are exposed only by some tardy critic, who is, perhaps, one of those vulgar souls, still believing in God and the judgment, and has not, to speak with our author, "that fine and delicious pleasure of a disdain known to one's self alone, and sufficient to itself."

M. Renan talks in lofty strains about morals: "The fragments collected in this volume concentrate in one thought, which I place altogether above the range of mere opinion and hypothesis; that is, that morality is the one thing most serious and true, and that it suffices to give to life its meaning and its object. It is an impregnable basis, which skepticism cannot overturn, and in which man will find, to the end of his days, the fixed point amid all uncertainties; the good is the good; the evil is the evil; to hate the one and to love the other, no system is needed." (*Préface*, i. ii.) "If the end of life were only happiness, there is no motive for distinguishing the destiny of man from that of inferior beings. But it is not so; morality is not a synonym for the art of being happy.

As soon as sacrifice becomes man's duty and need, I can no longer see the limit of the horizon that opens before me." (P. iv.)

Hearing such affirmations, one would believe that he was at least in the presence of a deist ; but skepticism soon appears. After having talked so finely of morality, he tells us, that " in the *moral* and political sciences, principles, on account of their inadequate expression, are always partial, *half true and half false* : the results of reasoning at every step are illegitimate, except as controlled by experience and good sense. Logic does not seize the shades of thought ; and *the truths of the moral order have their seat entirely in these shades*." Nor is this all. M. Renan proposes, first of all, to separate morality from all particular doctrines, that is to say, from all metaphysical elements. In doing this, he pretends that he is serving the true interests of religion better than his adversaries ; for he would not be esteemed a mere moralist, but also a religious man. Only he wants to transport religion " into the region where it cannot be attacked, beyond particular dogmas and supernatural beliefs." He agrees that such a religion is not at the command of every body ; but what matters that ? " The religion of our times," he says, " can no longer separate itself from delicacy of soul and culture of mind." It is to give it this " new degree of refinement," that he takes up his pen. On this basis, the ground of hope for man is found in " the law of the solidarity of the race." " To noble souls there is a superior satisfaction in feeling that their influence will not die, but pass down through humanity, pursuing its beneficent work : *this is the true immortality, a thousand times more certain than the Christian doctrine of the resurrection*." And then, too, in order to give to religion that new degree of refinement which is to be its salvation, God is turned into ridicule, and called, as in the Studies on Religious History, " that good old word, a little stupid." In place of a too obscure metaphysics, we are told, that " man has no more decisive mark of nobleness, than a certain refined, silent smile, implying the highest philosophy." The coming of a religion of curiosity is predicted, for " philosophical curiosity is the most noble, and the most sure employ-

ment of thought." In those fine days, "the good, the evil, the beautiful, the ugly, the mediocre even, will be equally interesting." Then will come that "high, placid, philosophic state, when, having passed the sphere of dispute and contradiction, it comes at last, as they used to say, to rest in God."

Such are the fine things he tells us about, without taking the trouble of supporting them by the slightest proof. As to the leading position, that morality is to be kept apart from all positive and special doctrines, appeal is sometimes made to the authority of Kant. But as the baggage of the sage of Königsberg, after the German fashion, was a great deal too heavy to be transported across the Seine, faith in immortality and faith in God have been dropped on the way. And then, all this is given to the public under the title, *Essays in Morals*. We confess that we should like to have had a glimpse of the face of the author, when he hit upon so appropriate a title to his volume; it was undoubtedly lighted up with a very "refined smile."

ART. VIII.—MARSH ON THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE.

BY REV. F. A. ADAMS, ORANGE, N. J.

Lectures on the English Language. By GEORGE P. MARSH.
New-York: Charles Scribner. 1860. Pp. 697.

THIS volume contains thirty Lectures, delivered in the winter of 1858 and 1859, as a part of the Post-Graduate course of Instruction recently provided in Columbia College.

The subjects discussed are: the sources and history of the English Language; its present condition; its undeveloped resources, and its prospects.

The Lectures are general in their character. They were not written for philological students, but for young men fresh from college, and others who, from a love of study, would be led to

listen to them or read them; and from the necessary limitations of a single course of readings, they are only introductory.

The author has faithfully observed the restrictions imposed by this general aim, avoiding all useless discussions, and even useful ones, when unsuited to his audience, when they would lead him into anthropology or psychology, and so away from the intelligence of his hearers. This reserve apparently costs him nothing, for his thorough culture proves adequate to producing ripe and abundant fruits from his limited field.

The publication of these Lectures is a timely service. The causes which have operated to give to the Latin and the Greek the almost exclusive domain of language in the course of liberal study are losing their preponderating power. Among the new studies that are claiming increasing attention, the modern languages, and, first of all, our own, holds an important place. The number of students is already large who will gladly accept aid to a more thorough knowledge of the English language than was possible in former times, when almost all that was known of it was through its use in translating the Latin and the Greek. It lies, too, in the nature of the case, that our best help in this study will, for the present, come from those who, to the general qualification of scholarship, shall add the special endowment of an intimate knowledge of our language in its Gothic or Saxon sources. Among the scholars who are fitted to afford this special help, the author of these Lectures has long held a distinguished place. And his manner of working in the case before us is worthy of all praise. While he is wisely reticent where nothing to the purpose can be said, he has the instinct to say with the heartiest will whatever the matter in hand seems to demand. The book has not only much learning, but a good deal of individual character—animosity, we would say, saving the modern damaging association, and holding the word to its original meaning. The reader who accepts the guidance, and this will almost always be safe, will know whither he is bound, and will reach the point without needless delay, while he who has the boldness to deny, is left in no doubt what it is that he is denying. The acknowledgment of

merit, and the praise of it where it is deserved in the labors of others, is hearty and unflinching.

Over and above the thorough excellence of these Lectures as a whole, we would specify several points as specially inviting attention. These are, the Etymological Proportions of the English Language; English as affected by the art of Printing; Orthoëpical Changes; the English Bible; and Corruptions of English. These topics are discussed with a scholarship, skill and completeness that we have not seen approached elsewhere in the treatment of the same subject.

Leaving the student of the English language to find for himself the many important helps which this book will afford, we proceed to notice a few points on which the views of the author will probably invite some dissent.

The first is a point in phonology. "Rask," says our author, "critically one of the most eminent of modern philologists, and a discriminating phonologist, fancied that he could detect, what no Englishman or American ever did, a difference between the pronunciation of our two English words, *pale*, pallid, and *pail*, a water-bucket."

Now it is easy to make a denial like this, and if it were only meant that, in ordinary use, the difference in the sound of these two words is not apparent, or that many persons could not detect it, or that the author, speaking for himself alone, could not detect it, it might all be quite true. But standing as it does in a critical essay on the topic Phonology, where the nicer shades of sound demand recognition, it is reckless in tone and contrary to fact.

Instead of no Englishman or American ever detecting a difference of sound in these two words, the fact is, that just as many detect it as have cultivated their ear to apprehend the more subtil distinctions of vocal sound. There is a difference in the length of the vowel-sound, there is a difference in the form of the vowel-sound, and a difference in the proportion in which the two elements, the initial and the vanishing, enter into the sound, and, finally, there is a difference in the position of the organs. We might add, speaking from the dynamic

point of view, that there is a reason in the motion of the utterance why there should be a difference in the sounds. The words here adduced are only specimens of a considerable class in the English language.

We observe that the author, in comparing the German and the Italian languages, explains the greater fatigue caused by reading or speaking the latter by its fuller grammatical inflexions. We think he has missed the most important reason, which is, the muscular stress required in Italian in uttering the double consonants which are brought by phonetic attraction under one organ. When the Latin *pectus* is changed to *petto*, and *factum* to *fatto*, the vocal organs have fewer changes to make; but this gain is more than counterbalanced by the greater muscular effort necessary to pronounce the double consonant. The English words which have two consonants like the above, furnish no true indication of the pronunciation in Italian. A native of Italy, guided by the eye alone, would pronounce the words *better*, *letter*, *setter*, with twice the muscular stress on the double consonant which we employ, and, conversely, the Englishman and the American naturally pronounce the Italian words with too little stress on the double consonants, and, from the same cause, estimate their exhaustive power too low.

The author compares at some length a homogeneous with a composite language, and draws the conclusion that a language of the latter class has important advantages in the greater number of its synonymous words and the greater selectness of association with its synonymous roots, each of which is restricted to a particular department of thought. Thus the English has advantages over the German, whose vocabulary has grown up from its own roots, and whose words must therefore bear in their radical part the taint of whatever low use any words from the same root have submitted to; while the English, drawing its vocabulary from two sources, uses the words from the Latin and the French for dignified subjects, for history, politics and society; and those from the Saxon for the lower, home-felt wants of common life.

Now if the case were just as here stated, the advantages

would not be all on one side. It is well for a language to have the words that suggest the higher objects and thoughts enlivened by something that is home-like and actual in the lowest experience. The Divine wisdom has made the body so that the blood of every member shall flow through them all; and when a language, the spiritual organism of a people's life, shall show a fact completely analogous to this, that people is, through the Divine goodness, most highly furnished for the manifestation of its moral and spiritual life. Where this is not the case, there is danger that the life of a people will fall asunder, and those whose interest it is to use language to conceal thought, will find utterance for themselves in some lofty emptiness hardly better than the language of French diplomacy; and the rest, cut off from communion with all higher thought, will grovel in a speech grown altogether base. The English races have escaped this disaster to their life not through the good fortune of their language, but in spite of its disadvantages, by the inspiration of the great truths of the Reformation and the political struggles of past times.

But looking for a moment to the incidental disadvantages of a homogeneous language, where the same root does duty in all words, high and low, and so the high may seem in danger of losing something of their *prestige* from this association, it should be borne in mind, that in proportion as the association is extensive, the bond becomes light. As a clergyman, because he belongs to the whole of humanity, can go through all ranks and acquire no social taint from his companionship with the lowest, so these true human roots of language have the freedom of the whole realm of life and thought, and suffer no debasement by the lowliest service. Even in the English language, where the association is much more strict, a word will instantly divest itself of all that is unseemly in its antecedents, when called by adequate authority to do service in a higher sphere. A word that seems fastened to the narrowest rustic use, suggestive only of bullocks and him that handleth the goad, asserts at once its freedom when summoned by a master to an unwonted service; it casts off the exuviae of the clown, and consorts with princes like one to the manner born.

"Cromwell, our chief of men, who through a cloud
Not of war only, but detractions rude,
Guided by faith and matchless fortitude,
To peace and truth thy glorious way hast ploughed."

Now when we pass to a homogeneous language like the German, where a root is associated with the multitude of its possible products by a far slighter bond than in English, we ought to make the largest allowance for the freedom with which a word may stand, at each post of duty, undamaged by any shadow cast by its antecedent uses. When we read, in Luther's version of the twenty-third Psalm,

"Du salbest mein Haupt,"

though the verb in the German language serves all the lowly uses that it does in English, we must not suppose that to a German mind the verse is redolent of dead flies, as it might be to an Englishman.

If we go into the Low Dutch, the case seems even worse. There the verb used, if we remember right, is "grease;" but the Hollander, to whom it is vernacular, and plays many parts in his experience, suffers no strain on his associations by the use of it in this particular case, as an Englishman would do, by admitting an etymological translation.

A discussion respecting the fitness and value of one language compared with another must resolve itself at length into a comparison of the people who use it; for as a language, whatever may have been its origin, is actually the expression of a people's life, it will in general be adequate to express that life. The exceptions we should naturally suppose to lie against languages of a composite character where the free formative instinct has been checked by conflicting tendencies and by external obstructions.

The most careful and extended examination has led the author to the conclusion that while the accessions to the English vocabulary for the last century have been mostly from other sources than the Saxon, the actual use is now much more Saxon than it was a hundred years ago, and this fact leads him

to the hope that the prejudice against some Saxon roots and forms, which are now obsolete, may yet give way, and our speech be further enriched from this neglected source. Especially the author hopes that our poetic language may be enlarged by the use of Saxon forms or inflexional endings, giving us a more free use of the Feminine cadence in poetry, from which it is now almost excluded.

There are great difficulties in the realization of either of these hopes. As to obsolete Saxon roots, it is against the whole genius of our language to admit them for the expression of new ideas. It is the law of the language, when a new distinction is made and a new word admitted to mark it, to leave the Saxon in possession of the old, more general and familiar idea, and to pass the new or more refined notion into the keeping of a word drawn from other sources. The learned languages have a sort of preëmption right to the new ideas. The admission of Saxon inflexional forms to enrich and vary our poetic vocabulary seems hardly more probable. For various reasons, the times are not favorable for new devices in poetic language. The age is too earnest to tolerate any sort of lazy literature, and the hunger for melody which such devices would seek to supply is met by the universal cultivation of music.

The fate of those who have tried innovations may warn those who think there is hope in this direction. Tennyson has used a few obsolete words, and in every instance removed himself farther from the sympathies of the common mind. The learned and unlearned are alike offended. The use of such devices proclaims at once that the reader is not treated as a man, but as one of a select class, and the reader's lingering faith in the poet's honesty and inspiration dies out.

We have as little expectation that Anglo-Saxon or Icelandic forms of metre will be established among us in consequence of the study of these languages. The advantages of such studies we do not doubt, but they will be found in quite other ways, we think, than in an adoption of their forms of versification. To present the case, however, as strongly as we can in favor of these metres, we extract two exquisite specimens given by the author, as imitations of Icelandic verse :

"Softly now are sifting
Snows on landscape frozen.
Thickly fall the flakelets,
Feathery-light, together
Shower of silver pouring
Soundless all around us,
Field and river folding
Fair in mantle serest.

"Clad in garment cloud-wrought,
Covered light above her,
Calm in cooling slumbers
Cradled, earth hath laid her,
So to rest in silence,
Safe from heats that chafe her,
Till her troubled pulses
Truer beat, and fewer.

"Every throb is over,
All to stillness fallen !
Flowers upon her forehead
Fling not yet, O spring-time !
Still yet stay awhile, too,
Summer fair, thy coming !
Linger yet still longer,
Lest thou break her resting."

The following mosaic is compacted with no less cunning :

"Roll ! O rill ! forever !
Rest not, lest thy wavelets,
Sheen as shining crystal,
Shrink and sink to darkness !
Wend with winding border,
Wide aside still turning,
Green o'ergrown with grasses,
Gay as May with blossoms—

"Toward yon towered castle,
Time and rhyme renowned.
Lightly let thy waves then
Leap the steepy ledges,
Pour in purest silver
Proudly, loudly over,
Dancing down with laughter
Dashing, flashing onward,

"Singing songs unending,
Sweet, replete with gladness
Drape with dripping mosses,
Dell and fell o'erhanging,
Lave with living water
Lowly growing sedges,
Till thy toil-worn current
Turneth, yearning, sea-ward."

The exquisite beauty of these devices must not beguile us from saying that they are more like ingenious play than like song. The mental picture is continually eluding the reader's grasp through the little coquetries of the rhythm. The breathing cannot be unconstrained and healthful where there is so much self-conscious beating of the pulse.

We believe this work will afford important stimulus and aid to every thorough student of the English language, and we sincerely hope the author will bring before the public the results of his more minute and extended studies in the same field.

ART. IX.—ABESSINIA.

Letter from the REV. DR. KRAPF, the celebrated Missionary and Explorer in Africa; communicated by JOSEPH TRACY, D.D.

[At length, in a letter dated "Richen, near Bâle, Switzerland, Oct. 4, 1859," from the celebrated missionary and explorer, Dr. L. Krapf, to the Rev. S. M. Worcester, D.D., of Salem, Mass., we have some intelligible and accurate information from this region of vague and doubtful reports. We must preface it, however, by a few geographical and historical statements.

Strictly speaking, Abessinia is not a kingdom, but a large region, containing several kingdoms. It is the elevated plateau and mountain region, in which all the eastern confluent of the Nile have their rise. Its ancient Arabic name is Hâbesh; whence the Latin Abassia, and by still farther corruptions, Abessinia and Abyssinia. The Hâbesh, like our term, "the Valley of the Mississippi," never had any precise boundaries. Slaves from this region are known in Egypt, Arabia, and India, as Habashi, or Hubshee, in distinction from the Shankala, Dokko, and other negroes.

About 1400 miles from its mouth, the Nile receives from the south-east, its first confluent, the Atbarah, the Astaboras of

Ptolemy; called also el Mokada, Bahr el Aswad, or Black river, and Takkazie. Around its head-waters is the kingdom of Tigre, the capital of which is Gondar. This is the domain of the young king Theodore, so often mentioned within a few years, as "King of Abyssinia."

About 200 miles south-east from Gondar is Ankobar, the capital of the kingdom of Shoa, around the head-waters of the Blue Nile, the river explored by Bruce. The King of Shoa was often, a few years since, called the "King of Abyssinia," and Shoa regarded as the leading state; but Shoa is now substantially under the control of Theodore, King of Tigre, and ecclesiastically subject to the Archbishop Abba Salama, at Gondar.

The latitude of Gondar is about $12^{\circ} 30'$ north; of Ankobar, $9^{\circ} 35'$. South of Shoa, extending to about lat. 5° N., are the petty kingdoms of Guragie, or Gurague, Kambat, Enarea, Kaffa, Yangaro, (called also Gingero and Zindero,) Sidama, and others, all classed as Christian, and all within the limits of Hâbesh. These kingdoms have been the principal seat of the eastern slave-trade. At Enarea, slaves cost less than a dollar each in European goods. They were carried through Guragie and Shoa to Massowah, Tajura, and Zeila, on the Red Sea, and thence into Arabia, and eastward as far as Persia, at the rate, sometimes, of 20,000 a year. Theodore of Tigre, Dr. Krapf informs us, since obtaining the mastery of Shoa, has interdicted this traffic; but some part of it may still go on, from the more southern kingdoms, by a more southern route, to Zeila. From this region, too, the natives say, coffee was first introduced into Arabia; and to this day, a large part of the Mocha coffee of commerce is the product of this, its native land, as is well known to American traders, who sometimes are obliged to wait for weeks at Aden, in Arabia, till it can be procured from Africa. The habits of the people are, to a great extent, pastoral. Except, perhaps, Tigre, all these kingdoms, especially the southern, have been overrun by the pagan Gallas, from the south, whose incursions commenced about the year 1500; but they have in some degree recovered; many of the Gallas have been subdued, some reduced to slavery, and

some compelled to accept the forms of Abessinian Christianity.

In 1826, the English Church Missionary Society sent the Rev. Samuel Gobat, now Bishop Gobat of Jerusalem, and Rev. Christian Kugler, to Egypt, to attempt a mission in Abessinia. They took with them portions of the Bible, printed by the British and Foreign Bible Society in Amharic, the vernacular of Tigre and Shoa, and perhaps other Christian kingdoms. Arriving at Massowah, on the Red Sea, December 28, 1829, they were well received, and permitted to reside at Adowa, in Tigre. Dr. Krapf joined this mission in 1837. Some opposition had shown itself among the ecclesiastics; and the arrival of a French and an Italian priest in March, 1838, to revive the old Papal mission, produced an excitement before which they were obliged to retire. Messrs. Krapf and Isenberg having been invited by the King of Shoa, then regarded as the dominant power, of which Tigre was considered a province, reached Shoa by way of Zeila, May 31, 1839. Mr. Isenberg left in November. Dr. Krapf remained, with hopeful prospects, till the mission was interrupted by difficulties which arose in 1842. After an abortive attempt to return, in company of others, to Tigre, by way of Massowah, he was employed to commence a mission on the eastern coast of Africa. He arrived at Zanzibar January 7, 1844, and in 1846, with the Rev. J. Rebman, commenced a mission at Rabbai Mpia, (New or Good Rabbai,) near Mombas, lat. 4° south. After much preparatory labor, and important explorations in the regions since explored by Burton and Speke, the failure of his health obliged him to return to Europe. So much from other sources by way of introduction. What follows is from his letter, which is written in English.—J. T.]

"After my return to Rabbai Mpia, my headquarters in the Wanika country, I was seized by sickness and compelled to return to Europe in 1853, leaving my fellow-laborers, Messrs. Rebman and Erhardt, on the station. After restoration, I started again for the east coast of Africa; but took my way to Jerusalem, to see Bishop Gobat, my former colleague in Abyssinia. My intention was, to take one of his missionaries with me, to Abyssinia, where I wished to introduce him with the new and friendly ruler, in whose country the Protestant mission, broken up in 1838, seemed to be renewed

with better success. Having met the new and energetic King Theodoros, and having received from him the firm promise that he would patronize the missionary to be sent by Bishop Gobat, I resolved upon taking my route southward to Shoa, Garague, Kambat, and the other countries where I knew I would meet with Christian remnants shut up by the pagan Gallas. I hoped to find an outlet somewhere about Barawa, whence I might proceed by water to Rabbai Mpia. But circumstances rendered it necessary to return from Gondar, the capital of Abyssinia, [of Tigre,] to Sennar on the banks of the Blue River, and thence to Nubia and Egypt. Whilst travelling, at the hottest season of the year, at the temperature of 120° Fahrenheit, on the sandy plain between Sennar and Khartum, (on the juncture of the Blue and White Rivers,) I got a stroke of the sun, which, though it did not, by God's mercy, put an end to my life, yet compelled me to leave Africa altogether in September, 1855."

[He repaired to Kornthal, a Moravian settlement near Stuttgart, in Wurtemberg, his native country, obtained a dismissal from the Church Missionary Society, married, (having lost his first wife at Zanzibar,) and spent his time in labors for the edification of his neighbors, and in literary labors, "among which," he says, "I may especially enumerate *Travels in East Africa during the years 1837-1855*; in two volumes, (1026 pages,) in the German language. This work left the press in September, 1858. An abridged edition of this work, in English, with a map and engravings, will shortly be published by Mr. Trübner & Co., Paternoster Row, London."

Having recovered his health, he has become pastor in the Deaconesses Institution at Riehen, near Bâle, a director of an Asylum for converted Roman Catholic priests fitting for Protestant Evangelical labors, and is connected with the Pilgrim Missionary Institution, at Chrishona, which gives literary, theological, and mechanical instruction to young men for missionary life, of whom "the Church Missionary Society in London have engaged a number for their new mission in the Haussa country, in Western Africa; Bishop Gobat has engaged about seven brethren for Abyssinia; Prince Lieven, in Russia, has selected a few for his serfs in Kurland; the Scottish Jewish Missionary Society will send a few to Thessalonica, among the Jews and Greeks; and a goodly number" have been sent to Texas and other parts of the United States, to labor among

German emigrants. Still, he feels himself "actuated by a strong desire for resuming missionary duties in any foreign country; most cheerfully, of course, in Eastern Africa, whose languages, habits, etc., I fully know from personal acquaintance." He would gladly labor in connection with any Missionary Society of a decided evangelical character. He writes:]

"I often pray God, that he, of his infinite wisdom, power, and mercy, would direct my path once more to the scattered Christian remnants in the south of Abyssinia, where they are shut up on mountains from their Abyssinian co-religionists. I feel convinced that these lost sheep would be susceptible of the Gospel much more than the Abyssinians whose country is now open to Protestant missionaries, since King Theodoros has taken the lead of the reformation of this church, by charging his priests to read henceforth the Amharic Bible, (the Amharic language being that of the people,) and no more the Ethiopic, which the common people cannot understand. The king is on the best terms with Bishop Gobat's missionaries, who are laboring among the Falashas (Jews) and Christians in Western Abyssinia. But what I mean is, that one separate society should take the revival of the southern remnants, (in Shoa, Gurague, Kambat, Wolamo, and Kaffa,) as well as the mission of the six or eight millions of Gallas, into its hands, and prosecute the Lord's work several hundred miles to the south of Gondar, where Gobat's missionaries are concentrated. The missionaries of this separate society could proceed to the southern regions either along the banks of the Nile, or more direct from the British possession at Aden to Shoa, through the Adal country, starting from Tadjoura or Seila on the East African coast.

"True, the difficulties would be great; but the blessing would be sure, for the Lord has manifest thoughts of peace upon Africa every where. When I was in Shoa, (1839-42,) there was a great despot ruling over that country and the adjacent region; but now Shoa has become a dependency of the reforming King Theodoros, who would facilitate the movements of missionaries toward the south. Both himself and his Archbishop, Abba Salama, who was brought up in the mission school at Cairo, have the conversion of the Gallas at heart, and a Protestant mission could be commenced by any society which has the means and the men for commencing operations. Gobat's private means are too limited to extend his activity beyond Amhara, [Tigre and Shoa;] and the Church Missionary Society is so much taken up by their increasing missions in India, Western Africa, and other quarters, that it has no inclination to resume missionary labors in Abyssinia, notwithstanding the bright prospects opening in that country. Therefore, I would strongly appeal to the Christians of N. America, and recommend to them the perishing millions of Christians and pagans in Eastern Central Africa. The Romanists would gladly occupy this interesting mission field, if Theodoros would permit them entrance into his dominions and beyond. When

I was in Shoa, the slave trade was still in its full force; but Theodoros has put a stop to it by cutting it off forever. This is a great help to missionaries in those region.

"The country of Shoa and beyond [southward] is extremely healthy, situated 6000 to 8000 feet above the level of the sea. The people pursue agricultural and pastoral habits. The means of subsistence for missionaries would be various and cheap, and an unmarried man can scarcely require more than one hundred dollars to live upon for one year, without putting himself to inconvenience or privation. Only the travelling from the coast to the interior would involve some expenditure. The temperature at Ankobar, the capital of Shoa, was between 46° at the lowest and 72° at the maximum of Fahrenheit. I feel assured that the Southern Abessinian countries, as well as the regions of the Galla, will one day harbor European emigrants, when the stream of emigration to America has ceased to flow, in consequence of over-teeming populations in the New World."

[It will be seen that Dr. Krapf uses the common English spelling, "Abyssinia," in every instance except the last, where he writes, as the best authorities now do, "Abessinian." He uses the name, sometimes as if it included only the dominions of Theodore, Tigre and Shoa, and sometimes as including also the more southern Christian countries. He takes no notice of the great expense of transporting heavy articles for missionary use, to Shoa, either from Zeila, an ascent of some 6000 feet in 300 miles, or some 2000 miles up the Nile and its branches; nor of the unsettled state of the country, the uncertainty of the continuance of Theodore's power, or the uncertain character of his successor; or of the not improbable fact, that the mission, to be successful, can be attempted only by men like himself, Livingstone of South-Africa, Bowen of Yoruba, and a few others, who can go any where, and who usually think that others may do the same. Yet, after all due abatements, his suggestions deserve to be seriously and carefully studied by Missionary Boards. The thing is among the things that are to be done; and it is not too soon for some body to be considering when, and how, and by what agency, it should be done. We hope it will not be left to be accomplished by his expected promiscuous emigration from Europe, after all the wild lands of the Western continent are taken up.

There is one favorable circumstance, which Dr. Krapf has

not brought out in its full force. Doubtless, all the southern Christian communities acknowledge some kind and degree of subordination to "the Archbishop, Abba Salama, who was brought up in the mission school at Cairo," and who has "the conversion of the Gallas at heart." There is, in all of them, some knowledge of letters; so that credentials from him could be read, and exert a favorable influence, very important in the commencement of a mission. If the power of Theodore should be overthrown, Abba Salama may fall with it.—J. T.]

Theological and Literary Intelligence.

THE SEPTUAGINT.—The new edition of the Septuagint, published at Oxford, pp. 1090, is described as altogether the best extant. The editor, Frederick Field, A.M., is favorably known by his edition of Chrysostom's Homilies. The work is issued under the auspices of the Foreign Translation Committee of the Christian Knowledge Society. The plan pursued has been to follow the Alexandrian text as found in the Moscow edition of 1821; to separate the canonical books from the Apocrypha; to bring the chapters and verses of the Septuagint into the order of the Hebrew, (a very great improvement;) and to supply deficiencies from existing MSS. No previous edition has attempted so much. The alterations, too, have been made in such a way that the student can still learn how the text previously stood. The Society, in their report, say: "This edition of the Septuagint was undertaken five years ago, to produce a text that might be serviceable to Biblical students at home, and also acceptable to the Greek Church, for whose benefit the Committee had already printed an edition of the Septuagint at Athens. The Athens edition, in four volumes, was printed from the Moscow edition, which was the one in common use in the East, and consequently might be considered as exhibiting the authorized text of the Greek Church; and with the ready and entire approval of the Synod of Attica in this reprint of the text under their own superintendence, the apocryphal were separated from the canonical books, and formed the fourth volume of the work." With regard to the text in the new edition, they say: "No pains have been spared to render it as satisfactory as possible." Mr. Field was well supplied with all needful means and appliances. Besides his own resources, the University library, and the library of Trinity College, Cambridge, afforded him important helps. Through the very liberal kindness of the Trustees of the British Museum, the Committee were enabled, without cost, to provide him with a copy of Mr. Baber's fac-simile of the Codex Alexandrinus; and wherever, in the course of his labors, there appeared to be any reason to question the accuracy of Mr. Baber's work, the original Codex was carefully examined. No previous edition has been so carefully prepared; even that of Tischendorf, in 1850, did not attempt to supply the deficiencies and correct the manifest errors of the old Vatican copy.

Dr. Constantine Tischendorf has returned from his eastern literary journey with a rich harvest of manuscripts. Besides the one of which we gave an account in the last number of the *REVUE*, he has twelve palimpsests, several of which are Syriac MSS. written over Greek-Coptic MSS. of a high antiquity. He also has several Greek Uncial MSS., and Arabic, Syriac, Coptic, Abyssinian, Hebrew, and Arme-

nian MSS., besides papyrus rolls from Egypt. They are the property of the Russian government, by which he was sent on this expedition.

The Ignatian Controversy.—German scholars are more and more inclined to accept the general positions of Cureton in respect to the Syriac version of the Ignatian Epistles, viz.: that in the three shorter Syriac epistles we have the original frame-work of the epistles, and that the seven were elaborated out of these three. During the last year, Dr. Lipsius has published essays on this subject, and Prof. Dr. Weiss has continued his investigations in the *Deutsche Zeitschrift*, Nov. 1859. The school of Baur rejected even the three; Denzinger and Uhlhorn still defend the seven; Ritschl, Bunsen, Lipsius and Weiss advocate the claims of the three Syriac. It has been shown that all the citations before Eusebius, viz., in Irenæus, Theophilus and Origen, are in the Syriac recension. Eusebius is the first one who speaks of seven epistles. Lipsius has further shown that Jerome could not have read Ignatius, and that Chrysostom and the monk Johannes knew only what is found in the Syriac recension, and that the use of the seven epistles can be traced only to Theodoretus. The MSS. of Cureton belong to the sixth or seventh century. Lipsius thinks it probable that the original MS. of the two first epistles is from the last part of the fourth century, and that of the third from the first half of the fifth century. At the close of his critical investigations, Lipsius also gives a newly-revised text of what he supposes to have been the original Greek.

Oriental Literature in Germany.—The Vienna correspondent of the *New-York Tribune*, under date Sept. 20, 1859, gives an interesting account of various publications, in the press or projected, upon oriental literature. Dr. F. W. A. Bernhauer, of the imperial library in Vienna, though only thirty-two years of age, takes a high position among the orientalists. His first publication was a German version of "The Forty Viziers," in 1851, and he is now preparing an edition of the original, with a glossary and notes. In 1857 he published, with A. T. Berlitzsch, the first part of a work on the Sources of Servian History; "a country in which, I believe, our own distinguished authoress, Mrs. Robinson, was the first to awaken an interest in Western Europe by her collection of its songs and poetry." This first part was a history of the battle on the river Marezza, in the fourteenth century, under Murad I.: the second part, in preparation, will "contain an account of the battle of Angora in the original Persian text, with German and Servian translations excerpted from the *Zafername*, or Book of Victory, a biography of Timur the Tartar, or Tamerlane." Another work, which he is now publishing, is *The Book of the Two Gardens, or News of Two Governments*, biographies of the Sultans Nouraddin and Saladin, by the Shafütan, Abu Shamäh, of the thirteenth century. This work is now appearing in the feuilleton of an Arabic newspaper of Beirüt. In the *Journal Asiatique* he is also publishing an essay on the Police System of the Arabs, Persians and Turks in the thirteenth century with reference to the office of *Muhtasib*, or superintendent of markets and police. Another work upon which he is engaged is a biography of Solyman the Magnificent, compiled from original MSS. and documents. A part of this, viz., extracts from the daily journal of Solyman's campaign in Hungary, in 1528, against the Emperor Ferdinand, and to reinstate Zapolya, was printed last year as a present to the Philological Congress which met at Vienna. It is said to be the only MS. copy in existence, and made a part of Von Hammer's collection. Dr. Bernhauer is also employed upon an edition of the

Risala Gahwarija of Ibn Zaidun, vizier of Cordova in the eleventh century, and in the front rank of the Spanish-Moorish poets. This *Risala* is a memorial addressed by him in person to Ibn Gahwar, Dictator of Cordova; full of materials illustrating the history and poetry of the Mohammedans. It was edited in the fourteenth century by an Arabic philologist, Salahadin as-Safadi; and in 1831, Prof. Meyers, of Leyden, published a specimen of it. It is to be issued by Brockhaus, of Leipzig, edited from various MSS.

Prof. Gustav Weil has published volume 1 of a *History of the Abassides Caliphs of Egypt*, a continuation of his general *History of the Moslem Caliphs*. The period is that of the wars of the Crusaders in Egypt.

Forgeries of John Bunyan.—Some Roman Catholic writers have recently revived the often disproved allegation, that Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress* is a forgery copied from an old Popish work on Popery. Mr. George Offor, the editor of Bunyan, and familiar with all the literature, sets the matter again at rest. The work in question is De Guileville's *Pilgrimage of the Soul*, translated and printed by Caxton in 1483; he also wrote the *Pilgrimage of Man*, printed by Fawkes in 1505. These are but parts of the full work of De Guileville, which was styled *Le Romant des trois Pelegrinages*; besides the above two, the only ones translated, the third pilgrimage was "that of our Lord Jesus Christ." The book was written in 1330, and printed at Lyons in 1485. This *Pilgrimage of the Soul*, of which Mr. Offor gives an analysis in his introduction to Bunyan, "commences where Bunyan ends, and shows the soul's horrid estate for thousands of years in purgatory, until released on the intercession of the Virgin Mary." The late Mr. Nathaniel Hill, who had studied this literature very fully, says that De Guileville's *Pilgrimage of Man* is really the work which Bunyan's most resembles; but "that the allegory which becomes in the hands of Bunyan a fascinating narrative full of vitality and Christian doctrine, is, in the work of De Guileville only a cold and lifeless dialogue between abstract and unembodied qualities." This *Pilgrimage of the Soul* has been translated anew by Miss Catharine Isabella Cust. *Guillaume de Guileville's Second Pilgrimage*, entitled, *The Booke of the Pylygrimage of the Soule*, translated (as is supposed) from the French by Lydgate, an. 1413, and printed by Caxton, an. 1483, with illuminations from the MS. copy in the British Museum.

Researches and Discoveries in the Levant, by Charles Newton, is announced in one volume; Bentley. The most remarkable part of the work is the account of the Mausoleum of Halicarnassus discovered by him, the remains of which are now in the British Museum.

Alexandrine Codex: Codex A.—The Messrs. Trübner have issued proposals for the publication of an accurate edition of this valuable Codex, ascribed to the fifth century. The missing portions, viz., Matt. 1:1 to 25:6, John 6:50 to 8:52, 2 Cor. 4:13 to 12:6, will be supplied. It is to be reproduced in modern type, but retaining its peculiar orthography with the exception of contractions. This MS. was given to Charles I. in 1628 by Cyril Lucaris, then Patriarch of Alexandria and afterwards of Constantinople. It is in the British Museum. A fac-simile was published by Woide in 1786: the Old Testament by Baber, 1819. It has nine thousand variations from the text of Mill, including peculiarities of orthography.

Maroccordato, a member of the Commission for the reduction of the Civil Code

of Greece, has published in modern Greek a *History of Russian Legislation* from the most remote to the most recent times.

Dschevdet Effendi has just published at Constantinople the first four volumes of his *History of Turkey*, and the work is reported to sell well. Events are traced in these volumes down to the beginning of the eighteenth century.

The Bohemian dramatist, Wenzel Klicpera, died at Prague, Sept. 15, 1859.

The archduke Ferdinand Max, of Austria, son-in-law of Leopold of Belgium, has published six volumes of *Travels in Greece, Italy, etc.*, for private circulation.

The Society of the Hague for the Defence of the Christian Religion has awarded to A. Reville, pastor of the Wallon church at Rotterdam, its prize for the best essay on the Gospel of Matthew in Relation to the *Logia* of the presbyter Johannea, mentioned by Papias and Eusebius. Among the topics proposed for future prizes are: A History of the Doctrine of Moral Freedom; A History of Materialism, with the Causes thereof; on the Doctrine of Immortality; An Examination of the Views of the School of Tübingen; on the Development and Influence of the Idea of Sin; and a Critical Investigation of the Contents of the Talmud. Each prize is of four hundred guilders. Communications to D. W. A. van Hangel, in Leyden.

The fourth volume of the *Bibliographical Notices of all the Works by Jesuit Writers*, edited by Augustin and Alois de Becker, has been published at Liege. This publication was begun in 1853.

The *Theologia Dogmatica* of Archbishop Kenrick, of Baltimore, is now in the course of republication at Malines, Belgium, in 3 vols. 8vo.

A full *History of the Raskolniks, or Russian Dissenters*, has been published at St. Petersburg by Schtschapoff. It embraces a sketch of the Russian Church during the seventeenth and a part of the eighteenth century. These dissenters are now treated with great leniency; the government protects them from local persecution. The Emperor has issued an edict, obliging the bishops of the Greek Church to consecrate the bishops and priests of these dissenters.

A Swedish theologian, Petrell, has made a new discovery about the number 666 in Rev. 13 : 18. He proves that it applies to the Mormon, Joseph Smith. In Hebrew, the letters of Smith's name just make out the number. Joseph Smith is the "beast" and the "false prophet." Those curious in such matters will find the evidence in a letter of Dr. Heinnordh, of Linköping, to Prof. J. P. Lange, published in the *Deutsche Zeitschrift*, Sept. 24, 1859.

The sixth volume of Ausbrialav's *History of Peter the Great* is announced at St. Petersburg. It is said to be very full on that hitherto obscure point, the condemnation of the Cæsarewitch Alexis; all the papers about this event having been put at the disposal of the author by the Russian government.

The Provisional Government of Tuscany has appointed a Commission to prepare a complete edition of the works of Macchiavelli.

GERMANY.

CARL RITTER, the great scientific geographer, died in Berlin, Sept. 28, 1859. He was born in Quedlinburg, Aug. 7, 1779; the third son of a physician of high repute. His academical education was in the University of Halle. The lectures of Forster,

who had circumnavigated the globe, early turned his attention to that branch of science, in which he attained such eminence. Among his earlier works were charts of Europe, in relief. In 1807 he published, in two vols., a *Geographical and Statistical Picture of Europe*. The first volume of his great work, *The Knowledge of the Earth in Relation to Nature and History*, appeared in 1815. In 1820, he became Professor at Berlin. In 1820, he wrote on *The History of the European Nations before Herodotus*. Various essays, which he read before the Academy of Sciences have been collected in a volume. Of his larger work, the twenty-fourth volume was published two months before his death. They have given a new character to geographical investigations; and all his writings serve to illustrate the harmony between science and religion. Trained in the most exact methods of science, he was also a humble, devout Christian. In his work on Asia and Africa, he often incidentally refers to the need and value of missionary enterprises. Palestine, especially, was a favorite subject with him; and he loved to show "that the union of the greatest contrasts, as to its position in relation to the rest of the world, is a characteristic peculiarity of the Holy Land." In no writings of the century have nature, geography, history, civilization, and religion, in their mutual relations, and as forming together one whole, been so clearly and impressively exhibited.

F. Wolf's *Studies on the History of the Spanish and Portuguese Literature*, have been issued by Asher, of Berlin in a large volume of 747 pages, 4½ Thlr. This is the most thorough work upon the subject in the German language; the author has spent upon it many years of labor.

An interesting addition to Melancthon's biography is given in a small work of Dr. L. Kock, on Melancthon's *Schola Privata*, a private class, by which the Reformer had, to eke out his salary, which was at first only one hundred florins. It gives interesting sketches of his private life, and of the thrift and care of his wife, Katharina Krapp. This school continued for ten years. "Melancthon was a born pedagogue," says the author, and justifies the position by the details about his course of instruction and method of discipline.

Dr. Hagenbach's valuable work on the Lives and Writings of the Fathers and Founders of the Reformed Church, is continued in the Biographies of John (Ecolampadius) and of Oswald Myconius, the Reformers of Basle, by Hagenbach. The work also contains full extracts from their writings.

Brockhaus, of Leipzig, has just published a work on the *Philosophy of the Beautiful and its Realization in Nature, Mind and Art*, by Moritz Carriere, which is highly commended by the critics.

A work has been published at Leipsic, on *Empedocles and the Egyptians*, by August Gladisch, illustrated and confirmed by the Notes and Criticisms of Dr. H. Brüsch and Jos. Passalacqua, to show that Empedocles had the Egyptian views and philosophy. Other similar researches have endeavored to trace the views of Pythagoras to China, of Heraclitus to Zoroaster, of the Eleatics to the East-Indians, and of Anaxagoras to the Israelites.

The *Jahrbücher für deutsche Theologie*, Heft iv. 1859, has the second part of Bertheau's article (pp. 595-685) on the Old Testament Prophecy of the Glory of the Kingdom of Israel in its own Land; a careful review and criticism of all the passages bearing on this subject. Weizsäcker contributes an essay on the characteristics of the Gospel of John, (pp. 685-768,) in view of the recent discussions. Barman re-

views and comments on Dr. Niedner's Exposition of the Nature of Christianity, in reference to the possibility of a scientific exposition of the Christian Faith. The last article is by Fries, on the first five chapters of the book of Job, as giving a key to the poem.

The third number of the *Theologische Quartalschrift*, 1859, the Roman Catholic review, has a learned discussion of the views of Justin Martyr on the doctrine of Original Sin, by Prof. Mattes, of Hildesheim. Professor Grimm, of Ratisbon, has an essay on the Four Women in the Genealogy of our Lord.

The second part of vol. 35th of the *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philos. Kritik*, edited by Fichte, Ulrici and Wirth, opens with a discussion by Adolf Zeising, on the Fundamental Forms of Thought in Relation to the Primitive Form of Being. The second essay, by Dr. Wirth, is a very valuable treatise on the Relation of Art to Morals, and the place of the philosophy of art in the organism of the philosophical sciences. Art, he shows, is, in its very nature, subordinate to ethics. The remainder of the number is occupied with reviews of recent philosophical works, and with a full bibliography of current philosophy, including the articles in the late German, French, Italian, and English periodicals.

The *Zeitschrift für die historische Theologie*, Heft i. 1860, has a long and valuable account of the Strasburg Anabaptists, 1523 to 1543, by Timotheus Wilh. Röhrich, pastor at Strasburg. It is derived from original sources, and contains a full sketch of their opinions. The second article is upon the origin of the Helvetic Formula Consensus, of 1675, by Dr. Alexander Schweizer, of Zurich. It is viewed in its connection with the history of theological opinion, and with the views of the Zurich divines. A valuable manuscript of Heidegger contributes some of the best materials. The third and last article is an account of John Brenz's Self-Vindication of his Orthodoxy, by Dr. George Veesenmeyer, of Ulm.

The *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*, the organ of the Tübingen school, in its fourth Heft, 1859, has the conclusion of Hilgenfeld's discussion of the Gospel of John, in relation to the later critical investigations; and also the conclusion of Dr. Baur's edition of Friedrich's Critical Investigation of the Commentaries on Isaiah and Jeremiah, ascribed to the Abbot Joachim, of Floris.

The first number of the *Studien und Kritiken*, for 1860, contains the third article of a series upon *Inspiration*, by Rothe. It occupies one hundred pages, and is to be continued. The views expressed will not be received by Christians in this country; but the subject is of such interest now, that all who wish to hold their old ground should have an eye upon every new article, especially when so distinguished a theologian enters the lists. There are some remarks by Prof. Wieseler, of Kiel, on the speaking with tongues. He holds that it was an ecstatic speech, not understood by the hearers. Pastor Krummacher, of Duisburg, gives an exegesis of the petition, *Deliver us from evil*. He would translate, instead of *von dem Uebel*, *von dem Bösen*, "deliver us from the evil one." There is a short article by Kleinert, on the doctrine of *inherited sin in the Old Testament*. The conclusions are: 1st. The doctrine is found in the Old Testament, but is clearly expressed only in a few passages. 2d. It is not given at the beginning of the theocratic religion, nor connected with the fall of Adam, "but it is first found in the advancing development of the theocratic-religious consciousness upon the path of speculation." 3. The fact, however, of the universal sinfulness is so fully recognized in the Old Testament, that the

Christian contemplation can add nothing substantially new. 1 Cor. 15: 29 and 30 is briefly remarked upon. The explanation is: What shall they do who are baptized for the dead, that is, if they are to remain forever dead, never to rise. How vain are all the ordinances of the Gospel, how useless our labors and perils, if the dead rise not. There is a remark by Umbreit, on Gen. 4: 1. Bunsen translates: "I have gotten a man with help of the Eternal;" Umbreit translates: "I have gotten, I possess, as a husband, the Jehovah." "Ich habe erworben, ich besitze als Mann, den Jehova." Her husband, as begetter, appears to her as the mighty creator, Jehovah himself. She exclaims, See there! the miracle of generation and birth. The remainder of this number is taken up with criticisms of books.

Works in Theology.—Dr. G. Sartorius, *Soli Deo Gloria*; (a comparison of the Lutheran and Roman Catholic doctrine, with reference to Möbler's Symbolism.) 8vo. pp. 248. Dr. Julius Köstlin, *Der Glaube*. 8vo, pp. 522. Fr. Köster, *Die biblische Lehre von der Versuchung*. 8vo, pp. 174. Dr. Fr. Ehrenfeuchter, *Die praktische Theologie*, 1 Abtheilung. 8vo, pp. 476. J. N. P. Oischinger, (Rom. Cath.) *System der christlichen Glaubenslehre*. 2 Bd. *Die ontologische Theologie*. 1 Abtheilung, (on the Attributes.) 8vo, pp. 350. D. Schenkel, *Die christliche Dogmatik, vom Standpunkte des Gewissens*. 2 Bd. 8vo, pp. 354.

Biblical Literature.—Düsterdieck, *Die Offenbarung Johannes*, (in Meyer's Comm. N. Test.) 8vo. pp. 588. E. F. J. von Ortenberg, *Das Buch Sacharja*. 8vo, pp. 95. K. F. Keil, *Biblische Archäologie*. Zweite Hälfte. 8vo, pp. 314. Neander's *Briefe an die Corinthier*. 8vo, pp. 391. Ebrard, *Die Briefe Johannes*, (in Olshausen's Com.) 8vo, pp. 478. K. Wiesder, *Galaterbriefe*. 8vo, 622. Hupfeld, *Psalmen*, 3 Bd. G. W. Hengstenberg, *Der Prediger Salomos*. 8vo, pp. 274. J. Bucher, *Leben Jesu Christi*. Pp. 862.

Patristics.—*Epiphanií episcopi Constantiæ*, ed. G. Dindorfius. Vol. i. and v. Pp. 469, 428. *Clementinorum Epitomæ duæ*, cura A. R. H. Dressel, (from Tischendorf's MSS., with Notes by Wiesder.) 8vo, pp. 353. Hippolyti S., *Refutationis omnium Hæresium librorum decem quæ supersunt*, ed. L. Duncker et F. G. Schneider. 8vo, pp. 582.

History.—Dr. Max Pertz, *Grandzüge der Ethnographie*. 8vo, pp. 477. G. G. Gervinus, *Geschichte der 19n. Jahrhunderts*. iv. Bd. (first part.) 8vo, pp. 440. Dr. C. Ritter, *Die Erdkunde*. 19 Theil. (Klein-Asien.) 2d ed. 8vo, pp. 1218. Dr. H. Brugsch, *Histoire d'Egypt dès les premiers temps jusqu'à nos jours*. (First part: Egypt under its native kings.) 4to, pp. 308. The work will have three volumes of text, and one of folio maps and plates. H. Handelmann, *Geschichte von Brasilien*. 8n. and 9n. parts. F. Walter, *Das alte Wales*. 8vo, pp. 549. K. Köpke, *Deutsche Forschungen*. 8vo, pp. 226.

Philosophy.—Prof. Dr. Huber, *Die Philosophie d. Kirchenväter*. 8vo, pp. 314. J. G. von Quandt, *Wissen und Seyn*. 8vo. pp. 122. K. Rosenkranz, *Wissenschaft d. logischen Idee*. 2 Theil. 8vo, pp. 478. F. W. Tittmann, *Aphorismen zur Philosophie*. 8vo, pp. 128. J. G. Erdmann, *Akademische Leben und Studien*. 8vo. Dr. H. Ritter, *Die christliche Philosophie nach ihrem Begriff*, etc. bis auf die neuesten Zeiten. 2 Band. 8vo, pp. 891. C. F. Koeppen, *Die Religion des Buddha*, 2 Band. (The Llama hierarchy and church.) 8vo, pp. 408.

FRANCE.

The *Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne*, a monthly periodical, published in Paris, edited by A. Bonnetty, has for its object to defend Christianity against infidelity, on the ground of historical and philosophical investigations. It is thoroughly Roman Catholic in its view of the Christian faith. But in many of its able articles and discussions it occupies common ground. Some of the best theological writers of Catholic France are enlisted as contributors. This collection of essays has now reached its 59th volume, the 20th of the fourth series. It was started to oppose the infidelity which reigned in France at the beginning of the century. Among the articles in later numbers of general interest are a series of Researches on the fourteenth dynasty of Manetho, by M. F. Robion, referring in part to the abode of the Israelites in Egypt, and which the author, following a variation of the Septuagint, makes to be three hundred years. M. Jules Mohl, of the Institute, gives an interesting sketch of the Progress in the Study of the Languages and History of the Oriental Nations in the years 1858, 1859, giving an account of the chief works issued. Five unpublished chapters of a work on Russia, by Count Joseph de Maistre, are given, in extracts, by Bonnetty. There is also a long and interesting account of a discussion in the Academy of Inscriptions and Belles Lettres, which sprung up in consequence of a memoir presented by M. Renan, (of whose general position we have given some account on previous pages,) on the question of the Belief in the Unity of God among the primitive nations. Many of Renan's objections are satisfactorily met. M. Schoebel has an essay on Satan and the Fall, viewing the serpent as a personification of evil. M. Laoueman, on the Origin and Antiquity of the Pagodas, and the religious observances of the Brahmins. M. de Charency, on the Origin of the Basque language.

The fourth and fifth volumes of St. Beuve's History of Port Royal have been issued, completing the work. The author discusses this history rather from a general literary and historical position, than under the strict theological aspect: but it is still the best account in the French literature of this revived Augustinianism in France.

The second and last volume of the works of Abælard (*Abælardi Opera*), begun in 1850, by Cousin, has been published, edited by Chs. Jourdain. 4to, pp. 834. Price 30 fr.

Barthélmy St. Hilaire's work on Bouddha and Bouddhism, is highly spoken of.

Michelet, in his *Jeanne d'Arc*, says, that the English literature is "sceptique, judaïque, satanique," and adds in a note, that he does not recollect to have seen the word God in Shakspeare. The accuracy of the criticism is illustrated by the fact, that the word God occurs more than a thousand times in Shakspeare, as appears from Mrs. Cowden Clarke's Concordance. (*Notes and Queries*.)

A new French version of the Bible has been published at Paris. This work is a quarto volume of too high a price for the general public, but the translation is well spoken of. It has been executed under the auspices of the indefatigable Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. The editors are mostly Lutherans, and among them we find Professors Matter and Munk, and Messrs. Bartholmess, Geroek, Sardinoux, Pichard, Kreiss, etc. Rodolphe Cuvier has examined almost

the whole; and Eugène Haag, one of the editors of *France Protestante*, has corrected the proofs. Those who are acquainted with the character of the versions commonly used in the French Protestant churches will appreciate this noble effort to place France on a level with England, Holland, and Germany, in regard to the Bible in the vulgar tongue. The need of such a work has been long felt, and various efforts have been made towards partially supplying the defect; but it was reserved for an English Society to give what was wanted.

Augustus Potthast has edited, with a preliminary dissertation, the *Liber de rebus memorabilioribus*, or *Chronicon* of "Henry of Erfurt," or Herford, whichever it was. The author belongs to the fourteenth century, and his work is a curious repository, beginning as usual with the Creation, but mainly occupied with the six or seven centuries preceding his own times. The value of this edition is much enhanced by the careful editing and a copious index.

Massimo d'Azeglio, the celebrated Italian statesman, author, and artist, has recently published in Paris, and in French, a work, entitled, *La Politique du droit Chrétien, au point de vue de la question Italienne*. D'Azeglio's theory is, that whereas Christianity has penetrated the social, intellectual, and religious life of nations, the sphere of politics is still left a prey to Paganism, and the ruling principles thereof, violence, conquest, and slavery. Hence the present complications. *

In a recent lecture delivered at Glasgow, Sir John Bowring having asserted that the lexicon of the Chinese language consists of seventy large volumes, M. Stanislaus Julien, Professor of Chinese at the College de France, and the first Sinologist in Europe, has written to the *Constitutionnel*, to point out Sir John's mistake. M. Julien states that, in reality, the Imperial Dictionary of the Emperor of Khanghi, being that which all European students of Chinese use, is only of thirty-two volumes in 12mo, not thicker than the little finger, and containing only 42,718 characters. M. Julien asserts, moreover, that a knowledge of about one tenth of these characters is sufficient to enable Chinese books to be understood, and that the Chinese language "is as clear as the easiest of modern languages."

Marc Debrit has published a *History of Philosophical Opinions in Italy at the Present Time*, 12mo.

A new edition of Garnier's translation of Adam Smith's *Inquiry into the Wealth of Nations* has been issued in three volumes.

Th. Henri Martin's *Essay on a Problem in Theodicy*, read before the Academy of Moral and Political Science, has been published by A. Durand.

The third and last Theological Encyclopedia of Abbé Migne (vol. 46) is called *Dictionnaire des Savants et des Ignorants*; it is intended to be a guide in reading, conversation, and writing. It will be in two volumes—the first is out.

The twenty-fourth volume of Michaud's *Biographie Universelle* reaches to Ly. The work will be in forty or forty-two volumes.

Bp. Malon, of Bruges, is issuing the third edition of his *Critical Researches on the Authorship of the Imitation of Jesus Christ*, contending for Thomas à Kempis.

T. Puaux *Histoire de la Reformation Française*, Tom. ii, 8vo, pp. 427.

The second and third volumes of the *History of the Evangelical Church of Elzac*, by Pastor Röhrich, are published at Strasbourg, consisting chiefly of biographical sketches.

A. Véra, who some years since wrote an Introduction to the Philosophy of

Hegel, showing a better acquaintance with his system than any other Frenchman had done, has published two volumes of a Translation of Hegel's Logic, with an Introduction and Perpetual Commentary. These volumes are to the close of the Subjective Logic of Hegel.

L. de Saulcy's *Dictionary of Biblical Antiquities*, 8vo, pp. 816. Besides the usual archæological matter, this work identifies the modern and ancient names of places, and contains a particular description of the basis of the Dead Sea, and of the Jordan.

ENGLAND.

The *Journal of Sacred Literature*, November, 1859, has articles on the Modern Prophetic Literature; the Descent of Christ into Hell; Bunsen's Egyptian History; the Emblems in St. John, Rev. xi.; the Theology of Revelation and of Heathenism; Slavery Condemned by Sacred and Profane Writers. The article on Bunsen is a valuable refutation of his extravagant Egyptian chronology.

The *British Quarterly*, for October, opens with an article on Unitarianism, reviewing the writings and position of Rev. James Martineau, at present its ablest and most learned advocate in Great Britain. The indefiniteness of his dogmatic statements is the point most earnestly pressed. In the course of the article, the statistics of Unitarianism, showing its comparative weakness and decline, are fully presented. The second article is upon Sir James Emerson Tennent's recent work on Ceylon, and gives a very interesting sketch of this island, its population and their customs, its resources and physical characteristics. Shelley's Memorials are next reviewed, with an estimate of his position as a poet. The Buddhist Pilgrims, Raindrops, Novels and Novelists, Financial Resources of India, Tennyson's Idylls of the King, and M. Metternich, are the subjects of the remaining articles. This Number of the Review ably maintains its high character.

The *Edinburgh Review*, for October, says of Mr. Alexander Bain's Psychological Works, (*The Senses and the Intellect*, 1855; and *The Emotions and the Will*, 1859,) that the author, following in the English track, "has stepped beyond all his predecessors, and has produced an exposition of the mind, of the school of Locke and Hartley, equally remarkable in what it has successfully done, and in what it has wisely refrained from; an exposition which deserves to take rank as the foremost of its class, and as marking the most advanced point which the *à posteriori* psychology has reached." Mr. Bain is Examiner in Logic and Moral Philosophy in the University of London. He develops the law of association more fully and clearly, with a greater variety of illustration, than has been done before.

The *North British Review*, for November, in noticing the recent Philadelphia edition of Dr. Edward Payson's works, says of him: "To an intimate and familiar acquaintance with the Scriptures, he added great breadth of intellect and varied literary attainments. Intimate knowledge of the human conscience was joined to massiveness of thought vouching the ways of God to man. In several of the sermons we have again and again had suggested to us one in whom these features found an almost perfect expression—the late Edward Irving." "We are not

acquainted with any recent work in practical theology which better deserves a place in the library of every Christian gentleman and minister than this edition of the *Memoir and Works of Dr. Payson*."

The Savilian Professor at Oxford, Rev. Baden Powell, in his last work, *The Order of Nature Considered in Reference to the Claims of Revelation*, comes out more decidedly in favor of nature, and against Revelation. He denies the very possibility of any such thing as a supernatural intervention. He plants himself on the "immutability of order" in creation, as if that were a universal and necessary truth of reason. He adopts the theory of the *Vestiges*, not shrinking back even from the notion of spontaneous generation or transformation of species. "The supernatural," he says, "is the offspring of ignorance, and the parent of superstition and idolatry;" and yet admits what he calls "a spiritual revelation."

The Hakluyt Society have published, *Expeditions into the Valley of the Amazon in 1539, 1540, 1639*, by Spanish and Portuguese explorers, translated and edited with notes, by Clements R. Markham. It contains Pizarro's Expeditions to the Land of Cinnamon, translated from Garcilasso; Orellana's Voyage down the Amazon, from Herrera; and the New Discovery of the Great River of the Amazons, translated from Acaña; this last work was first printed in 1641, and is the earliest complete account of the discovery.

Rev. J. E. Riddle died August 27, 1859. He was the author of a *Manual of Christian Antiquities*, two editions; *Latin-English and English-Latin Lexicon*; a *Critical Latin-English Lexicon*, two editions; *Ecclesiastical Chronology*; *Luther and his Times*; *History of Infidelity and Superstition*; the *Bampton Lectures for 1852*; *History of the Papacy to the Reformation*, 2 vols.; *A Manual of Scripture History*, seven editions; besides other smaller volumes.

A new volume of *Essays and Reviews*, by Oxford and Cambridge men, is announced, in continuation of the series began five years ago. The Oxford writers are: Prof. Jewett and Baden Powell, Dr. Temple of Rugby, Mr. Pattison and Mr. Wilson. The Cambridge writers are: Dr. Williams, of Lampeter College, Wales, and Mr. C. W. Goodwin, who wrote on the Papyri of Egypt for the previous series.

The third edition of Sir J. Emerson Tennent's *Ceylon* is to be enlarged by chapters on Buddhism, and the Devil Worship.

Mansel's *Bampton Lectures* are the subject of continued discussion. The author has published a *Reply to Mr. Munn's Strictures*, and the latter has issued a rejoinder: *A Sequel to the Inquiry, What is Revelation? in a Series of Letters to a Layman*, containing an answer to Mr. Mansel's *Examination of the Charges against the Bampton Lectures*.

Baron Macaulay died in London, Dec. 28, 1859, of a disease of the heart. Hallam, Prescott, Irving, and Sir James Stevens, among the historians; and Humboldt, Carl Ritter, and William Grimm, have all passed away during the year just ended. Macaulay's *Essays and Reviews* placed him among the foremost men in cotemporary literature—while his *History of England* insures him a permanent fame. In 1848 the first two volumes were published, in 1855 the third and fourth. It is not yet known whether the fifth is far enough advanced towards completion to be issued. His *Correspondence* is said to be of great value and interest, and will probably be given to the world.

Lord Brougham is about to publish, in a single volume, his principal scientific and mathematical works. They consist of: General Theorems, chiefly porisms on the higher geometry; Kepler's Problem; Calculus of Partial Differences; Greek Geometry, (ancient analysis;) Paradoxes Imputed to the Integral Calculus; Architecture of Cells of Bees; Experiments and Investigations on Light and Colors; Optical Inquiries, experimental and analytical; on Forces of Attraction to Several Centres; and, lastly, his Oration on Sir Isaac Newton. This volume is to be dedicated to the University of Edinburgh—a graceful compliment for his lordship's late nomination to the high post of Chancellor of that learned establishment. We understand that Mr. Gladstone, who has been chosen Rector of the same University, has some idea of publishing his speeches in a single volume, and also of dedicating them to the University of the northern capital.

Nearly £400 have been subscribed for the statue to Dr. Isaac Watts, in the public park at Southampton, Dr. Watts' native town. Mr. Lucas, the sculptor, has commenced the statue, which will be above life-size, and, with the pedestal, will stand nearly twenty feet high. About £200 more is required to be subscribed by the public. Mr. Lucas has completed a model of the statue, and has succeeded in perfecting an admirable likeness of the poet. The statue and pedestal will be of Balsover stone. The inauguration of the erection of the statue by a grand public ceremonial will take place.

A Memoir of the late revered John Angell James is to be prepared by Rev. R. W. Dale, his colleague and successor. The circulation of Mr. James's practical religious works, issued by the London Tract Society was immense: *Anxious Inquirer*, 18mo, 456,421; do., royal edition, 20,217; do., 32mo, 101,227; do., Welsh, 7710; do., Italian, 160; do., German, 429; do., French, 279—total, 586,443. *Pastoral Addresses*, 1,049,319; *Young Man from Home*, 88,001; *Christian Progress*, 37,817; *Believe and be Saved*, 32mo, 30,260; *Path to the Bush*, 32mo, 13,813; *Elizabeth Bales*, 32mo, 8262. Tracts — *Believe and be Saved*, 450,900; *Your Great Concern*, 129,250; *The Pious Collier*, 121,575; *The Man that Killed his Neighbor*, 416,310—grand total, 2,930,950. *The Anxious Inquirer* has been circulated in several other languages, but to what extent is unknown.

A Septuagint Lectureship has been endowed at Oxford, by Rev. Ed. Grinfield, with £1000, three per cent consols.

The Abbé Domenech, whose work on Texas recently excited so much attention in Europe, is about to publish in London a book, in two volumes, called, *Seven Years' Residence in the Great Deserts of North-America*.

Paley's *Evidences of Christianity* has been published in London, with Annotations by Bishop Whately.

There is to be seen in the library room of Trinity College, Cambridge, England, in John Milton's own handwriting, a plan of a *tragedy*, entitled "Paradise Lost," which he had purposed writing, and perhaps actually did write, some thirty years before the publication of his great Epic. The play and the poem have little in common, the former being in great part occupied with the expulsion from Eden, and the events which followed, and introducing the Virtues and Vices among the *dramatis personæ*. It was modelled after the Greek tragedies.

Critical Annotations on the New Testament, being a Supplementary Volume to Bishop Bloomfield's Greek Testament with English Notes, was announced by Messrs. Longman & Co., to appear in January.

A curious literary discovery was lately made in an old house, formerly a portion of a religious edifice, at Wiltscott, in Oxfordshire. While pulling it down, the workmen came upon a secret closet or oratory, hidden in the thickness of the walls, and covered by the panelling of the adjacent room. It proved to be the place of deposit for a small library of the earliest Protestant Theology of the time of the Reformation, concealed, no doubt, when the possession of such works was almost sufficient to doom the owner to fire and faggot. Some of John Knox's writings are especially mentioned, and a "complete copy of the first English, or Coverdale's translation of the Bible." No perfect copy of this Bible has yet been found; and one, the title and first leaf wanting, but supplied in fac-simile, sold for £365, or \$1800, in 1854.

A new room has just been fitted up at the British Museum, in which are arranged a collection of Assyrian slabs, received from Kouyunjik, from the recent excavations of Hormuzd Rassam and Mr. W. K. Loftus. They contain many animal groups in low relief, but differ materially from the collections of Layard and Rawlinson, in the spirit and life-likeness of their representations. Some of them are hardly inferior to the Greek sculptures in artistic merit. They are supposed to belong to the latest period of Assyrian art, about 2500 years ago. In an adjoining room, the Curators are arranging Carthaginian sculptures and antiquities lately exhumed by Rev. Nathan Davis, among which are a number of reliefs, with Phœnician inscriptions.

Literary Mortality.—It is computed that about three thousand novels have been published in Great Britain since the appearance of *Waverley*, counting about seven thousand volumes. Novel-writing is still a flourishing trade. The advertising pages of the *Athenæum* and the *Literary Gazette* are covered with announcements. The demand is enormous, the supply abundant. But the tables of literary mortality show the following appalling facts in regard to the chances of an author to secure lasting fame: Out of 1000 published books, 600 never pay the cost of printing, etc., 200 just pay expenses, 100 a slight profit, and only 100 show a substantial gain. Of these 1000 books, 650 are forgotten by the end of the year, and 150 more at the end of three years; only 50 survive seven years' publicity. Of the 50,000 publications put forth in the seventeenth century, hardly more than 50 have a great reputation, and are reprinted. Of the 80,000 works published in the eighteenth century, posterity has hardly preserved more than were rescued from oblivion in the seventeenth century. Men have been writing books these 3000 years, and there are hardly more than 500 writers throughout the globe who have survived the outrages of time and the forgetfulness of man.

Important historical documents are reported as discovered in Dr. Williams's library by Rev. Dr. Waddington, in a letter to the *Independent*:

"Manuscripts, stowed away for many years in dust and disorder, are now carefully examined. One result will be very satisfactory to those who are interested in Puritan history. The original sources of *Neal's History of the Puritans* are clearly identified. You will remember that the principal authority quoted by Neal is a MS. entitled the 'Second part of a register.' This is only the *copy* of papers, the existence of which was doubted by many. Bishop Maddox, in particular, spoke of it as unworthy of credit. But in the same library are now found the *original* papers from which the compilation has been made. They were collected by Mr.

Roger Morrice, who was ejected at the Restoration from Duffield, in Derbyshire, and for a long time protected by Lord Hollis, in whose house he lived. When his brethren were fined and imprisoned, he remained quietly in his study making a careful record of all the facts that could be ascertained to elucidate the course of Puritanism in this country. Stripe says: 'He left vast heaps of MSS. behind him.' The heaps are now under examination, and we shall come, ere long, to the root of the matter. The Memorial Church of the Pilgrim Fathers is not forgotten."

Wm. Smith is preparing a *Dictionary of Biblical Antiquities, Geography and History*, on the general plan of his classical dictionaries.

We are glad to see a notice of the publication of the first volume of a translation of J. E. T. Wiltch's *Hand-book of Geography and Church Statistics*. It is translated by John Lestel, Esq.; edited by Prof. F. D. Maurice.

The fifth volume of Mr. Ruskin's *Modern Painters* is announced as in preparation.

The first number of a *Quarterly Index to Current Literature* has appeared. Its object is to give a reference to all new publications, and to the articles in the different reviews and periodicals.

Darwin's *Origin of Species by Natural Selection* is exciting a great deal of interest from the novelty of his views and the ability with which they are enforced. The work has been republished in America.

Rawlinson's *Historical Evidences of the Scripture Records*, the Bampton Lectures for 1859, will also be republished.

Three works have been published on the present condition of the Friends: S. Fothergill, *An Essay on the Society of Friends*; being an Inquiry into the Causes of their diminished Influence and Numbers: J. J. Fox, *The Society of Friends*; an Inquiry into the Causes of its Weakness as a Church: and E. Sheppard, *A Fallen Faith*; being a Historical, Religious and Socio-Political Sketch of the Society of Friends.

Immanuel Hermann Fichte's (the younger) *Contributions to Mental Philosophy* have been translated and edited by J. D. Morell in one volume. 12mo. Pp. 150.

New Works in Theology.—C. Ellicot, *Commentary on the Ephesians*; a new edition of Jowett on *Thessalonians, Galatians and Romans*; *Liturgies of St. Mark and St. James*, translated by Neale; Kelly's *Union of Christ and his Church*; Lathbury's *History of the Book of Common Prayer*, second edition; Chs. Bridges on *Ecclesiastes*; T. W. Robertson's *Lectures on Corinthians*; Smith's *Patriarchal Age*, second edition; Robert Buchanan on *Ecclesiastes*.

General Literature.—Vinet's *Studies on Pascal*, translated by Smith; Bacon's *Works*, new edition, volume 7, completing the Literary and Professional Works; Whewell's *Platonic Dialogues for English Readers*; Rev. Chas. Kingaley's *Miscellanies*, two volumes; Hecker's *Epidemics of the Middle Ages*, third edition, translated by Babington, adding a *Treatise on Children's Pilgrimages*; W. S. Walker, *Critical Examination of the Text of Shakspeare*; *Life of Schleiermacher*, translated by Rowan, two volumes; *A Translation of Theod. Mommsen's History of Rome*; Prout's *Reliques* in Bohn's Library; a new edition of Bosworth's *Anglo-Saxon Dictionary*.

UNITED STATES.

The *Historical Magazine*, N. Y., Dec. 1859, contains a copy of the application of the Pilgrim Fathers to the city of Leyden for permission to "live in the city" and "have the freedom thereof in carrying on their trades without being a burden, in the least, to any one." This is now first published. It seems to show that the reason why the Pilgrims under Robinson, unlike the English dissenters under Robert Durie, had no church in Leyden, was, that they preferred to take care of themselves. This congregation at first consisted of about one hundred persons; in 1620 they had increased to about three hundred, of whom about one half came to America. Most of them pursued useful trades. A list of many of those who did not embark in the Mayflower is given in the *Magazine*.

The complete works of Bacon, after the new English edition, are to be issued in superior style, in Boston, in twelve volumes, at \$1.50 the volume.

A new and improved edition of the works of Dr. Emmons is to be published by the Congregational Board of Publication, to be comprised in six volumes. It will contain a full index of all the principal topics discussed. The first volume will be ready in a few weeks.

Mr. S. Rhee, Clerk of the Smithsonian Institute, has published a *Manual of Public Libraries, Institutions and Societies of the United States*, from which we gather some interesting statistics. The whole number of libraries is 40,890, containing 12,720,686 volumes. Of the public libraries there are 1297, containing 4,280,866 volumes. Of these, New-York has 750,421 volumes and Massachusetts 632,800. Pennsylvania ranks next, with 467,716 volumes. A comparison of the number of volumes in public libraries in the larger cities shows New-York has 346,185; Philadelphia, 271,081; Boston, 258,079. The Astor Library in this city is also the largest public library in the country, containing 80,000 volumes, 6000 more than the next in size, that of Harvard University. One fact worthy of remark is, that of 4,008,081 volumes in the public libraries of all the States, (omitting the District of Columbia, which contains 272,835,) there are 3,103,085 in those of the free States, and 904,946 in those of the slave States.

On the *History of the Churches and Ministers of Indiana*, a work commenced by Father Dickey, and for the last four years in the hands of T. S. Milligan, a committee consisting of G. P. Tindall, J. M. Bishop, A. W. Freeman, and T. S. Milligan, was appointed by the Synod of Cincinnati to devise ways and means, and publish the work as soon as possible.

Messrs. Ticknor & Fields, Boston, announce the early publication of a new volume, by Ralph Waldo Emerson, entitled *The Conduct of Life*.

The science of philology in this country has sustained a deep loss in the decease of Prof. W. W. Turner, formerly teacher of Hebrew in the Union Theological Seminary of New-York city. At the time of his death he was Librarian of the Patent Office, Washington. The *Transactions of the American Ethnological and Oriental Societies* were enriched by his numerous and valuable contributions. In addition to these, his reputation as a linguist was so great that scarcely a philological work has appeared of late without his advice or coöperation being solicited. The Semitic languages were his peculiar province, and Nordheimer's *Hebrew Grammar* (the best ever published, now very scarce) owes to him a large portion of its excel-

lence. He was the compiler of the Latin dictionary known as *Andrew's Lexicon*, and had the arranging and superintendence of the works on Indian languages issued by the Smithsonian Institution, as Riggs's *Dacotah Grammar and Dictionary*. At the last meeting of the American Oriental Society in New-York, in October, he read on the Phenician Inscription of Sidon, exhibiting a fac-simile which he had himself made from the monument sent by the Duc de Luquet to the Smithsonian Institution.

Prof. A. J. Schem, of Carlisle, Pa., is preparing an American *Ecclesiastical Year-Book*, to be published by H. Dayton, N. Y. It will be very valuable. The author has a more thorough knowledge of the present statistics of Christianity all over the world than any other man in the country.

Dr. Owen's *Commentary on John* is rapidly advancing to its completion.

We are glad to welcome among our quarterly journals *The Undergraduate*, conducted by an Association of Collegiate and Professional Students in the United States and Europe. The first number contains two hundred and twenty pages, and does great credit to the Association. It is very handsomely printed. The price is only \$2 a year. Besides the Introduction and Testimonials, it has articles on German Student Life and Travel; The University of Cambridge, England; Horace Mann; A Student's Voyage to Labrador; Dickens, how far a Literary Exemplar; Milton; The Responsibility of Writers of Fiction; The Literary Societies of Yale College; a Course of Study in the English Language and Literature suitable for Colleges and High Schools; and College Characters and Characteristics; with News-Articles from various institutions. We wish it all success.

Literary and Critical Notices of Books.

BIBLICAL LITERATURE.

1. *The Words of the Lord Jesus.* By RUDOLF STIER, Doctor of Theology, Chief Pastor and Superintendent of Schkenditz. Translated from the second revised German Edition. By REV. WILLIAM B. POPE. Manchester: New Edition. Vol. I-VI. 2. *The Words of the Risen Saviour, and Commentary on the Epistle of St. James.* By the same; published as Vol. IX. 8vo. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. New-York: Sheldon & Co. 1859-1860. It is an encouraging sign in respect to the theological literature of our country, that works of such sterling virtue, and of such bulk, are having so wide a circulation. The six volumes of Olshausen's Commentaries, have been even a book-selling success. We give a cordial welcome to these volumes of Dr. Stier. They are faithfully translated by Mr. Pope, aided in a part of the second volume by Rev. John Fulton. The work itself has for fifteen years had a high reputation among the evangelical Lutherans of Germany. It is a Lutheran commentary, upon the doctrines in controversy between them and the Reformed; but those points are only incidental, and will not mar its value to the general reader. In Vols I. and II., and part of III., we have the words of Christ in the Gospel of Matthew; in III. and IV. those in Mark and Luke; in V. and VI., a portion of those in John. The commentary is learned, minute, and extended, yet also full of thought and life, and such as to quicken the spiritual mind. The idea of the work is a most happy one—that of taking the very words of our Lord in his reported sayings, and learning truth directly from them: learning just how the truth stood in the speech of Him who is the way, and the truth, and the life. And this truth is here unfolded and developed in its various applications, and in opposition to the manifold forms of error so rife in the author's native land. The commentary, too, is written in a style of free, as well as of minute exposition. Such a work cannot fail to be of the greatest advantage to all who will make it a study. None better can be found as a basis for homiletical exposition of those parts of Scripture which take the deepest hold of Christian life and experience. It stimulates every reader, by disclosing unexpected turns and combinations of thought. We trust that the publishers may find their amends in a large circulation for giving us so valuable an addition to our exegetical literature at so reasonable a price.

3. *Commentary on the Pentateuch.* By OTTO VON GERLACH. Translated from the German by Rev. HENRY DOWNING. Philadelphia: Smith, English & Co. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1860. 8vo, pp. 585. For sale in New-York by

A. D. F. Randolph. Otto von Gerlach was born in 1801 and died in 1849. Such were his connections and relations, that he might have aspired to a high position in the state; and he was admirably fitted also to the career of a professor. But he preferred for his Master's sake to devote himself to the humble work of a pastor, in one of the most responsible posts in Germany, the outskirts of the city of Berlin. Here he labored indefatigably from 1835 to 1847, when he was called to the cathedral church. Here, too, he lived, in the midst of his arduous toil, to gather around him young men, students for the ministry, and impart to them the fruits of his ripe experience. We recollect well the deep impression he often produced in those colloquies; and how, as he discoursed, the hearts of his hearers were elevated. His great parochial toil, however, did not prevent him from still continuing his studies. He prepared a commentary for popular use, on the New Testament and portions of the Old, which is considered one of the very best of that character in Germany, where it has passed through several editions. The commentary is based on thorough study, but makes no show of investigation, giving the results in the simplest form. The translator, we think, judged wisely in selecting the Pentateuch as the first portion for translation. English students of the Bible have long needed just such a work as this. It is well adapted for general use, being both concise and simple. We hope that both the translator and publishers may be encouraged to give us other parts of this commentary.

4. *Theologisch-homiletisches Bibelwerk*. Von Dr. J. P. LANGE. Die Briefe Petri und der Brief Judä, von Dr. G. F. C. Fronmüller. Bielefeld: 1859. Royal 8vo, pp. 125. Of the general plan of this work we gave an account in the first volume of the REVIEW. It was projected by Dr. Lange, and is to be carried out with the aid of other theologians. Its aim is to give a thorough, yet concise exegesis of each verse; to show the internal relations of the different parts; to bring out the theological and Christological sense and bearings of the passages; and to append succinct homiletical hints. Thus far the work has fulfilled its promise. It has been warmly welcomed in Germany. Dr. Fronmüller's portion is carried on in the spirit of the original design. It forms the 14th part of the New Testament division, Dr. Lange's Commentary on John completing the Gospels, and Dr. Lechler's on the Acts are announced as in the press.

5. *Dr. A. Neander's Auslegung der beiden Briefe an die Corinther*. Herausgegeben von Willibald Heyschlag, Hofprediger zu Karlsruhe. Berlin: 1859. 8vo, pp. 384. This is the third volume of Neander's Theological Lectures, published chiefly from the notes of his auditors. His exegetical lectures were highly prized. Not deficient in philological learning, their aim is rather to bring out the spiritual sense of the sacred writers, and to expound their sayings in the light of the history and circumstances of the times. These commentaries on the Epistles to the Corinthians are a good specimen of his exegetical powers, and will prove a valuable aid in the interpretation of the writings of Paul.

6. *Bunsen's Bibelwerk*. Vollständiges Bibelwerk für die Gemeinde, von CHRISTIAN CARL JOSIAS BUNSEN. Of this work, three new parts have appeared.

namely, Joshua, Judges, 1, 2 Samuel, 1, 2 Kings, in one vol.; Isaiah, in another; also the first part of the second main division of the work, namely, Bibelurkunden, (Bible-documents,) on the law and the older prophets. The object of this second division is to give a history of the Books, and a critical revision of the texts of the Bible. The full plan of the work comprises three divisions: the Bible Text; the Bible Documents; the Bible History. Of this third part, no volume has been published. The object of the author is to adapt the Bible, by and through criticism, to the wants of the modern world. It is a work of immense labor and research, traversing the whole of ancient history, and examining the objections of modern criticism. But Bunsen himself is not seldom arbitrary in his hypotheses, and satisfies only himself in his solution of difficulties. His work is intended to meet the wants of the critical skeptic, of the inquisitive believer, and of the common mind. It is learned, able, and eloquent; but it lacks in clear method, and leads to ambiguous results. Chevalier Bunsen's favorite idea is, that Japhet is to expound and apply the ideas and history of Shem. This may be so; but we are strongly inclined to doubt whether that task has been performed, as a finality, in this Bible-work.

7. *The Epistles of St. Peter and St. Jude*, preached and explained by MARTIN LUTHER. Wittenberg. 1523-41. Translated, with Preface and Notes, by E. H. GILLET. New-York: Anson D. Randolph. 1859. 12mo, pp. 336. The Rev. E. H. Gillett, of Harlem, N. Y., has done a good service in this translation of works of Luther, which have not hitherto been rendered into English. In his Preface, he tells us that he found the original "stored away upon the upper shelves of the library of the Union Theological Seminary," N. Y., in the first Wittenberg edition. That library also contains almost all of the earlier editions of Luther's writings, as well as of those of cotemporary reformers. The translation is very well executed, retaining much of the boldness and force of the original. Luther, as a practical and direct expositor, has never been surpassed. He applies Scripture with surprising force and pungency to the circumstances, and especially to the errors, of his own times. These Lectures contain vigorous attacks on the Papal corruptions and assumptions, drawing sharply the difference between divine and human authority. Sometimes the writer breaks out in vehement denunciation; but strong words were necessary in those days of hard strife. If any one would see how Scripture may be handled, so as to be most effective, let him read the commentaries of Martin Luther.

8. *The Epistle to the Romans, in Greek and English, with an Analysis and Exegetical Commentary*. By SAMUEL H. TURNER, D.D., Professor of Biblical Literature in the Theological Seminary of the Protestant Episcopal Church. Revised and Corrected. New-York: Anson D. F. Randolph. 1859. 8vo, pp. xvi., 252.

9. *The Epistle to the Hebrews, in Greek and English*. By the same. New-York: 1859. 8vo, pp. viii., 200.

10. *Spiritual Things Compared with Spiritual; or the Gospels and Acts Illustrated by the use of Parallel References*. By the same. New-York: A. D. F. Randolph. 1859. 12mo, pp. xi., 221.

Dr. Turner stands, by common consent, at the head of the expositors of Scrip-

ture in the Protestant Episcopal Church. In the range and accuracy of his Biblical learning he has no equal in that Church, and few in other churches take higher rank. He comprises many of the best qualities of a commentator—thorough study, careful judgment, clear statement, and eminent candor. Even where we may differ from him in the exposition of particular passages, we feel that his own opinion has a deserved weight, because formed from a careful survey of the meaning and scope of the passage, and penned, too, from a simple regard to the teaching of the Divine word. His Commentaries on the Romans and Hebrews here appear in a revised form. They show a familiar acquaintance with the best writers, English and German, and also with the patristic literature. They are admirably adapted, by clear arrangement, to the use of students and ministers. An appendix to each volume gives, in a series of questions, a convenient analysis of the work. The third of these volumes was prepared as an aid to theological students. It is a selection of parallel and illustrative passages, made with great care, running through the Gospels and the Acts. Its object is to elucidate Scripture by Scripture; citing no passages but those directly in point. Its usefulness may well extend beyond its original destination; for all who desire to know the mind of the Spirit will be thankful to the honored author, for giving them so convenient a help. We trust that his original purpose of extending it to the remaining Books of the New Testament may yet be carried into execution.

11. *A Dictionary of the Holy Bible*; for general use in the Study of the Scriptures. With Engravings, Maps, and Tables. 12mo, pp. 584.

12. *A Commonplace-Book to the Holy Bible*. By the celebrated JOHN LOCKE. From the fifth London Edition. Revised by Rev. WILLIAM DODD, LL.D. With an Enlarged Index. 8vo, pp. 413.

13. *The Bible Text-Book*; or the Principal Texts relating to the Persons, Places and Subjects occurring in the Holy Scriptures. Arranged for the use of Ministers, Teachers, etc. 18mo, pp. 208.

These three valuable aids in the study of the Bible have been published by the American Tract Society, New-York. The Dictionary is based upon Dr. Edward Robinson's *Condensed Bible Dictionary*, first published in 1833, with additions from the Dictionaries of Rev. John Brown and Prof. Eadie, of Scotland. The whole has been thoroughly revised by Prof. Barrows, of Andover Theological Seminary. It is issued in a very handsome style, and will undoubtedly come into general use. The *Commonplace-Book* of John Locke is too well known to need any additional commendation. The *Bible Text-Book* is a very convenient manual for finding at once what the Scriptures say upon any particular topics. These works, with the *Family Bible* and *Cruden's Condensed Concordance*, which are also published by the Tract Society, furnish a great variety of aid in the study of that Word, which alone is able to make us wise unto salvation. They also indicate, that the Tract Society is enlarging its means for supplying our country with a truly evangelical and unsectarian literature.

14. *The Holy Bible*; containing the Old and New Testaments. Translated out of the Original Tongues, and with the former Translations diligently Com-

pared and Revised. In which all the Proper Names are Pronounced, and a copious and original selection of References and numerous Marginal Readings are given; together with Introductions to each Book, and numerous Tables and Maps. New-York: Carlton & Porter. 1860. Royal 8vo. This is a very handsome and convenient edition of the Sacred Scriptures. The title sufficiently describes its special characteristics. It also differs from the ordinary edition of the version in common use, by very considerable changes in the headings of columns and the contents of chapters. The alterations in the references, it is claimed, "give a more complete Scripture Concordance than can be found in any of the Reference Bibles now in use." The introductions to the different Books are concise and to the point. The chronological, historical, geographical, and archaeological tables, are "from the most recent and authentic sources."

HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY.

15. *The History of the Religious Movement of the Eighteenth Century, called Methodism*, considered in its Different Denominational Forms, and its Relations to British and American Protestantism. By ABEL STEVENS, LL.D. Volume II. From the Death of Whitefield to the Death of Wesley. New-York: Carlton & Porter. 1859. 12mo, pp. 520. In noticing the first volume of this able work, we expressed our judgment as to its high merits. This is confirmed and increased by the second volume. It is a work far above the ordinary range of sectarian history, and has a deep interest for all who would understand the cause and relations of that great religious movement which it depicts. Dr. Stevens unites in himself some rare qualities for the successful exhibition of such a wide range of historical events. He is not only an indefatigable explorer into the sources, but has the art of presenting the results of tedious investigations in distinct general outlines, as well as in graphic individual portraiture. This volume, in two books, gives the external history between the periods named in the title-page, and also an account of the Doctrines, Discipline, Literature, and other Characteristics of Methodism. It opens with the famous Calvinistic controversy brought on by Wesley's Minute (afterwards modified,) soon after the Conference of 1770. We differ, of course, from the author in his view of the merits of this controversy; but we have derived instruction and profit from the perusal of his vivid sketch. To escape Antinomianism, we need not take refuge in Arminianism. Both of these, in our view, are extremes equally remote from the truth. And Wesley's explanations as to the relation of his opinions, as avowed in the Minute, to the doctrine of justification, while sufficient to show that he personally held to justification in the evangelical sense, do not fully relieve all the difficulties of the case. On the assurance of Faith, we notice that Dr. Stevens cites the opinion of Sir Wm. Hamilton as conclusive in favor of the position, that that doctrine was held by all the early Protestant writers. But it has been fully shown, we think, that here the philosopher was incorrect. The doctrine of perfection is stated in such a modified form, as to suggest the inquiry, whether some other word had not better be used to express it. It is

such a perfection as requires the constant application of the atonement to cleanse from remaining sin, and as admits of continual increase. We should be glad, did our space allow, to give extracts illustrative of the vigor and skill of the narrative. The work will undoubtedly be a standard history of this powerful and growing denomination.

16. *The Life of the Rev. Adam Clarke, LL.D., F.A.S., M.R.I.A., etc. etc.* By J. W. ETHERIDGE, M.A. New-York: Carlton & Porter. 1859. 12mo, pp. 487. At Port Steward, in the north of Ireland, a school, church and parsonage, and at Portrush, an obelisk and statue, are to be reared to the memory of the Irish school-master, who, under the most unpropitious circumstances, came to stand among the foremost learned men of England. Years ago we read with great profit a prolix memoir of this eminent man, and are glad to revive the recollection of his worth by the perusal of this volume. It is an excellent biography, worthy to be put into the hands of the students of theology of all denominations. The narrative of his early life and his struggles in acquiring an education; and of what he was able to accomplish by his indefatigable application and industry, and of his high service to exegetical literature, at a time when sacred philology was in its low estate in England, ought to arouse our young men to greater diligence in pursuing their severer studies. And then the character of Dr. Clarke was so simple and earnest. His piety was so childlike and growing, that in this respect, too, his life is a useful study. He had his eccentricities of mind; he was sometimes fond of an odd theory; he was better as a philologist than as a systematic divine. But he was still a noble, simple, independent and true-hearted man, as well as a scholar of vast attainments. His name, in his own denomination, stands first for learning, and second only to that of Wesley in general influence. The volume is issued in good taste and style.

17. *Historical Vindication: a Discourse on the Province and Uses of Baptist History.* By SEWALL S. CUTTING, Professor in the University of Rochester. 12mo. 1859. This discourse was originally delivered before the Backus Historical Society, and repeated before the American Baptist Historical Society. It is an eloquent and learned vindication of several points in the history of the Baptists. The value of the work is increased by its Appendices. Appendix I. has notes on the Alleged Self-Baptism of John Smith. The Historical Baptism of the English People, Creed, Statements in the Baptist Denomination, and the origin of the name "Baptists." Appendix II. contain the Confession of the Seven Churches, 1663; the Philadelphia Confession of 1689, and the Discipline adopted by the Philadelphia Association.

18. *Fifty Years among the Baptists.* By DAVID BENEDICT, D.D. New-York: Sheldon & Company. 1860. 12mo, pp. 437. The venerable historian of the Baptists of this country here gathers up many facts in relation to their history, which could not be conveniently interwoven into his more comprehensive work, and presents at some length, in an Appendix, his ideas on the early Christians, as a model on several practical points and questions. There are many interesting

reminiscences about events, and preachers, and meeting-houses, and societies, and customs now gone into disuse. Some of the author's opinions are probably peculiar to himself; but they are expressed with great honesty and plainness of speech.

19. *Sketches of New-England Divines.* By Rev. D. SHERMAN. New-York: Carlton & Porter. 12mo, pp. 443. This volume contains a miscellaneous series of sketches, of a "fragmentary character" about several of the New-England divines, Congregational, Methodist, and Baptist. The author has evidently aimed to be fair in his delineations, even of those from whom he is most widely separated in his theological views. The rhetoric of the work is occasionally exuberant; adjectives and adverbs are now and then brought into unusual combinations. Among the most interesting sketches are those of Jesse Lee, Elijah Hedding, Wilbur Fisk and Stephen Olin.

20. *The Life of the Rev. Richard Knill, of St. Petersburg.* By CHARLES M. BIRRELL. New-York: Carter & Brothers. 18mo, pp. 358. This volume contains selections from the reminiscences, journals and correspondence of the author, and also a Review of his character by the late Rev. John Angell James. The Review has a hallowed interest as being among the very last of the writings of this eminent man, and it is a most just and affectionate tribute to Mr. Knill's work. The latter was an eloquent and affecting preacher, instrumental in the conversion of a hundred preachers of the Gospel. This biography gives an excellent account of the man, and of the sources of his great usefulness. It also contains interesting sketches of his life in India, and his long sojourn in the capital of Russia.

21. *An Address on the Life and Character of Parker Cleaveland, LL.D.* By LEONARD WOODS, D.D., President of Bowdoin College. Portland. 1859. 8vo, pp. 61. We present our sincere thanks to President Woods for this admirable delineation of the character of Professor Cleaveland, so long identified with the history and fame of Bowdoin College. The sketch is true to the life; and it is no ordinary skill in portraiture that could have given it to us in such a finished shape.

22. *The Life of Jabez Bunting, D.D., with Notices of Contemporary Persons and Events.* By his son, THOMAS PERCIVAL BUNTING. Vol. I. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1859. 12mo, pp. 389. Jabez Bunting was a great ecclesiastical leader; an able preacher; a consummate debater; a wise administrator. For forty years he was the ruling mind in English Methodism, at the time of its transition from a Society into a Church. He came upon the stage of action at the period when the Methodists would and could no longer be regarded as a mere appendage of the Church of England; when its ministers claimed that they must become real Christian pastors, administering the sacraments to their own people. Dr. Bunting, more than any other man, helped forward this great work. He also contributed powerfully to the development of the lay influence in the legislation and administration of Methodism. In wide and important spheres, he contended that the laity had a right to a share in the administration. This volume is written with the zeal and affection of a son; but at the same time with care and discrimination. It is a

valuable contribution to the history, not only of Methodism, but of the Christian Church. Dr. Bunting was a man of large natural endowments; and also one of the best educated men in his Church. As a preacher he was eloquent and solid, disdaining the mere arts of the rhetorician. He also had great working and organizing capacities. This work also gives incidental accounts of other leading men of the day. It closes with the Conference of 1811, when Dr. Bunting was just beginning to exercise his most potent influence upon the cause of Wesleyan legislation.

23. *Autobiography of Dan Young, a New-England Preacher of the Olden Time.* Edited by W. P. STRICKLAND. New-York: Carlton & Porter. 1860. 12mo, Pp. 380. This is a plain and exceedingly interesting autobiography of a man of wide experience, and constant diligence in doing his ministerial work. It traverses a wide field of itinerancy, and brings out that system in its most effective light. The author is a shrewd reasoner, meeting, in a practical, direct, common-sense way, various forms of error. His example shows how religious opinions and convictions may, and should, make themselves to be felt in all the various circumstances of life. He was always ready to speak a word in season.

24. *Self-Help; with Illustrations of Character and Conduct.* By SAMUEL SMILES. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1860. 12mo, pp. 363. This book grew out of lectures to young men, met together for self-improvement. From a wide range of reading it collects facts and anecdotes, illustrative of its main theme. It is a capital work to put into the hands of young men, to stimulate them to self-culture; to guide in the formation of habits of perseverance, energy, courage; and to lead to a high tone of moral character. "Character is human nature in its best form. It is moral order embodied in the individual." The author is already well known by his *Life of George Stephenson*.

25. *The Eighteen Christian Centuries.* By the Rev. JAMES WHITE, author of a "History of France." With a copious Index. From the second Edinburgh Edition. New-York: D. Appleton & Co. 1860. 8vo, pp. 538. The plan of this book meets a long-felt want in the reading public. We have not had any good popular compendium or outline of Christian history. The church histories are prolix, and intended chiefly for students. The general histories have had too little to say about Christianity. Mr. White has executed his plan in a very commendable manner. He passes down, through these eighteen centuries, giving a rapid review of the course of events, and showing at all epochs the mutual influence of the Church and the State. It is neither a civil nor an ecclesiastical history; but a combination of both. The volume, too, will be more popular from the fact that the narrative is chiefly restricted to external events and relations; though even these might have been better understood by fuller sketches of the history of thought and doctrinal opinions. The style is clear and animated. The division into centuries has its convenience for the memory, even when it does not fully correspond with the marked points in history. Each century is preceded by a list of some of its prominent rulers, great writers, and distinguished men. Each century, too, is, as it were, personified, and its main characters and events are presented in such full outlines, as to leave

upon the mind a distinct and the distinctive expression of the epoch. In no single work is this difficult task better accomplished. The volume will be attractive and useful to that large class of readers who wish a summary and grouping of events, rather than to go through with the details of more extended histories.

26. *A Popular History of the United States of America*; from the Discovery of the American Continent to the Present Time. By MARY HOWITT. Illustrated with numerous Engravings. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1860. 2 vols. 12mo, pp. 406, 387. Both the author and the subject will commend these volumes, which are issued in an attractive style. The work is, as its title indicates, a popular history, intended for general circulation, and it has marked excellences in this point of view. It makes, of course, free use of the materials found in the larger works of Bancroft, Hildreth, Tucker, and others, who have narrated the events more at large, and with more research. The tone of the history is eminently favorable, for an English writer, to our country and institutions. Whether it assigns its full value and power to the religious element in our history, is more doubtful. But there is no work of the same class, in England or our own country, which gives upon the whole a better popular exhibition of the development of the United States from the earliest colonization to the middle of the nineteenth century.

27. *The French Revolution of 1789 as Viewed in the Light of Republican Institutions*. By JOHN S. C. ABBOTT. With one hundred Engravings. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1859. Royal 8vo, pp. 439. This very handsome volume presents, in an attractive style, the results of Mr. Abbott's long studies upon the French Revolution, its causes and effects. The ability shown in the narrative of events is of a high order. The style is natural and animated, without parade or ostentation. There is no aiming after mere effect by word-painting, and yet the men and scenes are vividly portrayed. It is a work which cannot fail to be of deep interest. Mr. Abbott, and rightly as we judge, seeks for the causes of the Revolution in the antecedent history of France for more than a hundred years. Absolute monarchy supporting the Papacy, and exterminating Protestantism, gives the clue to the grand catastrophe. It was no sudden outbreak, but the revolution of a people debarred of its rights. And the author, too, is right in viewing this revolution as a great turning-point, not only in European history, but also in the history of humanity. France was the volcano; but the subterranean fires were under the whole of European society. The volume is written from the stand-point of a republican and a Christian. We may differ from the author occasionally in his judgment of men and measures; we may think that he has occasionally given too much the French version of affairs, and is too determined in his opposition to the English views; but still, as a rectification of many current prejudices, which we have received too implicitly from Allison and other English historians, the work is one of high value and importance, and will take an honorable position in our historical literature.

THEOLOGY.

28. *The First Adam and the Second.* The Elohim revealed in the Creation and Redemption of Man. By SAMUEL J. BAIRD, D.D., Pastor of the Presbyterian Church, Woodbury, N. J. Philadelphia. 1860. 8vo, pp. 688. This is the most solid book of American theology which we have had in hand for some time. Its author is known by his useful *Digest of the Minutes of the Presbyterian General Assemblies*, but here, for the first time, we believe, publishes in the sphere of systematic theology. It is a vigorous and learned work. It discusses, with ability, the two fundamental problems of revealed theology, our relation to the First and to the Second Adam. We agree with him in making the great questions of sin and of holiness centre here. The whole biblical doctrine of sin runs back into our relation to the First Adam; the whole doctrine of redemption from sin runs back into our relation to the Second Adam. The chief stress of the volume is in respect to the first of the questions, as it is by far the most ably treated. And, on this point, the work is significant of what we believe to be a better method of stating the doctrine of imputation than has prevailed among some Old School brethren. The author coincides with Dr. Breckenridge, and opposes Dr. Hodge, in his view of the nature and mode of the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity. It is imputed to us, because it is only through our native connection with, or "seminal inbeing in," the head of the race. The imputation is not merely external, but has a vital ground and reason in the connection between Adam and his posterity. "That which is not mine otherwise, cannot be made mine by imputation." In taking, and ably defending, this general ground, and showing, with abundant learning, to how large an extent it has the assent of Calvinistic divines, we think the author has rendered a real service to theology. It was one of the unfortunate circumstances about the doctrinal discussion in the Presbyterian Church at the time of the schism, that the whole theory of sin was resolved, by those who claimed to be the head and front of orthodoxy, into the most abstract and unreal form of imputation. Adam, as an individual, stood as the representative of all the rest; his sin was made over to them, by an external imputation, so that their very native corruption was a part, and not at all a ground, of the penal infliction. This view, the author clearly shows, is not sanctioned by the general consent even of the most orthodox Calvinism. When Dr. Baird comes to the exposition of the views of the elder Edwards, it seems to us, that he has incorrectly identified them with that form of mediate imputation, which virtually does away with all imputation, and he does the same with Stapfer. The metaphysical theory of Edwards, on this point, is a very subtle one, and his speculations about identity, and the divine constitution in relation to it, have led some of his followers to different results from those which he himself entertained. But as to his view of original sin, and our relation to Adam, and of the ground of the imputation of the sin of Adam to his posterity, we think that Dr. Baird makes a greater difference between his own theory and that of Edwards than can be maintained. Other points, too, we have noted, to which we should take exception, but we cannot at present pursue the discussion. The work contains such an amount of learned investigation, and attacks so strongly positions, which have earnest and able defenders, that it will undoubtedly call forth much criticism. If any one

wants to read upon these topics, he had better by all means get the *Elohim Revealed*. There are very few of our theologians who might not be instructed by it.

29. *Die lutherische Kirche und die Union*. Eine wissenschaftliche Erörterung der Zeitfrage, von FRIEDRICH JULIUS STAHL. Berlin. 1859. 8vo, s. xiv. 562. The author of this book, though a jurist, stands as the most prominent leader of the opposition to the union between the Lutherans and the Reformed in Prussia. He was called from Erlangen to Berlin about the same time Schelling came from Munich to oppose the Hegelian philosophy. What Schelling was to do in metaphysics, Stahl was to do in jurisprudence. With the revival of Lutheranism, the latter came forward as one of its most earnest advocates. He draws the line so sharply between Lutheranism and Calvinism, he makes them so radically distinct, that any union must be forced. All that is good and sound in the Reformation, all evangelical truth that the two confessions have in common, he ascribes to the Lutheran influence. This work is the most important one that has yet appeared in the controversy, excepting the able volume of Julius Müller, in the defense of the Union, published some four or five years ago. It is divided into four books: the first discusses the Different Spirit of the Lutheran and Reformed Church; the second is on the Particular Doctrinal Differences; the third examines the Union Question; the fourth is on the Union in Prussia. To make out a radical difference, forbidding union, the author is of course obliged to exaggerate the points that separate the two communions. He finds the heart and soul of the Reformed Church in its rejection of sacramental grace, leading Zwingle to view God as the only real cause, and to derive all grace directly from Him. The Lutherans, on the other hand, maintain the necessity of the Word, the sacraments, and the external means of grace. The Lutheran views the sacraments as means or vehicles of grace; the Calvinist considers them as signs and seals of grace. The Lutheran doctrines of Consubstantiation and the ubiquity of Christ's body, and the Calvinistic doctrine of Predestination are secondary, but not the primary, differences. The Reformed would abolish all that is not in Scripture; the Lutheran would retain all that is not opposed to Scripture. The Lutheran holds to the power of the keys, ministerial absolution, the divine authority of the ministry over the congregations; the Calvinistic puts the congregation of believers first, and the ministry second in order. Stahl, too, laments that the Lutheran Church gave up Episcopacy. His views are substantially those of the Oxford school. Dr. Stier has already given a valuable review of his book in the *Deutsche Zeitschrift*, October, 1859, also separately issued; and, in the same periodical, Baxman has defended Zwingle against him. Able as the book is, and remarkable as a theological work by a jurist, it yet shows the hazard any man runs in writing on topics remote from his profession; for it misrepresents Calvinism, not only as seen in Calvin himself, but also as it appears in its creeds and its history.

30. *The Divine Human in the Scriptures*. By TAYLER LEWIS, Union College. New-York: Robert Carter & Brothers. 1860. 12mo, pp. 400. This volume, says Dr. Lewis, "was intended as an introduction to another work, on the *Figurative Language of the Scriptures*," which he hopes soon to give to the public. We think he has done wisely in publishing this by itself. It is an eloquent and forcible elaboration of the theme, that "a true faith in the Scriptures must have its

strength in the Scriptures themselves." It is a living book throughout, and shows on every page that it was written under the full pressure and influence of one great idea. That idea is, that in and through the Human in the Scriptures, the Divine is revealed and known; and that only in this way could we attain such knowledge. The idea expressed in "THE WRITTEN WORD—THE INCARNATE WORD," with which the first chapter opens, is carried through to the last. "No book is so human as the Bible; therefore, no book is so divine." There is a profound and subtle philosophy pervading the glowing descriptions and forcible arguments; this comes out in the fourth and fifth chapters, on "the Denial of the Supernatural," and in meeting the objections of Anthropopathism, which, he says, must lead to the position, "that there can be no Divine Knowledge of the Finite. The titles of some of the chapters are full of thought: for example, chap. vi. "If Revelation is Human, it must be most Human;" chap. xi. "The Natural of the Scriptures—a Proof of the Supernatural." This last position is admirably carried out in a summary of Scripture history, carried forward, like the parts and acts of a drama, to its conclusion. It would be difficult to find a more distinct and forcible summary of the main point in Scripture history, or a more true and yet original application of this history in the way of proving its essentially supernatural origin. It is the internal argument for the divinity of the Scriptures, in a broad and just comprehension of it. On the subject of Verbal Inspiration, with the author's explanations, the question in dispute becomes one merely of the best term by which to qualify the doctrine; for Dr. Lewis wholly rejects the mechanical form of the theory; the language is the result of the inspiring influence working through the human soul. His argument for the reality and the need of the supernatural, is forcibly presented; and then comes the proof that we have it in the Bible, and there alone. The last chapters give the application of the argument in the position, that "the Bible is a World-Book." This includes a comparison of the Hebrew with the Greek and Latin literature: "Moses is nearer to us, notwithstanding his orientalism, than the Greek and Roman legislators." There are also some beautiful and true remarks on the intelligibility of the Hebrew Bible, springing, on the one hand, from the fact, that "the breath of the Lord inspired it," on the other, from "the intense humanity of its image."

31. *An Appeal to the People in behalf of their Rights as authorized Interpreters of the Bible.* By CATHERINE E. BEECHER. New-York: Harper & Brothers. 1860. 12mo, pp. 380. Miss Beecher is more logical than many ministers, who are kept from carrying out their theories into all their consequences by their practical ministerial work. She has taken certain current principles of natural ethics, and made them the ultimate standard by which to interpret Scripture and the doctrines of the Church. If all sin is found in volitions, there is, of course, no original sin. This is the doctrinal substance, if substance it can be called, of the volume. Again, if all holiness consists in the choice of the greatest happiness, then redemption from sin must be found in such a choice; and Christ and his work are left outside. Al! that he does for us is to move us to make this choice, by his self-sacrifice and suffering. Read, on this point, chap. xxix., which has for its title, "What must we do to be saved?" Read it, and compare it with the scriptural answer: "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved." The work is, in form, an Appeal to the People; the author, apparently, being shut out of the religious

periodicals, and the theological seminaries. Even her brothers seem, according to her representations, somewhat coy; though she has some hopes for the eloquent Henry Ward Beecher, which we trust will be disappointed. The author is an avowed Pelagian; Augustinianism and all intermediate systems she fully rejects. Her "Common-Sense Theory of the Origin of Evil," (p. 144,) is, that "*It is the eternal nature of things existing independently of the will of the Creator, or of any other being.*" This may sound strangely, as compared with her theory of moral agency. But such a theory of moral agency can only account for the superficies of evil. Its ground and roots are not thus reached. And if the Augustinian system be rejected, the next most consistent system is to put the origin of evil in the very nature of things. This Miss Beecher has fairly and squarely done. The book has many personal allusions and details, which give it interest, if not value. It shows a good deal of general reading, though not thorough historical investigation. There are some surprising slips and inaccuracies; for example, on page 55, "*Per* is the Latin word for *by*, and *con* is the word for *without*! So we have *perceptions* by the senses, and *conceptions without* the senses!" This is the most original application of etymology to psychology, which we have seen for many a day. Again: "*Ideas* is the word most frequently used to express *all* the operations and states of mind."

32. *The Immortality of the Soul and the Final Condition of the Wicked carefully considered.* By ROBERT W. LANDIS. Second thousand. New-York. 1859. Pp. 518. We noticed this work in last year's volume. It discusses the subjects of immortality and retribution, and the question of the annihilation of the wicked, in a forcible and thorough manner. It is a repertory of the arguments and objections. On the question of annihilation, it is more full than any work yet published in relation to recent views.

33. *Christian Believing and Living.*—Sermons by T. D. HUNTINGTON, D.D., Preacher to the University and Plummer Professor of Christian Morals in Harvard College. Pp. 528. The records of theological opinion have not many parallels to this volume. There are but few instances of men of such eminent gifts and position, distinguished in the service of a given form of faith, who boldly and convincingly come to utter the words of another and counter faith. Forty years ago some men were found publicly professing one faith, yet really teaching another. There was an apostasy; this is a conversion. Known for fifteen years as a "bright particular star" in the Unitarian pulpit of New-England, transferred to the Chair of Christian Morals, to be the representative of the religious believing and living in our most ancient University, and there obtaining a brilliant reputation, Dr. Huntington, now in the noon of his fame and manhood, sends forth a volume like an army with banners against the creed and traditions, the premises and the conclusions, of which he has been counted one of the supporters. This is an act of moral heroism.

Aside from this, we seldom open such a book. Its plenitude of thought, dignified yet simple, its rare, rich speech and forms of thought, put the book far in advance of our ordinary religious literature. There is in it the gushing of a fresh life; it is like the coursing along the king's highway of one for many days hampered by what the author calls "a general infirmity (which) creeps into religious action."

Budding and blossoming as a Unitarian, our first inquiries about him naturally go to the question of his *Trinitarianism*. For such questioning we find a manly answer ready in a sermon and notes, covering sixty-four pages, where he has wrought an avowal of his faith, and planted it round about with defences of no ordinary skill and strength. We will let him speak for himself. "Life, Salvation, and Comfort for Man in the Divine Trinity," is the title of the sermon. The text, Matt. 28: 19, "Go ye therefore and teach all nations," etc. In the opening, page 356: "Our faith is summoned to the Three Persons of the One God—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. No hint is given that there is any difference of nature, dignity, duration, power, or glory between them." "The Three are Persons, and the Persons are Three." "To each of them Divine attributes and Divine acts are ascribed, and to each Divine worship is offered." His argument then strides into the history of the Church, and arrays the affluent evidence from all times, peoples, tongues, and lands, into a magnificent "cloud of witnesses." At pp. 362, 3 he asserts: "Holding fast the prime and positive part of this unity, we have given us, as an equal matter of faith, the Threeness." . . . "We conceive of God always, not as an Absolute Being, but as in relations, in process, in act. And in such relations, process, act, we behold him only as Three: the Son, eternally begotten of the Father, not subordinate in nature, or essence, nor created, nor beginning, but consubstantial with the Father; the Holy Ghost, ever proceeding from the Father and the Son, not in time, nor made out of nothing, but one in power, and glory, and eternity with them both." Not content with setting forth his faith in a profusion of forms, like the above, he presses his arguments against unbelievers, and puts on the double character of convert and champion together. As an argument, we hear the discourse sharply complained of.

That it is not the argument of a trained polemic, which only one like himself could understand, we concede; but that it has in it the forces of a popular conviction of vastly more value, is equally plain. That is the real reason for disparaging it.

Other sermons (the volume contains twenty-five) bear equal testimony to the decisive faith and exalted fervor of the author. In them all are found gems of choice learning, fastening and adorning his persuasions, like nails of fine gold, with jewels for a head. Few volumes excel it in the rarity and abundance of choice illustrations, chosen from all knowledges.

We deplore the scantiness of space forbidding a longer stay with these fervid, brilliant, bold and quickening pages. Any heart panting for relief from the pangs of indifferentism and restless indecision as to doctrine, will find an efficient help in these rare and vital pages.

34. *Graham Lectures*. Human Society: its Providential Structure, Relation, and Offices. Eight Lectures, delivered at the Brooklyn Institute, Brooklyn, N. Y. By F. D. HUNTINGTON, D.D., New-York: Carters. 1860. 8vo, pp. 307. The citizens of Brooklyn will have great reason for honoring the memory of Mr. Graham, if his benefactions give them the opportunity of hearing such admirable lectures as those of Dr. Huntington. Human society is here viewed and described as (1) A Divine Appointment; (2) A Living Instrument of Divine Thought; (3) A Discipline of the Individual Character; (4) A School of Mutual Helps; (5) In Relation

to Social Theories; (6) In Relation to the Intellect; (7) as Subject to a Law of Advancement; (8) as the Sphere of the Kingdom of Christ on Earth. In these aspects it illustrates the power and wisdom of God. The style of discussion is animated and eloquent; for a treatment of these high themes before a popular audience it is very felicitous. There is sound and strong thought at the basis; but the thought is wreathed around with vivid imagination, and a glowing rhetoric. Human society, as a Divine institution, is amply vindicated against all those theories which would make it a merely human contrivance, and which see the final destiny of man in his terrestrial lot. It is the Christian view of society, in contrast with the naturalistic and socialistic. We cordially thank this distinguished author for the instruction and pleasure we have derived from the perusal of his volumes. It is issued in a beautiful style of typography.

35. *The Ancient and the Modern Teacher of Politics.* An Introductory Discourse to a Course of Lectures on the State. By FRANCIS LIEBER, Professor of Political Science in Columbia College. New-York. 1860. 8vo, pp. 35. The students in the Law School of Columbia College have been highly favored this winter in hearing such a course of Lectures on the State, as that recently concluded by Dr. Lieber. He stands confessedly at the head of English writers in the department of political ethics; and these Lectures have given the ripest fruits of his wide range of knowledge and experience. His wise cautions and criticisms are such as our political men must need to lay to heart. And his philosophical grasp of the great subject, in its various relations, will commend his views to all right-minded thinkers. This interesting lecture (which, we trust, will be followed by the others) discusses the position which should be occupied by a public teacher of politics in our country. The difference of modern from ancient civilization is found, he says, in two facts. Now, "several nations strive in the career of progress, abreast like the coursers of a Grecian chariot," while in antiquity there was only one leading state at any given period; and, further, "modern states have a recuperative energy." In ancient times the philosopher appeared, "when the period of high vitality was past;" but "modern critics, philosophers, and teachers, have lived while their age was productive." The lecture is full of similar thoughts, condensing mature knowledge.

SERMONS AND PRACTICAL RELIGIOUS WORKS.

36. *Sermons by the Rev. H. GRATTAN GUINNESS.* New-York: Robert Carter & Brothers, No. 350 Broadway. 1860. Pp. 363. This volume derives fresh interest from the fact that its author is now preaching, with marked effect, to large audiences in Philadelphia. His labors have been greatly blessed, it is reputed, in Scotland and Ireland. These sermons are plain, earnest, and practical. They show that the preacher is full of his great theme, and zealous in winning souls to Christ. His whole soul seems poured out in warning and exhortation.

37. *Sermons.* By RICHARD FULLER, D.D., of Baltimore. New-York: Sheldon & Co., 115 Nassau street. 1860. 12mo, pp. 384. This is a volume of very able

discourses, full of thought, expressed in an impressive diction, and arranged in a clear method. The sermons on the Lonesomeness of the Redeemer, the Deity of Christ, the Sympathizing High Priest, and the Cross, contain the marrow of the Gospel.

38. *Sacramental Discourses*, by JAMES W. ALEXANDER, D.D. New-York: Anson D. F. Randolph, 683 Broadway. 1860. Pp. 366. *The Alexander Memorial*, Sermons in reference to the Death of J. W. Alexander, D.D., by Charles Hodge, D.D., and John Hall, D.D. New-York: A. D. F. Randolph. 1859. Pp. 72. The discourse of Dr. Hodge describes Dr. Alexander in a felicitous manner, as the preacher of Christ; the sermon of Dr. Hall is the warm tribute of an attached friend. The Discourses of Dr. Alexander are published just as he preached them, and are thus specimens of his ordinary pulpit ministrations. They prove that Dr. Hodge has fitly described his character as a preacher; they are full of the great central truths of the Gospel—Christ, and him crucified. Not so elaborate as the volumes he published while living, they still show his fertility of illustration, his clear and definite style of thought, and his absorption in his great work. No one could have heard, or can read, such discourses as those on the Hymn of the Eucharist, Water and Blood, Communion in Christ's Body and Blood, Christ's Cross and Crown, without being better prepared for that sacred festival which commemorates the one only sacrifice for sins.

39. *Haste to the Rescue; or, Work while it is Day*. By Mrs. CHARLES W. WITH, Preface by the author of *English Hearts and English Hands*. New-York: Carters. 1859. 18mo, pp. 324. The materials of this book were gathered in personal intercourse with over five hundred working-men, learning their wants. They are Annals of the Poor, addressed to the rich and the educated, and appealing to them to give more personal effort to the rescue of the needy and debased. The incidents are simply and impressively told. The lesson they teach is one that ought every day to be laid to heart: Work while it is Day; Work for the Poor and Needy; Follow thus Christ's own Example.

40. *The Missing Link; or, Bible Women in the Houses of the London Poor*. By L. N. R., author of *The Book and its Story*. New-York: Carters. 12mo, pp. 302. This is a work of kindred aim with the above. It describes the London heathen, and what is doing, and may be done, for their improvement. The Link that is Missing is an appropriate female agency. There are many women who would gladly engage in such works of mercy and love, if the way could be clearly seen. In this respect the work points to a real deficiency in the Protestant mode of doing good. The establishments for Deaconesses, at Kaisersworth, and in other parts of Germany, were meant to supply this deficiency. No subject in respect to practical religious work needs more careful consideration.

41. *The Cottage and its Visitor*. By the author of *Ministering Children*. New-York: Carters. 1860. 18mo, pp. 242. This little work, nicely illustrated, is intended as a guide to those who would benefit the poor, and yet feel the drawback of inexperience. It is "strictly true," and in a pleasing narrative shows how a visitor may reach the hearts of the inmates of a cottage.

42. *The Hart and the Water-Brooks*; a Practical Exposition of the Forty-Second Psalm. By the Rev. JOHN R. MACDUFF, D.D. New-York: Carter & Brothers. 1860. 18mo, pp. 229. Dr. Macduff, in his numerous works, has approved himself to be an earnest and evangelical preacher. His writings abound in forcible illustrations and strong appeals to Christian sympathies and emotions.

43. *The Three Wakings*, with Hymns and Songs. By the author of *The Voice of Christian Life in Song*. New-York: Carters. 1860. Pp. 228. This volume, chiefly of religious poetry, manifests a good degree of poetical taste and feeling, and facility in expression. The *Three Wakings* are from three trances in three periods of life; those of youthful fancy, of manly work, and of triumph in redemption.

44. *Hymns for the Sick-Room*. New-York: A. D. F. Randolph. 1860. Pp. 130. An appropriate selection of hymns for religious comfort in times of sickness, with prayers, meditations and passages of Scripture interspersed.

45. *The Still Hour*; or, *Communion with God*. By AUSTIN PHELPS. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1860. 18mo, pp. 136. This slight volume, by the accomplished Professor of Sacred Rhetoric in the Andover Theological Seminary, is composed of a series of delightful and edifying meditations upon prayer in its different aspects and relations, with salutary hints and cautions.

46. *The Precious Things of God*. By OCTAVIUS WINBLOW, D.D. New-York: Carters. 1860. This is a volume of a highly spiritual and devout character, intended, says the excellent author, to "cheer solitude, soothe grief, and dispel doubt, depression and gloom." It is a fit companion for the hours of devotion and meditation. In a simple, practical and earnest manner, it discourses upon the preciousness of Christ, of faith, of trial, of God's thoughts, of the divine promises, of Christ's blood, etc., ending with the theme that the death of saints is precious.

47. *Gotthold's Emblems*; or, *Invisible Things understood by Things that are made*. By CHRISTIAN SCRIVER, minister at Magdeburg in 1671. Translated from the 28th German edition by Rev. Robert Menzies. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1860. 8vo, pp. 316. Christian Scriver was born in 1629 and died in 1693. He was highly honored in his own times as a spiritual guide. These *Emblems* rapidly passed through twenty editions. In this fair volume we have a portion of them; the translation preserving much of the spirit of the original. The most common things of daily life are made the symbols of spiritual truth, or the occasions of devout meditation. Even when the analogies are fanciful, they do not seem to be forced, for they breathe every where a contemplative spirit. A mystical tendency, in a good sense, pervades the volume. Through the earthly we are led to the spiritual; the mortal guides to immortality.

News of the Churches and of Missions,

UNITED STATES.

STATISTICS OF CONGREGATIONALISM.
—The *Congregational Quarterly* gives a complete summary of Congregationalism in the United States and Canada:

	Churches.	Ministers
Maine,.....	247	190
New-Hampshire,.....	184	177
Vermont,.....	191	190
Massachusetts,.....	487	590
Rhode Island,.....	21	21
Connecticut,.....	284	383
New-York,.....	181	183
New-Jersey,.....	4	6
Pennsylvania,.....	29	22
Ohio,.....	193	110
Indiana,.....	29	17
Illinois,.....	185	175
Michigan,.....	118	115
Wisconsin,.....	160	129
Iowa,.....	147	102
Missouri,.....	2	1
Minnesota,.....	47	27
Nebraska,.....	8	4
Kansas,.....	27	24
Oregon,.....	10	11
California,.....	11	16
South-Carolina,.....	1	1
Jamaica,.....	6	5
Canada,.....	82	73
New-Brunswick,.....	7	4
Nova Scotia,.....	10	5
Total,.....	2,676	2,531

Summary: Churches, 2676;
Church-members: 75,158 males,
144,690 females; not specified, 37,
786; total, 257,634, including 27,705
absentees. Additions for the year:
25,590 by profession; 9623 by let-
ter; total, 35,213. Removals for the
year: 3589 by death; 8205 by dis-
missal; 717 by excommunication;
not specified, 82; total, 12,593.
Baptisms: 10,618 adult; 6156 in-
fant. In Sabbath-schools, 206,441.

The *Congregationalist* sums up

the following changes among the
Congregationalist churches during
the year 1859: 150 ordinations and
installations; 65 dismissals from
pastoral charges; 25 ministers died;
22 new churches formed; the last
principally in the Western States.

STATISTICS OF PRESBYTERIANISM.—
The *Presbyterian Historical Almanac* for 1860, published by J. M. Wil-
son, contains a large mass of statisti-
cal and other information respecting
the condition and strength of the va-
rious branches of the Presbyterian
body throughout the world. Some
few of these present no full reports of
their membership nor of the amount
contributed to benevolent objects;
but the number of ministers in con-
nection with each is given, and from
these data an approximation can be
made to a correct estimate on other
points. The total number of minis-
ters is 10,555; so that while 7400
ministers report 877,053 communi-
cants, an average for all would give
us 1,255,688 as the membership of
all Presbyterian bodies throughout
the world. Of the ministers, 6664
are resident in the United States, 475
in the British Provinces, and 3414
in Great Britain; thus showing that
in this country is twice the amount of
Presbyterian strength to be found in
England, Scotland, and Ireland.

EPISCOPALIANS IN AMERICA.—Ac-
cording to the *Church Almanac* for
1860, the Episcopal Church in the
United States contains 33 dioceses.
The present number of bishops, pro-

visional bishops, and assistant bishops, is 43; priests and deacons, 2030; parishes, 2110. There were ordained during the year 78 deacons and 93 priests. Number of candidates for holy orders, 281; churches consecrated, 69. The baptisms were as follows: infants, 24,415; adults, 5121: not stated, 487; total, 30,023. Number of confirmations, 14,596; communicants added, 14,794; present number, 35,767; marriages, 7059; burials, 12,442; Sunday-school teachers, 14,091; scholars, 118,069. Amount of contributions for missionary and charitable purposes, \$1,627,183.12.

STATISTICS OF BAPTISTS.—The *Baptist Almanac* for 1860 states that there are in the United States 590 associations, 12,163 churches, 7590 ordained ministers, 1035 licentiates, 992,851 communicants, and that the number baptized in 1858 was 98,508—nearly 100,000 baptisms, and a little less than 1,000,000 members. The largest number of Baptists reported from any one State is Virginia, 115,146. The largest number baptized in any one State is New-York, 10,802, and the next largest, Georgia, 7944. The *Almanac* gives the names of 33 colleges, 14 theological seminaries, 29 weekly newspapers, 16 monthlies, and 2 quarterlies, that depend on Baptists for their support. The names are also given of 64 new church edifices erected in 1858, of 238 new churches constituted, of 65 ministers deceased, and 304 ministers ordained—a number six or seven times larger than the whole number graduated in the same year, 1858, from all our theological institutions.

In Nova Scotia there are 3 Baptist associations, comprising 135 churches, with a membership of 13,057. Added by baptism, 1539. New-Brunswick has 2 associations, 113 churches, and 7703 members. Added by baptism, 1037; making a total in the two Provinces of 248 churches and 20,760 members. Five

churches have been constituted, 6 "meeting-houses" erected, and 8 brethren ordained to the work of the ministry.

STATISTICS OF METHODISM.—The *Methodist Quarterly Review* furnishes the following view of Methodism throughout the world:

Methodist Episcopal Church, (North,)	956,555
" " (South,)	700,000
Canada Wesleyan Conference,.....	43,672
Eastern British American Conference,.....	16,935
Methodist Episcopal Church, Canada,	13,352
American Wesleyan Methodists,....	21,000
Methodist Protestant Church,.....	70,018
African Methodist Episcopal Church,	20,000
" " " Zion	6,203
Church,.....	21,076
Albright Methodists,.....	
Total lay members in America,.....	1,863,811
Add Trav. Preachers, (except Albright's,)	11,458
Total American communicants,...	1,880,269

The Methodism of Europe, excepting the British and American colonies and the American and European missions included above, exhibits similar, though not equal vigor. The latest accessible returns show:

Wesleyan Methodists,.....	435,308
Primitive " ".....	123,863
New Connection Methodists,.....	27,000
United Free Church Methodists,.....	43,000
Wesleyan Reformers, (who remain independent,).....	12,000
Bible Christian Methodists,.....	19,068
Church Methodists in Ireland, (called Primitive Methodists,).....	9,158
Total British lay members,.....	669,397
Add Travelling Preachers,.....	3,225
Total Communicants,.....	672,622

JEWS IN THIS COUNTRY.—The Israelite population in the United States is estimated at about 200,000 souls, who have established 170 synagogues. Of these, 40,000 dwell in the city of New-York, and alone outnumber the entire Hebrew population resident in the British Isles. Of this aggregate, about three fourths are derived from the immigration of the preceding twenty years.

MORMONS.—Judge Cradlebaugh thinks that the entire Mormon popu-

lation of eastern Utah does not exceed 35,000, of whom not more than 8000 are entitled to vote. The Gentile population of eastern Utah he estimates at 3500 voters, that of western Utah he puts down at 3000 voters, and as there is an absolute certainty of an increase of 15,000 or 20,000 in the spring, he hopes to outvote the Mormons at the election next year.

THE AMERICAN BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS FOR FOREIGN MISSIONS.—This Institution having resolved, on account of difficulties growing out of the question of slavery, to withdraw from the Choctaw Indian territory the missionaries late in connection with it, have, on their application, been received by the General Assembly's Board of Foreign Missions of the Old School Presbyterian Church. The ecclesiastical connection of all the missionaries has been with this body, and the Board with which they have now become united has had a mission on the same field since 1846.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE AMERICAN BOARD IN THE "HARD TIMES" OF TWENTY YEARS AGO.—The great crash of 1837 came on in March. The financial year of the American Board closed with the following July, the receipts amounting to \$252,000. The advance in donations (exclusive of legacies) beyond those of the previous year, had been \$68,000. The next year, the contributions of the churches were but about \$6000 less; and the whole amount of donations for the two years was \$147,000 more than for the two previous years of temporal prosperity.

THE American Colonization Society held its annual meeting in the Smithsonian Institute, Washington City. After the report had been read, addresses were delivered by the Rev. Dr. Pinney, of New-York, Rev. Dr. Styles, of Georgia, and the Hon. Mr. Taylor, of Tennessee. The receipts during the year were about \$160,000, and the

expenditures about \$80,000. Three hundred emigrants have been sent to Africa during the past year.

THE American Missionary Association held its annual meeting in Chicago, Oct. 19, 1859. From the Treasurer's report it appears that the receipts during the year had been \$50,511.76, and the expenditures, \$52,301.15.

The number of foreign missions is 8, and the number of stations and out-stations, 29. The number of laborers connected with the foreign missions is 54, and 15 native assistants. Two male missionaries and one female missionary have returned to this country from Africa. One female missionary has gone from the same mission to her home in Scotland for the benefit of her health, and three missionary families have retired from the Ojibway mission, Minnesota Territory.

The Association has 6 ordained missionaries in the Mendi mission, West-Africa, 6 in Jamaica, 1 in the Sandwich Islands, and 1 in Siam. The Coptic mission is, for the present, suspended. In the home field it employs 98 missionaries and 5 colporters, located as follows: In States east of Ohio, 9; in Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan, 24; in Illinois, 22; in Wisconsin, 1; in Minnesota, 15; in Iowa, 10; in Kansas, 6; in Missouri, 1; in Kentucky, 7; in North-Carolina, 2; in Washington City, 1. Three colporters in Kentucky, 1 in Indiana, and one in Southern Illinois.

CALIFORNIA.—The *State Register* estimates the number of Christian congregations at 216: the clergymen number 289. Of the latter, 133 are Methodists, 71 Roman Catholic. The Catholic inhabitants are reckoned at about 100,000. The Catholic property is very large. Santa Clara College at San José belongs to the Roman Catholics, and is the best endowed literary institution in the State. The Jews have 5 congregations and 3 ministers. In 1857 there

were 367 common schools, 486 teachers, 36,222 pupils. The population is estimated at about half a million : of these, 50,000 are Chinese ; about the same number are Europeans and Mexicans not naturalized. About 75,000 are children under 18 ; about the same number are women. This leaves the male population, over 18, at 350,000. Of Indians, there are probably not more than 30,000, of whom about 17,000 are on the government reservations. The whole population in 1850, not including Indians, was 92,597 ; in 1852, 264,435, of whom only 22,193 were females.

GREAT BRITAIN.

DISSENT IN ENGLAND.—The last London *Watchman* gives the relative numbers of Dissenters and Churchmen, as follows : *England and Wales*, Established Church, 52 per cent of the population ; Non-established, 48 per cent of the population. *Scotland*, Established Church, 34 per cent of the population ; Non-established, 66 per cent of the population. No statistics of religious worship were collected for Ireland, but the Committee of Public Instruction of 1834 made a complete census of the religious belief of that country. Its results were : Established Church, 10 per cent of the population ; Non-established, 90 per cent of the population. The returns made under the Marriage Registration Act prove these proportions to have remained unaltered up to the year of the census. The aggregate result of the above would give, for these kingdoms, in 1851, a population belonging to the two (Episcopalian and Presbyterian) Established Churches of rather more than eleven millions, and to the Non-established Churches, of rather more than sixteen millions.

RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN ENGLAND.

—In the course of a recent debate in the House of Lords, it was stated by the Bishop of London, that out of the 8700 parishes of the Church of England, only 400 had refused to grant

rates for the maintenance and repairs of churches. His lordship also adduced the following significant fact in reference to the proportion of instruction, etc., for the poor, furnished by the Church and by Dissenters :

Church schools for the poor,.....	88 per cent
Other schools, " " " " " "	17 " "
Children in Church-schools, " " " "	78 " "
Children in other schools, " " " "	12 " "

CHURCH ATTENDANCE IN ENGLAND.

—The statistics of the religious bodies of England, as presented to Parliament by a special committee, present some interesting facts. Calculations based on accurate data, show that 7,546,948, or 42 per cent, of the population, are actual attendants at the Established Churches. There are 5,303,609 church-goers among the Protestant Dissenters of various denominations, and 610,784 Catholics. One fourth of the population attend none of the churches. In the cities and large towns the non-church-goers are generally in the majority, and the church sittings of all denominations are only sufficient for 57 per cent of the population, and of these sittings more than half are furnished by the Dissenters. Rev. Dr. Hume, the incumbent of a parish, populous and poor, in Liverpool, and a witness before the committee, expressed his conviction, founded on long experience and observation, that the large masses of the population who attend no place of worship whatever are in danger of being lost, not only to the Church, but to religion altogether. The population of the country, always on the increase, is becoming more and more a town population. In 1851, there were 9,000,000 living in towns of 10,000 people and upwards, and only 8,000,000 in smaller towns, in villages, and in rural districts. Dr. Hume apprehends that at the close of the present century 70 per cent of the gross population will be located in large towns : and, therefore, he adds, if our large towns are left to themselves, practical heathenism must inevitably outgrow Christianity. These

facts have a home interest from the similar condition of things in this country, for which as yet no sufficient remedy is found.

UNITARIANISM IN ENGLAND.—According to the *British Quarterly Review*, the stated attendants upon Unitarian preaching in England and Wales, is less than 40,000. Unitarians have 229 chapels, of which 147 run back into the last century; the whole number of churches and chapels of all denominations is 34,467, of which 14,077 belonged to the Church of England. The Moravians have 32 churches; Swedenborgians, 50; Irvingites, 32; Independent Methodists, 20; Seventh-Day Baptists, 2. The sittings in the Unitarian chapels were 63,770; in all churches and chapels, 10,212,563. As to its hold in cities and large towns: in 73 there are no Unitarians; in 49 towns they have 71 chapels—5 in Birmingham, 4 in Manchester, 4 in Liverpool, etc. In the City of London and suburbs, with a population of over 2½ millions, there are only 4 Unitarian chapels, or 5, including the one in which the member for Oldham exercised his early ministry; in this same district are 291 Episcopal churches and chapels, and 231 Dissenting chapels. The number of Unitarians in London and vicinity, is less than they were 50 years ago; their congregations altogether do not comprise more than 1500 persons. In this same time, the other denominations have been advancing with great rapidity. The Wesleyans in England, in the last half century, have grown from 852 places of worship to 11,007; the Independents, from 914 to 3244; the Baptists, from 652 to 2789.

A NEW MISSIONARY ENTERPRISE.—The Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, in England, acting under the promptings of the African explorer, Dr. Livingstone, have determined to send a special mission to Central Africa, for the purpose of propagating the Gospel. They do not pro-

pose to form a new missionary society, but by a special effort, extending through some five or ten years, to plant the Gospel and Christian institutions, together with the arts and sciences of civilized life, in some one of those hitherto unexplored regions which Dr. Livingstone is making known, and having done this, to hand over the management and oversight of their work to some existing association, probably "The Society for the Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign parts." It is their intention to send out at once a Missionary Bishop and six ordained clergymen as missionaries, together with a medical practitioner, artisans, and skilled laborers of various kinds. The immediate outlay contemplated is \$100,000. There will also be an annual expenditure of \$10,000 for five years. After that time, it is expected that the missionary colony (for that is what it amounts to) will be self-supporting. A large part of money needed has been already raised or pledged, and altogether the indications are favorable to there being prompt and vigorous action.

LITURGICAL REVISION MOVEMENT.—A petition signed by 460 clergymen of the Church of England has been presented to the Queen on this subject. It asks for abbreviation of the services; and among other things, for the discontinuance of the Athanasian Creed and the use of Apocryphal Lessons. It also specifies certain changes desired in the burial, baptismal, and ordination offices.

SCOTLAND.

TEMPERANCE IN SCOTLAND.—Scotland is making a successful experiment of a temperance law against Sabbath drinking-houses. The *Scottish Journal* says, the decrease of four years is actually \$25,020,560, or nearly a fifth part of the whole previous consumption. The diminution is even greater than it appears, since the increase of the population must

be taken into account. The people of Scotland, under the Forbes-Mackenzie Act, have scarcely drunk more than three fourths of the quantity of spirits consumed under the old law.

THE REVIVAL IN SCOTLAND.—The Scotch journals contain copious reports respecting the progress of the revivals in various parts of the sister country, while they are marked by an energy, an earnestness, and in some cases by physical manifestations closely similar to those which have characterized them in Ireland.

From various portions of Scotland the most gratifying accounts reach us; and there, as here, ministers and laymen of almost every evangelical body, engage heartily in promoting the movement. In many cases, the ministers who address the meetings have been over the revival districts in Ulster, and give heart-stirring details of what they witnessed. In Edinburgh and Glasgow, the assemblings together for prayer for the outpouring of the Spirit are in many churches held daily, and with truly hopeful results. At Paisley, Kilmarnock, Kirkintilloch, Bushby, Denny, Aberuthven, Aberdeen, Hamilton, Dundee, and a great number of other places—west, inland, east, and north—the work is making rapid progress.

THE "HEADSHIP" CONTROVERSY REVIVED.—Scotland is still, as it has been for at least three centuries, the grand battle-ground of religious liberty. The question raised by Mr. McMillan, of Cardross, who had been deposed for appealing from a sentence of the Free-Church General Assembly to the civil courts, has been fully discussed by the Scottish judges, four of whom have given judgment (on the preliminary point whether the Church was bound to produce before the judges their sentence, and the record of proceedings leading thereto in the case) against the Church, with costs. What the effect of this judgment may be on the position of the Free and other Non-established Churches, and

how far it may assail the liberty to exercise discipline free from secular interference, remains to be seen. The agitation produced by it in Scotland is intense, and it is feared that a new struggle between the civil and the ecclesiastical powers—the field of which is now removed from the Established to the Non-established platform—has already commenced.

WALES.

THE revival in Wales still continues with great power. In the county of Cardiganshire alone, about 15,000 have been added to the churches in nine months.

IRELAND.

It is stated that a regular crusade has been organized by Archbishop McHale, in the county of Mayo, against Protestants and converts. Scripture-readers have been waylaid and assailed, converts beaten, and children kept by force from attending school. Several cases of assault had been brought before the magistrates.

The attempted demonstration of Roman Catholic laymen of Dublin in favor of the temporal power of the Pope, has turned out a significant failure. The clerical promoters of the meeting had to telegraph at the last moment to the O'Donoghue, M.P. for Tipperary, to take the chair. Three other provincial members of Parliament were present—gentlemen who owe their seats to priestly patronage. Not a single merchant of Dublin was present; not a single Roman Catholic barrister was present; not a single man of political eminence. Coupling this with the fact stated by Sir Robert Kane at the distribution of prizes at Queen's College, Cork, that the attendance of the Roman Catholic laity has not fallen off, we have solid proofs that the liberal Roman Catholics of Ireland are not followers of Dr. Cullen.

THE IRISH REVIVAL.—The Rev. Hugh Hanna, of Belfast, in a letter to a friend, published in an English journal, thus writes: "We have had very refreshing and delightful meetings here last week. We have adapted our procedure to the present state of the revival. To improve to the utmost the readiness of all classes of the people to hear the Gospel, we have instituted a visiting association. The object of it is to penetrate the destitute parts of the town; to organize classes for Scriptural instruction and for prayer. Nearly three hundred persons have engaged in the work; they have seventy-six meetings each week, attended by about three thousand five hundred persons. There is a large number of applicants for admission to the churches. What a change! It is as life from the dead. People don't now exert all their ingenuity to shy off from spiritualities, but gladly listen to what ministers have to say, and are themselves indeed often the first to introduce them."

The London *Christian Observer* has two articles on the revival now in progress in Ireland, in which the divine character of the work, and its excellent results in promoting temperance, allaying partisan animosity and bigotry, as well as in accomplishing the higher work of bringing souls to Christ, are heartily and reverently acknowledged. The question of the physical manifestations is fully discussed, and they are said to be disappearing as the preaching is addressed less to the imagination, and more to the reason, while the number of hopeful conversions is increasing."

FRANCE.

The *Revue des Deux Mondes* is the leading Review of France. It commands the best talents of Paris. In a late number, it makes the following extraordinary concession to Protestantism:

"Much may be said of Protestant

diversities and sects, but one fact remains certain: it is, that nations where the Bible circulates and is read, have preserved a strong, deep, and enduring religious faith; while, in the countries where it is not known, one is obliged to deplore a moral superficiality and want of principles, for which a splendid uniformity of rites cannot compensate. Let the learned theologians discuss on certain passages, on the authenticity of such and such texts, what are such niaseries compared to the healthful and pure atmosphere which the Bible spreads wherever it is read, whether in low or elevated classes!"

AMERICAN CHAPEL AT PARIS.—R. H. Seeley, of the American Chapel at Paris, states the following facts:

"The original cost of the chapel was between sixty and seventy thousand dollars. Of this amount, all except \$16,000 was paid before the edifice was opened for Divine service. Of this \$16,000, \$12,000 was a permanent loan, secured by mortgage, and \$4000 remained as a floating debt.

"I have not examined the Treasurer's books, but I believe the *income of the chapel has been sufficient to defray all its expenses*, (including the interest on the mortgage,) and to *reduce the floating debt more than one half.*"

By that extraordinary pamphlet, *The Pope and the Congress*, the whole subject of the temporal possessions of the Papacy has been brought anew into discussion. Several of the Roman Catholic bishops have protested against the position there taken. The project is, in fact, a revival of a plan of the first Napoleon. De Pressensé has published a tract on the question, which has aroused a good deal of interest.

SPAIN.

MISSIONS TO SPAIN.—The work of the Edinburgh Spanish Evangelization Society, may be placed in pleas-

ing contrast with that of the "Propagation" Society. The latter confines its attention in Spain to English sailors and English residents. The Edinburgh Society, on the other hand, makes use of the Spanish sailors who come to England to carry back the word of life to their own countrymen. It has agents (for the most part volunteers, so that the funds are almost wholly expended in books) in every English port that is frequented by Spanish vessels. Besides this, it has a few agents in Spain itself, and others in Spanish America, and in the colonies. The testimony from all is the same. Spain is closed, but the Spaniards are open; and no one knows this better than the priests of the Church of Rome.

BELGIUM.

THE Paris *Siecle*, publishes the following: "An affair something like that of the boy Mortara has just occurred in Belgium; but, thanks to the good organization of the tribunals and the impartiality of the judges, the issue is in conformity with the principles of justice and paternal authority. There is in Flanders a sect called Stevenists, who observe most of the prescriptions of the Roman Church, but deem themselves more Catholic than the Pope himself, and deny that Pius VII. had any right to conclude a concordat with Napoleon I. These sectarians are rather numerous in the environs of Courtrai, and one them, named Mooneus, was alarmed in April last by the unaccountable disappearance of his eldest daughter, a girl aged about ten years. For nearly two months all his efforts to ascertain what had become of her were fruitless; but on the 31st May she was found in the convent of St. Genois, where she had been placed under the false name of Marie Maes. Five women, who had been concerned in her abduction and concealment, were in consequence, a few days back, brought to trial before the Correctional Tribunal of Courtrai, on the

ground that Roman Catholics who steal the children of Stevenists to bring them up in the orthodox faith, are just as criminal in the eye of the law as Stevenists or Jews would be who kidnapped Roman Catholic children with a view to convert them. Each of the accused was sentenced to fifteen days' imprisonment, and to pay a fine of 100 francs."

GERMANY.

FOREIGN MISSIONARY SOCIETIES.—

Germany has at present the following foreign missionary societies: 1. The Moravian, which has labored since 1732. 2. The Basel Society, which, though its centre is in Switzerland, receives the largest part of its contributions from Germany. It has lately published its forty-third annual report. 3. The Rhenish Mission. 4. The Berlin Society. 5. Gossner's Society, established in 1836. 6. The North German Missionary Society. 7. The Leipzig Lutheran Society. 8. The Society of Hermannsburg. The Societies of Berlin, Leipzig, and Hermannsburg, are under the control of High-Church Lutherans; all the others are evangelical. The number of foreign missionary papers amounted, in 1857, to twenty, among which that of Burman had the largest circulation, (15,000.) But since 1857, the circulation of several papers has more than doubled.

PRUSSIA AND PRESBYTERIANISM.—

The strong arm of civil power has cramped the growth and development of the Presbyterian system in Prussia, especially in the eastern part of the kingdom. But a very important step was recently taken in the right direction. Kirk sessions have been granted to all the parishes, the people being allowed to elect them. Lay patrons still exercise a deleterious influence, and consequently an agitation is in progress for the total abolition of patronage, similar to what prevailed in Scotland prior to the disruption. Prussia is undergoing a

liberalizing process, both in matters civil and ecclesiastical.

CHRISTIAN CHARITY.—In Germany, public charity is almost entirely in the hands of the civil magistrates, every town having to support the aged and infirm, widows and orphans, and those deprived of the means of living. In the sixty cities of Prussia, with a population of 1,730,000, there are 312,000 poor, or more than one to every six, and their support costs 2,750,000 German dollars. At Berlin, 600,000 German dollars are annually expended for the support of the poor, who claim it from the town as a debt. At the last meeting of the Home Missionary Society at Hamburg, a report was read by the first burgomaster of Elberfeld, a city of 400,000 inhabitants, living chiefly by their labor in the silk and other manufactories, which stated that as long as the magistrates of the city dealt out the legal charity, the number of poor increased alarmingly. A free and Christian society for dispensing aid was then formed on the principles developed by Dr. Chalmers in his essays on the Christian and civic economy of large towns. The city was divided into two hundred and fifty districts, containing each three or four poor families, and two hundred and fifty religious men selected, each of whom must personally distribute alms, in money or otherwise, according to his judgment, and also try to exert a good influence over the needy by his advice and fraternal care. In a few years the number of those requiring aid was reduced from 4400 to 1400, or more than two thirds. Many families have been placed in a state of comparative ease, and spiritual blessings have often accompanied the temporal relief of the poor.

FREE CONGREGATIONS AND GERMAN CATHOLICS.—A General Council of the Free Congregations and German Catholics, was held at Gotha on June 16th and 17th. The number of congregations which have succumbed to

the measures adopted against them since 1849, in almost all the German states, is estimated at over 200. About 100 still exist, with 22 preachers. The Council adopted for the future the name, League of Free Religious Associations. Every form of a confession of faith was rejected, and the principle of the absolute independence and self-determination of the individual in all religious matters proclaimed. The League will be divided into districts and circles, and elect a directory, consisting of five members, as the highest representative organ. A General Council will meet every fifth year. The Free Church in Magdeburg, which a few years since had 7000 members, is now reduced to 1000. The Breslau congregation, which had 10,000, now numbers only 418.

SWEDEN.

RELIGIOUS AWAKENING.—At the meeting of the Conference of the Evangelical Alliance in Belfast, Mr. Scott, of Stockholm, stated that at least 200,000 persons had been awakened out of a population of 3,000,000. The chief instrumentality is found in the colporteurs, of whom the Stockholm Society employs 40, and the Baptists about the same number. Some of the congregations in the country districts number 3000 at special services, collected from 80 to 90 miles. In no country but Ireland is there so great a religious revival. Count von Stakelberg is one of the most zealous preachers in this movement.

The Swedish government has published the draft of a bill for toleration, to be laid before the Riksdag or Parliament. It allows dissenting congregations with regal assent; permits them to elect their own pastors, who keep the registers of marriage, baptism, etc., for their people. No children but their own are to be taught in their schools. Children are to be educated in the creed of the father.

A CONFERENCE OF THE CHURCHES of Sweden, Denmark, and Norway has been held at Lund, chiefly with reference to the question of religious toleration. There were present 99 Swedish pastors, 98 Danes, and 4 Norwegians. Bishop Thomander, of Lund, opened the session with a discourse on Mark 8 : 38.

Liberty of worship since 1849 was now enjoyed to a considerable extent in Denmark, and the King of Sweden has avowed the necessity of modifying the harsh laws of that country. The Danish pastors, even those of the strictest orthodoxy, as Dr. Rudelbach, reported upon the favorable influence of this freedom in promoting the welfare of the churches. Mr. Hammar advocated the repeal of the law which requires members of the Swedish Church to receive the Lord's Supper from the pastor of the local parish. He was sustained by Prof. Hammerich, of Copenhagen. The great revival in Denmark was ascribed, in part, to the increased religious liberty. The larger part of the Mormon converts, (3000,) it was said, were from the Swedes and Norwegians.

HUNGARY.

THE Protestant movement, both of the Lutherans and Reformed, against the new church constitution offered them by the Emperor, is gaining daily in definiteness and intensity. The Calvinists object, that it has no proper basis in the previous legislation, and that it deprives the Church of its right of self-legislation. By this patent, 1. The right of the State to simple superintendence has been changed into a claim to issue ordinances; 2. The Church elections are to be confirmed by the State; 3. Church meetings cannot be private; 4. Superintendents are to be paid by the State; 5. Districts always connected have been divided; 6. The State superintends schools, books, and teachers; 7. Synods are to be formed by election of the district as-

semblies, and not by the vote of the congregations. These are the chief points of objection. The Protestants of the Comitatus of Presburg have adopted an address to the Emperor, asking for the reestablishment of the regulation in force before 1848, confiscated by Haynau in 1849. The Comitatus of Pesth has spoken in equally decided terms. One hundred and sixty-nine Protestants, the signers of the Kœsmark "Representation," as it is called in Hungary, against Count Thun's decree for the organization of the Protestant Church, have received summonses to appear before the Provincial Criminal Court of Kashau. All of them are clergymen, church inspectors, seniors, and seniorial inspectors, at their head, Mr. Edward Zsedényi and the Right Rev. Mr. Topperezer, Superintendent Administrator of the Tibiscan District. The government tries hard to break the unanimity of the Protestant movement, and has succeeded in the little town of Skalicz on the Moravian frontier, (3000 inhabitants, of whom scarcely one fourth is Protestant,) and in the senioralty of Zólyom and Bács, in getting a small majority in favor of its organization; but this partial success makes the unpopularity of the measure with the great bulk of the Protestants still more apparent, who, even after the steps taken against the Tibiscan leaders, continue to hold meetings and to protest against Count Thun's decree. The Vienna papers little understand the earnest spirit of Protestantism, and continue to see in all these manifestations nothing but political separatist tendencies against the centralization of Austria.

Popovico, the United Greek bishop of Munkacs, has been seized in his Episcopal palace by the Austrian government and carried no one knows whither. This was done under the direction of Haas, the R. C. bishop of Szathmar, who was sent six years ago to Hungary to oppose the national Hungarian bishop.

THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY AT GENEVA, SWITZERLAND. — A correspondent of the *Watchman and Reflector* furnishes the following encouraging view of this institution: "I was present at the opening of the Fall term, on which occasion D'Aubigné addressed the young men on the subject of revivals, evidently desiring to infuse into their minds the spirit which will prompt them to appreciate and labor to promote them. There are some thirty young men in a course of instruction here for the ministry. The most of them spent the long summer vacation in laboring in different parts of Europe to promote evangelical religion. A few were in the army of Italy devoting their pious energies to the troops. The ladies of Geneva furnished them with large quantities of lint and other things that they knew would be grateful to the soldiers, and armed with these and the Gospel, these young men were warmly received and cordially listened to as they read the Bible or spoke of Christ to their military countrymen. It is to be hoped that the good seed thus sown will not be lost. I had an opportunity to see this company of pious students together, and their appearance greatly gratified me. They look serious, humble, and devout, and though coming from France, Belgium, Holland, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy, they all seem animated by one spirit, as they have devoted themselves to the same work. Much is to be hoped for from them."

ITALY.

RELIGIOUS MOVEMENT IN ITALY. — The Florence correspondent of the *London Times*, writing on the 30th November, says:

"I some time ago alluded to what is called 'evangelical Christianity' in Tuscany. The movement seems daily to assume more significant dimensions. Two, three, five hundred, and even nearly one thousand people meet of a Sunday evening in this town, in and about the small room

doing duty for a chapel. The brethren are loudly calling for a larger locality. They number, I am told, at least 300 communicants. Nor is the movement limited to this capital. Every where throughout Tuscany, and still more in the Romagnas, are the books spread, and people induced to join in the perusal of them. These new congregations have as yet no definite symbols, no established clergy, no appointed teachers; they profess to ground their faith on the Gospel and on freedom of inquiry. Their most gifted preacher is Muzzavella, a Neapolitan, once connected with the Waldenses of Piedmont, then a seceder from them and the founder of an opposition sect, yclept Evangelical Society, in Turin and Genoa. The man of the highest rank in the flock is Count Pietro Guicciardini of Florence, the same who, years ago, suffered imprisonment and banishment as guilty of the crime of reading the Bible privately with two or three friends in his own house. Some of his congregation think the Count rather lukewarm and timid in the cause; they complain that his faith does not sufficiently shine through his works. Altogether, hitherto the new sect lacks the lead of a real chief — it lacks a head, a heart, and a tongue."

An American clergyman, Rev. Edward Everett Hale, also writes from Florence that in every book-shop and book-stall in the city he found some edition of the Bible for sale. He adds:

"I am told, on authority which I have no right to dispute, that there were whole villages — two were named to me — which are recognized as Protestant villages. In these particular cases some scandal connected with the priests had led to dissatisfaction; but the people, instead of sinking into Nothingarianism, had at once put themselves into communication with the Protestants of Florence, and by the study of Scripture were working out their way to a Protestant faith."

VENICE.—The accounts that reach us from Venice are most deplorable. The emigration of every man of substance, of all the able-bodied youth; the alarm and distrust of all classes, the complete stoppage of all trade, and the sullen despair visible on every face, are only general symptoms. But one fact is more cogent—the city of Venice numbers, or did last year, 125,000 inhabitants; there are at this moment on the police lists, registered as paupers, beggars, and people dependent on public charity, no less than 45,000 of the whole number.

AMERICAN COLLEGE IN ROME.—The new ecclesiastical college for North-Americans was opened at Rome on the 7th ult. It is a magnificent building, capable of lodging more than 100 pupils. Cardinal Bernabo, in his quality of Prefect of the Propaganda, inaugurated it with a speech, in which he gave a description of the moral and religious state of North-America. He pointed out the advantages the United States would derive from the new college founded in the Eternal City by the munificence of the Sovereign Pontiff. Mr. Stockton, the American Minister to the Holy See, was present at the ceremony of the inauguration. Pius IX., having considered the increase of Catholicity in the United States, where there are already 50 Catholic dioceses, did not hesitate to expend 70,000 crowns on this institution. The Bishops in the United States have already sent 40,000 crowns to Rome to endow the college. The College of the Propaganda will consequently no longer receive pupils from the United States.

Jews under Papal Government.—

The proclamation of entire religious freedom in Tuscany since the late revolution is welcomed not only by the Protestants, but by the Jews, about 25,000 of whom by this act have been raised to the enjoyment of equal rights with other citizens. They have been so long oppressed, that the

blessing of freedom is appreciated. A congregation of 4000 assembled, at Leghorn, at a solemn feast for the purpose of giving thanks and imploring the divine blessing on their newly-elected king, Victor Emmanuel, King of Sardinia.

A resident of Florence, in a letter to the Newark *Sentinel*, gives an interesting account of the condition of the Jews in Rome, where, as well as in Naples and Venice, they are in worse than Babylonian bondage. The Ghetto, or Jews' quarter in Rome, is one of the most wretched places that disgraces Christendom. Four or five thousand poor creatures are crowded into it so closely, that if the rest of the city was peopled in proportion, it would contain over 500,000 inhabitants, where there are now less than 170,000. There they are doomed to live under an inexorable despotism, constantly exposed to insult and suspicion, deprived of almost every right and privilege, not permitted to pursue any profession of literature, science, or the arts, or that demands public confidence. There is no legal validity in their acts without Christian witnesses, and their testimony is not received in the civil courts. Besides other taxes, they are obliged to pay \$300 yearly to the monasteries for converts from their faith, and \$1100 to the establishment of Catechumens for the instruction of apostate and abducted Jews in Catholic doctrines, besides \$800 for the prizes of the running horses at the carnival races. They live in perpetual fear, being under the special jurisdiction of the Inquisition, and dare not complain.

VILLAGES IN BOHEMIA LEAVING THE CHURCH OF ROME.—

The *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, a paper which enjoys a deservedly high reputation in Germany for the correctness of its information, states, in one of its recent numbers, that a very powerful religious movement is now taking place in the northern parts of Bohemia, where (it is believed from disgust

with the oppression exercised under the Concordat) whole villages are going over to Protestantism.

THE MORTARA CASE is still working. A demand has been made by the family of the boy, with proof that the child was kidnapped by order of the Rev. Father and Inquisitor, Zilette. The latter has been arrested on this charge at Modena, and political proceedings instituted against him.

RUSSIA.

STATISTICS OF THE GREEK CHURCH IN RUSSIA.—The *Protestant Church Gazette*, of Berlin, publishes the following statistics as coming from an official source. In 1857 the Greek Church in Russia counted a population of 49,159,714 souls, (soldiers excepted,) among whom were 11,000 converts from the Greek sects, and 6000 converts from Paganism, Mohammedanism, Judaism, and other Christian denominations. The Church had 74 hierarchs, 55 eparchies, 12 vicariates, and 49 consistories. In the same year, 1849 priests were ordained, of whom 1246 had received a full course of instruction. The number of monks was 5211; of nuns, 2451, and secular priests, 49,985; of churches, 46,022; of monasteries, 465; of nunneries, 127; of parishes, (congregations,) 30,258; of chapels, 11,956; of ecclesiastical academies, 4, (a fifth one has since been established;) of seminaries, 48; of ecclesiastical schools, 201; of teachers in the two latter classes of institutions, 1849; of pupils, 53,042. The contributions of the people for religious purposes amounted to 5,247,094 rubles.

The above statement, if correct, would indicate that the membership of the Greek Church has not increased since the taking of the last but one census, while the whole population has risen to 71,500,000 souls.

THE *Missionary Herald* has another interesting communication from

Mr. Dunmore on the Malakans, a body of simple-hearted Christians some of whom have been driven by persecution from Russia into Turkey. He says:

"The largest number now together are said to be near the Crimea. Another large settlement remains near the Caspian Sea, from whence many have been banished at different times by imperial orders, and scattered through various parts of Southern Russia, with the hope of forcing them into the Greek Church. As nearly as I could learn, they number in all from 50,000 to 70,000 souls. This, however, is not a reliable estimate. They have, nominally, no Church organization, because they can have none; but they have teachers and preachers educated in the Gospel, and Mr. Rotte assured me that they observe the Lord's Supper and baptism as Gospel ordinances. It is against their teachers and preachers that Government has levelled its heaviest blows. They have been watched, and still are, with a jealous eye, and not a few have been taken from friends and family, dragged into slavery, and banished to Siberia. But none of these things move them."

EMANCIPATION OF THE SERFS.—The work of emancipation in Russia progresses. A large proprietor in Star-dub, a Russian village, has voluntarily emancipated his 181 serfs, and has given to them one third of his land, requiring from them capitation taxes and all subsisting imposts. This large-hearted man—his name is Herr Nicolai Furgieniew—at the end of the contract, declares that the peasants are at liberty to withdraw from the arrangements as soon as the negotiations between the Government and the nobility shall offer them more favorable conditions.

In a recent address to the nobility of Pskow, the Emperor said:

"This question, the freeing of the serfs, is now going forward to its solution, and I hope that you expect its consummation with the same reliance

on me that I manifested when addressing myself to you; and with the full persuasion that this matter will be concluded to the mutual advantage of both parties—so that the interest of the nobles will be, as far as possible, secured, and, at the same time, the condition of the peasants improved. I am persuaded that you will justify my confidence in you."

RECENT letters from Constantinople announce the arrival in that city of a delegate from one of the two bodies of Malakans who have fled into Turkey, and promise soon more particular information concerning this interesting people.

The Emperor Alexander treats the German colonies in Georgia with more kindness than did Nicholas. They are Protestants, and are not molested in respect to their worship and churches; but, as is the case with Protestants elsewhere in Russia, they are not allowed to prosecute labors for the evangelization of others than their own communion.

GREECE.

THE kingdom of Greece has at present 41 newspapers and periodicals, among which are a few theological, judicial, and medical papers; also 1 military and 1 Sunday paper. Three fourths of these papers, 31, are published in the city of Athens. In 1853, the number of political papers published in Greece was 23, of which 14 appeared in Athens. Among the theological papers is also a weekly with evangelical principles, conducted by Mr. Kalopothakes, under the title, *The Star in the East*, which gives brief articles and religious intelligence of Greece and other countries. Though the Greek clergy are not favorably disposed toward the paper, it has in Laconia alone more than a hundred subscribers, and is read by nearly all the educated citizens of Athens. Mr. Kalopothakes completed his education in the United States, where he is very favorably known.

A fuller account of this newspaper may be seen in our number for May, 1859.

TURKEY.

THE recently defeated conspiracy to assassinate the Sultan and revolutionize the government, was in the interest of the Mohammedan feeling, which is outraged by the reform policy, which undoubtedly is rapidly undermining faith in the Koran. Dr. Dwight, of the American Mission in Constantinople, remarks:

"I feel quite sure, that no men here who were capable of taking the lead in such an insurrection would, at this day, insert in their programme *the massacre of the Christians*. At the same time, it is impossible to predict whereunto an insurrection against the Turkish Government might grow. In spite of the intention of its leaders, it might involve an exterminating religious war; and we cannot be too grateful to our Father who is in heaven for having so providentially interfered, and led to the timely discovery of so dangerous a plot. Possibly, it may now be thought necessary for the public safety, to have several foreign ships-of-war always kept at anchor in the Bosphorus."

The administration of Government in the interior is severely animadverted upon, in the newspapers printed in Constantinople. The corruption and oppressions of the officials are often almost incredible. The exposure of these in the newspapers of the capital is a new and hopeful fact. The strange freedom of the press, at the present moment, under the eye of the Sultan, is also seen in the copying of a recent article from a semi-official Russian paper, which represents the pretended reforms in Turkey as a delusion, and the "sick man" as rapidly declining and sure soon to die.

Lately, the Censor of Armenian publications refused to approve of a missionary controversial work. Through the intervention of the English Ambassador, an order was issued

by the Government for the appointment of a Protestant Censor for Protestant publications.

THE impression of the American missionary operations in Turkey upon the Mohammedan mind is becoming deeper and more wide-spread. Dr. Schaffler has recently baptized four converts from Mohammedanism—one of them a near relative of one of the highest grandees of the empire. Great numbers of Turks, in all the walks of life, are found to have become well acquainted with the Christian Scriptures and to have lost, altogether or in good part, their confidence in Islamism. Mr. Williams (the converted Turk and preacher) is increasingly abundant and aggressive in his labors, and is unmolested. In an interesting scene described by Dr. Hamlin, he recently avowed boldly his faith in Christ to the Pasha, Chief Kadi, and "Defterdar" of Broosa, and was treated with marked consideration.

The leaven is also working among the Moslems of the far interior. That is now daily witnessed, which, a few years ago, would have caused torrents of blood to flow. Mr. Farnsworth writes from Cesarea in the heart of Asia Minor, concerning a converted Mohammedan family: "Our Turkish friend and his family are now at the village of Moonjasoon. He seems to be known very generally as a Protestant, but has suffered no violence as yet. He meets with our brethren for prayer, which he was unable to do in the city. We continue to feel very great anxiety for that family; but whatever their fate may be, it is clear that Moslem superstition and bigotry are rapidly crumbling, and liberty will soon be established for the followers of the prophet in Turkey."

MR. PRATT reports of Killis, on the border of Syria: "There has been a great increase of interest, and the number of Mussulman hearers is quite considerable. I know of no place where any such interest has been awakened among them. Every Sab-

bath, as many as five men and women, and oftener ten or fifteen, are found listening to the sermons. So constant has it become, that the preacher often adapts his language to the Moslems, using terms peculiar to them. I attended the women's meeting on Wednesday. There were seventy-five present, five or six at least being Moslems. The common school also is in a very flourishing condition, containing about 120 scholars, a large proportion, of course, being from the Armenians. The Bishop removes the scholars, and in a few days they return, saying they do not like the other school. The school is well organized, on the monitorial system, and is very orderly and well-behaved. It attracts much notice from all classes, especially Mussulmans, and is visited by the chief men of the place."

THE BULGARIAN FIELD.—Messrs. Merriam and Clark have succeeded, after a previous failure, through the bitter opposition of the Greek priesthood, and the necessity of a governmental order from the capital, in obtaining a residence in Philippopolis. Mr. Byington has removed to Eski Zaara. A tour made by Dr. Riggs and Mr. Byington has disclosed that the Bulgarian language is more widely spoken than they had supposed.

MR. PRETTYMAN, of the Methodist Episcopal mission in Bulgaria, says: "Our work of circulating the Scriptures goes nobly on; for several weeks the sales averaged one hundred and twenty-five volumes a week. Efforts are made to repress it, but the Lord causes 'the wrath of man to praise him.'" "Twenty days ago, one of our colporters made a large sale of Testaments, in a village belonging to a small and insignificant diocese. The Archbishop sent orders to a Greek priest, residing in the village, to collect these books and destroy them. After considerable hesitation, the priest went from house to house, demanded the books, and cut to pieces all that were given to him.

Nearly half the people, among them a Bulgarian priest, refused to give up their Testaments."

THE GREEK CHURCH.—The *Independent* gives an interesting digest of recent events, illustrating the inner development of the Greek Church in Turkey. The National Council of Reforms convoked in 1858, and consisting of the most prominent laymen of the Church, has continued its deliberations on the reorganization of the ecclesiastical constitutions and the abolition of several abuses. The vigorous support given to it by the Turkish Government, and the sympathy of the Patriarch of Constantinople, has enabled it to carry through some of its projects. A passionate resistance was made by those Metropolitans who are members of the Holy Synod, and who have long been accustomed to neglect the administration of their own dioceses, and to take up their permanent abode in Constantinople. When the lay representatives of the Council of Reform resolved to abolish the taxes heretofore levied by the higher Greek clergy on the laity, and to assign to the Bishops fixed salaries, they entered a solemn protest, contesting the authority of the Council to make any change in the old customs of the Church. In order to overcome their resistance, the Turkish Minister of the Interior, Fuad Pasha, ordered them to leave Constantinople, and to take their residence in accordance with the canons of the Church, in their own dioceses. This order was represented by the discontented prelates as a grave encroachment of the Mohammedan Government upon the domain of a Christian Church; a second protest was issued by them, and communicated to the Holy Synods of St. Petersburg and Athens. In the latter place the political press endeavored to make capital out of it against Turkey, but its reception in St. Petersburg is said to have been much cooler. In Constantinople the National Council approved the steps taken by the Government, and prepared a refutation

of the statements of the Metropolitans through the *Byzantia*, the official organ of the Patriarchate. The Council has since continued its labors, and, among other resolutions, assigned to the Patriarch of Constantinople a fixed salary of six hundred thousand piasters. It is generally believed that the higher Greek clergy cannot possibly retain henceforth its unlimited and oppressive power, and will have to share it to a greater extent than before with the representatives of the laity. On the other hand, however, it can hardly be doubted, that the present transformation of the constitution of the Greek Church will make it more prominently a State Church, and extend the influence of the Sublime Porte upon its government. The order of a Mohammedan minister who calls on a Christian bishop to comply with the canons of his Church, is a novel phase in the history of State-churchism, and will be a dangerous precedent in case the Mohammedan rule in Turkey last longer than is expected. In the Danubian Principalities the ecclesiastical connection with Constantinople is constantly losing ground. The Bulgarians have again sent petitions, covered with more than six thousand signatures, to the Government, to obtain the appointment of a native Patriarch and native Bishops, instead of the Greek prelates, heretofore appointed by the Patriarch of Constantinople.

NEW REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE ELECTION OF THE PATRIARCH OF CONSTANTINOPLE.—The *Univers* of Dec. 7th, publishes a regulation promulgated by the Greek National Assembly, on the first of the ecclesiastical reforms on which it has to occupy itself, the mode of electing a new Patriarch of Constantinople. The following are the most important points of this regulation: When the Patriarchal see becomes vacant, the Holy Synod, in union with the Metropolitans residing at Constantinople, will elect a Vicar, through whom it convokes the College of Electors, for the

forty-first day. All the Metropolitans belonging to the Patriarchate, and the members of the Holy Synod, have the right to nominate one candidate for the vacant see. The lay members of the College of Electors may add other names to these nominees, if one third of the Metropolitans who are members of the Assembly approve of their choice. After all the nominations have thus been made, the College of Electors chooses three candidates by plurality, among whom the "Holy Prelates" will elect one as Patriarch. In case of a tie vote, the vote of the Vicar will decide the question. No one is eligible who has not before administered for seven years, a diocese, in an irreproachable manner. The College of Electors consists of the following members: The Holy Synod and the Metropolitans who have ecclesiastical functions at Constantinople, three prominent laymen, who are officers of the Patriarchate, the members of the permanent Council, three laymen belonging to the first or second class of the civil officers of Turkey, two military men who are at least colonels, and three other state officers; the Governor of Samos, or his representative; the three representatives of the Danubian provinces; four distinguished literary men; five merchants; one banker; ten members of the first corporations; two representatives of the parishes of the city, and one of the Bosphorus; twenty-eight representatives of other large cities and monasteries.

MESOPOTAMIA.—In the field of the "Assyrian Mission" of the American Board, popular violence, and the inefficiency and corruption of the civil authorities, occasion much suffering and hinder the progress of evangelical truth. This is especially the case at Mardin, the ecclesiastical capital of the Syrian Church, and also the stronghold of Rome, which is newly occupied as a station. Mr. Knapp finds encouragement in the new and hard field of Bitlis. The progress at Diarbekir, continues to be very

marked; but at Mosul it is less decided. Amadiyah, in the Bootan, is to be occupied, with special reference to the Mountain Nestorians, and as a health retreat from Mosul. Mr. Marsh says: "The great enemy of evangelical truth in our entire field is the Papacy. Other influences are either unorganized or decrepit. Moslem intolerance is chiefly formidable only as excited and wielded against the right by Jesuitical craft; the Jacobite church is in its dotage; the Nestorian church has no vital growth. These venerable organizations linger like decaying oaks; Popery is a living fire running through the dead branches. Protestantism, coming with its open Bible and witnessing spirit, is a new germ springing from the living root of David, which the fire may check, but can never kill. Papal fire cannot live in its green branches."

JAPAN.

THE Japanese Embassy Extraordinary to the United States is to embark on board the Powhatan, on the 22d of February. Mr. Consul-General Alcock has made arrangements, at Hakodadi—a small town, with few public buildings—for the establishment of the Consulship there under Mr. C. P. Hodgson. The currency question has, at last, been satisfactorily arranged, and Itzebues are to be exchanged for Mexicans, at the rate of 311 for 100. Increasing confidence exists between foreigners and the Japanese Government. The Government, however, has endeavored to confine foreigners to Yokohama, an extemporized village two miles from Kanagawa, in the bay of Yedo, instead of allowing them residence at the latter place. The American Consul resists this attempt. Mr. Brown and Dr. Simmons, of the mission from the Reformed Dutch Church in this country, have visited Kanagawa to make arrangements for a residence for their company of missionaries. Dr. Hepburn, of the American Pres-

byterian Board, (Old School,) was there residing with his family in a Buddhist Temple. Mr. Verback, of the Dutch Church Mission, was to spend the winter at Nagasaki. Rev. Mr. Goble and wife, accompanied by a native Japanese, Samuel Sentharo, have sailed from New-York, to commence a mission in Japan, from the American Baptist Free Mission Society.

CHINA.

THE most interesting intelligence from China is that of the visit of the American Commissioner, Mr. Ward, and his suite, to Peking, and the ratification of the American Treaty. Rev. Mr. Aitchison, a missionary of the American Board at Shanghai, who accompanied the Legation as an interpreter, died on his return to the coast. It is rumored that the Chinese have sought Mr. Ward's mediation with the British and French powers.

Numerous conversions are said to have taken place among the British soldiers at Canton. A few native Chinese have just been baptized there. From Amoy, Fuh-chau, Ningpo, and Shanghai, come tidings also of spiritual fruits of evangelistic labor.

AN official census taken in China twice during the present century, at an interval of forty years, gives the following result: The first, taken in 1812, by order of the Emperor Kai-King, gave the number of inhabitants at 360,278,597! and the second, in 1852, under the reign and orders of the present Emperor, Hien Fung, 536,090,300. If these accounts be correct, (and there is nothing to lead to the supposition that they are not,) the Chinese population has in forty years increased 176,629,703.

SIR JOHN BOWRING, in a recent lecture in Edinburgh on China, said, in respect to the geographical extent of that vast Empire, "that the eighteen provinces of China proper ex-

tend in breadth nearly thirteen hundred miles, and in length nearly fourteen hundred; and if the dependent and tributary regions were taken into account, the distance from east to west exceeds forty-eight hundred miles, and from north to south, twenty-three hundred." He gives the population as 412,000,000.

The *Foreign Missionary* for January announces the retirement, for the present, of the missionaries of the Presbyterian Board from Hang-chow, as follows: "It was a question only to be answered by experience, whether missionaries would be permitted to live and labor at Hang-chow. This is a city in the interior, at which foreigners have never been permitted to reside. Its great population, probably 1,500,000, its relations to surrounding districts, and other considerations, have made our missionary friends anxious to form a station there; and measures, well devised and well executed, were apparently attended with success, and the Gospel was about to be preached by American as well as native laborers to the multitudes of its inhabitants, when the outbreak between the Chinese and the Europeans at the Peiho occurred. This deplorable event at once endangered the position of our brethren at Hang-chow, and for the present, has resulted in the withdrawal of Mr. and Mrs. Nevius from that city. They are not without hope of being able to return, or, at any rate, to make visits there in the work of evangelization, and the native brethren were still at their work unmolested." Mr. Rankin, of the Presbyterian Board, writes respecting Ningpo: "There are several applicants for baptism, and by the next mail I hope to report four of our girls and one of our servants baptized, and perhaps others." The printing-press at Ningpo, has been doing a good work, under Mr. Gamble's efficient superintendence. He says, under date of August 31st: "We are working now at night, so as to get

the Testament finished, and each press is throwing off three thousand sheets a day."

INDIAN ARCHIPELAGO

A SINGULAR display of the power of Divine grace among a heathen people, has recently taken place in the island of Celebes. Several missionaries of the Netherlands Missionary Society have labored there for some years, with but little apparent success. One of these missionaries, however, now describes a remarkable religious movement. A native preacher was passing through a village on Saturday, to his preaching appointment on the Sabbath, when he saw a priest who had been bitterly opposed to the Gospel and the missionaries, with a large crowd about him. Trembling with fear, he inquired what they wanted, when he was told greatly to his surprise, that he and the people had resolved to renounce idolatry and become Christians.

The movement spread from village to village, the people casting away their idols, and seeking instruction from the missionaries. The people say that they had come to the knowledge of the truth chiefly by the instruction their children had received in the mission-schools. The missionary mentions three districts, containing at the beginning of the year not less than 10,000 heathen, and adds: "But to all appearance, and with the help of God, by the end of the year there will be not one left there."

SOUTH PACIFIC OCEAN.

THE Rotumah mission is a branch of the mission on the Feejee Islands, and is sustained by English Wesleyan Methodists. The following tidings are from a Wesleyan missionary, temporarily removed from his field on the Feejee Islands. "The Rotuman mission, which I visited on my way to Sydney, illustrates the value of native agency. As the result of this labor, there are now upwards of two hundred church-members, and twelve

hundred attendants on public worship. The native teachers have had to combat with the ancient heathenism of the country, and have been opposed by clergymen of the Church of Rome; but the preaching of the pure Gospel has gained the victory.

This solitary island may yet become a nucleus for missionary operations. Already Christianity has been introduced by a Rotuman into a group of islands about two hundred and fifty miles to the north-north-east. At one of these islands, (Nukufitau,) about three hundred people collected their gods, in consequence of what they heard from their visitor, and committed the idols to the flames! It was agreed that the converts should keep holy the Sabbath, and send a deputation to Rotumah to await the John Wesley. On my arrival the deputation waited on me, and I deeply regretted my inability to respond to this urgent call for spiritual instruction."

THERE are now five missionary ships in the Pacific Ocean, the Morning Star, owned by the American Board, the John Wesley, the John Knox, the Southern Cross, and the John Williams. The last is the oldest and largest, having been in service nearly fifteen years. It sails to England every three or four years, with the children and wives of missionaries, and the contributions to the cause of missions from the natives of the South Seas; and returns with passengers, supplies of Bibles and other books, and material for printing purposes. On her special missionary work she averages more than 20,000 miles annually, among more than forty islands, with a population of about 110,000, cheerfully affording aid to all who labor to diffuse the Gospel.

AFRICA.

THE Jews in Morocco are said to be in great distress, placed as they are between the attacking Spaniards on one side, and Moors on the other. Hundreds of Jewish families have fled

from Tangiers, regardless of their destitution, and heedless where they shall find shelter for their houseless wives and starving children. Three thousand five hundred of these careworn beings have arrived at Gibraltar, where they are suffering every privation. The English Jews, at the head of whom is Sir Moses Montefiore, have commenced a subscription for their relief, and appeal to the American Jews for aid.

SPECIAL religious interest is reported from Cape Palmas. The Methodist paper of Liberia announces a "recent outpouring of the Holy Spirit, felt in all the churches of the community," and says that "the peculiar features of the work indicate that it is only the commencement of a great blessing, which our Heavenly Father designs for Africa." Twenty-three converts had been baptized in the Baptist church on a late Sabbath, fourteen received into the Methodist church, and seven into the Protestant Episcopal.

A MISSIONARY of the American Presbyterian Board, at Corisco, gives the following cheering picture of things on that island:

"Our missionary work was never more interesting than at present. Yesterday, after Sabbath-school, I met a class of inquirers numbering seventeen. At our quarterly communion service, the first Sabbath of the present month, our church was so crowded that we could scarcely get seats enough for all, when the passages were filled with benches carried in. The people have advanced much in civilization since the establishment of our mission. Every one who visits the island, who had any previous knowledge of this people, is struck with this; but the present interest in religious things is far more cheering to us than their mere advancement in civilization. We rejoice to see among our young men a desire to do something for the great cause in which we are engaged.

They are not only willing to labor, but to make sacrifices for the cause of Christ. Three or more are pursuing their studies with the hope of ultimately entering the ministry.

ABYSSINIA.

THERE are now laboring in Abyssinia eight missionaries, chiefly from the Mission-school of St. Crischora, near Basle, and under the direction of Bishop Gobat, of Jerusalem. To make communication with them more direct, it is proposed to establish 12 mission-stations between Jerusalem and Gondar, to be named after the 12 Apostles, "The Apostolic highway from Jerusalem to Gondar." An English lady has offered £100 for each of the stations. Five gentlemen at Basle and elsewhere, compose the committee that have this project in charge. This mission to Abyssinia was begun about four years since by Gobat, who then sent four of the brethren. They were well received by King Theodorus, and have ever since enjoyed his favor. They have been active in distributing the Amharic Bible. A short time since the king gave each of them \$150. The king is now aiming to introduce the Amharic as the ecclesiastical language. The brethren also report success among the Jews in Abyssinia, there called Felashas.

SOUTH-AFRICA.

A LETTER has been received by the American Geographical and Statistical Society from Dr. Livingstone, containing an account of his explorations to a date several weeks later than the latest detailed information that has reached England. Dr. Livingstone has been engaged in surveying the Shire, a branch of the Zambezi, and had found the river flowing, for more than a hundred miles, through a cotton-growing region. The quality of the plant was so good that Dr. Livingstone did not offer the natives any of the American seed,

with which he was furnished by the British Government. The health of the expedition had been unusually good, and not a single death had yet occurred. The letter is full of interesting details.

THE Episcopal Church is making strenuous efforts to extend itself all over the Colony, and beyond it. Churches and schools have been established in almost every town and village, however small may be the number of Episcopalians; and new accessions of clergymen and schoolmasters from Great Britain are continually making their appearance. Those selected by Bishop Gray, for the western province, are of the high-church party, and those selected by Bishop Cotteril, for the eastern provinces and Caffraria, of the low-church.

A LETTER from Cape Town states that the Reformed Dutch Church in that colony has lately made an important movement in the establishment of a Theological Seminary, and the appointment of two of its most talented and pious ministers as professors. Suitable premises have been provided at Stellenbosch, about thirty miles from Cape Town, and subscriptions have already been raised to the amount of £15,000 or £16,000.

MR. ALDEN GROUT mentions a general meeting, at his station, of the members of churches connected with the Zulu mission, to commemorate the arrival of the first missionaries. About two hundred were present from abroad. "On the Sabbath which they spent here," he says, "we had an audience of five hundred and fifty, but only four hundred and twelve of them could get into the chapel." Respecting the communion service in the afternoon, he writes: "I could not count the communicants, neither did I feel a disposition

to do so. It filled my heart to look at them and speak to them. How quickly did my mind run back to 1835, when all those before me were wild, ignorant, debased heathen. Now behold a large collection of them sitting at the table of their Lord—joint heirs with him—members of his body! I could not but think, as I looked around upon them, that our mission had really done a good work—a great work." Again he remarks: "Another thing interested me. They had several sittings at which they discussed the question of the personal consecration of themselves to God as missionaries—ministers: and as to how some of their own number, thus given to the ministry, could be supported. Three of those present arose and expressed a willingness to leave all and follow Christ in this work; and we were told that one who was absent was willing to do the same."

MADAGASCAR.

REV. MR. ELLIS, Secretary of the London Missionary Society, reports some alleviation of the sufferings of the Christians, and invites united prayer in their behalf.

PILGRIMAGE TO MECCA.—A recent publication of the Ministry of Algeria and the Colonies makes some curious statements relating to the pilgrimages to Mecca during the present year. The ceremonies at Mecca terminated on the 11th of last month, in the presence of about 50,000 pilgrims; of whom 17,850 had come by sea, and 32,150 by land. In 1858 there were 160,000 pilgrims; in 1857, 140,000; and in 1856, 120,000. This great decrease in the number in 1859 is owing, the natives say, to the events of Djeddah last year, and also to the dread of the cholera, which made extensive ravages in 1858.